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Abstract. 
In this thesis I present and defend an account of empathy and then use this 
account to evaluate the epistemic and moral worth of empathy. I understand 
empathy as the activity of recreating in one’s imagination another’s 
experience, a recreation which does not necessarily imply an isomorphism 
between the states of empathiser and target. I understand empathy as a tool 
which one can become skilled at using. 
I then go on to argue that empathy so construed has epistemic value. I argue 
that recreating in one’s imagination certain aspects of another’s experience 
allows one to learn about other, unknown, aspects of the other’s experience. 
Then I argue that empathy also has epistemic value for learning about 
evaluative features of objects; it is like testimony without the middle man. 
I am also concerned with the moral value of empathy. I argue that empathy is 
a morally neutral tool that can be used to moral advantage. I present and 
assess the existent criticisms of empathy’s moral worth, as well as put forward 
a criticism of my own. Apart from discussing criticisms, I also make a positive 
case by arguing that empathy has moral value in three ways: it allows us to 
make better informed decisions, it increases our motivation to bring about the 
good to others, and it brings about a valuable kind of togetherness. 
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Introduction. 
The purpose of this thesis is to argue that empathy has both epistemic and 
moral value. 
Empathy has been the subject of much attention from philosophers over the 
past couple of decades. The predominant focus of discussions of empathy has 
been in two areas: about the way we make sense of other minds (also known 
as ‘mindreading’) and about morality. 
My aim in this thesis is to argue that empathy has both epistemic as well as 
moral value. Definitions of empathy vary considerably but what I am in 
particular interested in, and what I understand empathy to be, is the activity 
of recreating in one’s imagination the experience of another. The purpose of 
this thesis is to investigate the value of this activity. The thesis is motivated by 
the simple question of whether and to what extent it is desirable for one to 
empathise with others. Given that empathy is something I, as an individual, 
could engage in, is there any worth in doing so on any particular occasion, and 
in doing so on a regular basis? 
Part of what I take to be distinctive about the present work is that it puts 
much emphasis on empathy’s epistemic worth. By contrast, most of the 
present discussion of empathy focuses on its moral value. The fact that there 
has not been more discussion targeting specifically empathy’s epistemic value 
I find a little puzzling, given how plausible it is (as I hope to demonstrate) to 
suppose that it is precisely empathy’s epistemic value which grounds some of 
its much more discussed moral value: one of the things often pointed out 
about empathy is that empathy aids us in making moral decisions since it 
allows us to understand how these decisions are going to affect others. I think 
that empathy’s epistemic role is significant, and I aim to assess it in Chapter 3. 
Another way in which I take my discussion of empathy to be distinctive, is 
that I am interested in whether there are any prudential reasons for empathy 
to be encouraged. A lot of the existing discussion that aims to show that 
12 
 
empathy is desirable focuses almost exclusively on empathy’s altruistic side – 
the claim has been that empathy should be encouraged because it tends to 
result in good for people other than the empathiser themselves. I do speak 
about empathy’s altruistic side. However, I am also interested in the question 
of whether empathy is desirable for the individual who empathises. What 
reasons do I have, as an individual, to empathise with others? Part of these 
reasons would come from my desire to bring about the good for others; but 
not all would. Independently of whether I want to be moral or not, 
empathising would yield epistemic goods and is therefore something I have 
reason to do. Also, as I attempt to show in Chapter 5, empathy brings about a 
valuable kind of togetherness between two people that I, as empathiser, might 
want to bring about independently of my concern for the well-being of others. 
All this suggests that empathy could aid us in being moral, only if we had 
independent motivation to want to be such. But there is a twist. I argue, in 
Chapter 5, that when I engage in empathising with you, that activity in itself 
makes me more likely to care for your well-being than if I had not empathised. 
Thus, even though I think that empathy is a morally neutral activity, and no 
panacea for our moral problems, I argue that, all other things being equal, it 
does tend to make us care about others that little bit more. 
This thesis ultimately argues that empathy should be encouraged because it 
has both epistemic and moral value. Individuals have reasons to empathise 
with others - and not just moral reasons, but also prudential reasons. It is 
therefore desirable to cultivate empathy: to learn to empathise regularly and 
to become good at doing so. 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. 
In Chapter 1, I set the background for the discussion. I argue that there are 
some desiderata that the account of empathy I will develop should satisfy. In 
particular, the account should see empathy as an experience, since I am 
interested in empathy as an activity undertaken by the individual, and also the 
account should not include a veridical condition. 
13 
 
In Chapter 2, I put forward an account of empathy. I am interested in the 
activity of recreating in one’s imagination the experience of another. I provide 
an account of how this exercise of experiential imagination works. I think of 
empathy as a tool, which one can become skilled at using, and I also discuss 
what being skilled at empathy implies. It is in this chapter as well that I also 
distinguish empathy from sympathy and from emotional contagion. 
In Chapter 3, I argue that empathy has epistemic value. I provide a model of 
how empathy brings about epistemic goods, and what sort of goods these are. 
I argue that empathy provides us with three kinds of epistemic goods: 
understanding of others, understanding of evaluative properties of objects, 
and an understanding of oneself. 
In Chapter 4, I discuss many of the criticisms that empathy has received, as 
well as an additional, original criticism of my own. None of these criticisms 
aims to show that empathy is undesirable and should have no role to play in 
our lives. Rather, they aim to show either that empathy should not be 
overused, or that it should have no role at all in particular contexts. My aim in 
this chapter is to assess these claims and as such I am not always arguing 
against the general claims the criticisms make. Still, I argue that in most cases, 
the criticisms levelled at empathy have been too harsh and have not properly 
acknowledged the very real possibility of putting empathy to a better use than 
what the criticism suggests. My conclusion from this discussion is that 
whereas empathy, as any other tool, has its own limitations, these do not 
render it worrisome enough to conclude that empathy should not be 
encouraged. On the contrary, I argue that a cultivated form of empathy is not 
going to be subject to as severe limitations as the criticisms suggest. 
In Chapter 5, I argue that empathy has moral value. I point out that empathy’s 
epistemic value creates moral value because the epistemic goods empathy 
provide allow us to make choices of moral worth. I then try to show that, all 
other things being equal, empathy tends to motivate us to bring about the 
well-being of others. Finally, I argue that empathy can bring about a special, 
valuable kind of togetherness between individuals. 
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1. Review of Empathy Research. 
 
This thesis is about empathy which is understood as the activity of re-creating 
in one’s imagination the experience of another person. The purpose of this 
thesis is to examine the epistemic and moral value of this activity. 
In the second chapter I will provide an account of what empathy is. Before I do 
that, in this chapter I will provide an overview of some existing philosophical 
work on empathy. Empathy is a complex phenomenon and the accounts that 
have been given of it have been many and varied. 
In what follows, I will first discuss the history of the term ‘empathy’ and will 
point to some historical interest in the phenomenon. Then I will provide a quick 
review of what current research on empathy is focused on, and I will draw 
attention to a specific kind of account of empathy, namely, what I will call 
‘experiential’ accounts. I will argue that adopting an experiential account would 
be best suited for the purposes of the present thesis, before going on to provide 
such an account in Chapter 2. 
 
1.1. Historical interest in empathy. 
Currently empathy is a topic of interest to philosophers both with regards to 
questions in moral philosophy, as well as the question of how we understand 
other minds.1 In this section I will provide an overview of some of what has been 
said about empathy before the current debates were initiated. 
It might seem reasonable to suppose that philosophical interest in empathy is 
ancient. For many people2 perhaps the first thing that comes to mind when 
thinking about imagining what it is like to be another, is what is often referred 
to as the ‘Golden Rule’ of morality – ‘Do to others what you would have them 
                                                 
1  Stueber, 2018. 
2  Present author included. 
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do to you’. The Golden Rule is ancient, if anything is, with first known mention 
of it being found in the Story of Ahiqar, a story dating from at least 5th century 
BCE, about Ahiqar who served under the Assyrian king Sennacherib (705–681 
BCE).3 Mentions of the Rule are found in other ancient traditions as well, 
including Confucian, Buddhist, and Judaic traditions, among others, as well as 
early testimonials of European culture.4 Those are some of the most ancient 
preserved references to the Rule, and it is likely that the Rule was much older 
than that given it has an intuitive appeal, an ‘elementarity’ both in the sense of 
simplicity as well as fundamentality, which could also explain how it is that 
various thinkers from different civilizations have formulated it in almost 
identical ways.5 
Given all this, one would be forgiven to think that among philosophers 
discussion of the Golden Rule has been abundant, and therefore also discussion 
of empathy, since the Golden Rule seems to presuppose a kind of imaginary 
exchange of place with the other person.6 However, just as the current tradition 
of moral philosophy seems to have ‘barely taken notice’7 of the Rule, so empathy 
has not dominated the recent philosophical scene as an object of analysis itself 
until the last few decades. 
Still, over the past decades interest in empathy has been quite big in 
philosophical, scientific, political, and lay discourse8, with the word ‘empathy’ 
becoming something of a buzzword, appearing in popular press, political 
campaigns, studies on autism, neuroscience, ethics, art, and others.9 
                                                 
3  Guseinov, 2013, p.40. 
4  For a historical review see Guseinov, 2013. 
5  Guseinov, 2013. 
6  More specifically, it seems that in order to apply the Golden Rule one has to imagine oneself 
in the other’s situation, and treat them accordingly – this is in order to know what it is that 
‘you would have them do to you’. Of course a more ‘passive’ application of the Golden Rule is 
also possible – one where one merely knows how one would like to be treated in a similar 
situation. Even though in this second way of applying the rule it seems that one does not 
specifically need to imagine what the other person is undergoing, the intuition that motivate 
the rule, it seems to me, is a kind of realisation that the other’s experience is just like one’s 
own and that the other person could have been oneself. 
7  Singer, 1963; Puka, 2018. 
8  Coplan and Goldie, 2011. 
9  Coplan, 2011, p.3. 
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Its recent popularity notwithstanding, it does not seem that empathy had 
received similar levels of attention before. In the next two sections I will look at 
the history of the word ‘empathy’ first, and then at historical interest in the 
phenomenon of empathy from before the current debate. 
 
1.1.1. History of the word ‘empathy’. 
If one is to check the scholarship on the activity of imagining what it is like to 
be another, one is not going to get very far back in time if one’s strategy is to 
search for the word ‘empathy’. The word ‘empathy’ itself is quite new, and even 
in its short life-span, it did not always denote what it does now. 
The word ‘empathy’ was introduced into English as an adaptation of the 
German term Einfühlung (from ein "in" + Fühlung "feeling") in the writings of 
Lipps. Lipps in turn adopted the concept of Einfühlung from the writings of 
Vischer10 who in his 1873 essay ‘On the Optical Sense of Form’ contributed to a 
then raging debate in German Aesthetics. The question that Vischer gives an 
answer to in this essay is how it is possible that we come to be emotionally 
affected by pure form (such as a geometric shape) which does not have any 
‘content’. Vischer’s answer is that content is something the observer cannot 
help but to infuse the form with: ‘We have the wonderful ability to project and 
incorporate our own physical form into an objective form’.11 According to 
Vischer, the ‘in-feeling’ [Einfühlung] is reached when we project ourselves to 
the interior of the observed phenomenon: ‘Thus I project my own life into the 
lifeless form, just as I quite justifiably do with another living form. Only 
ostensibly do I keep my own identity although the object remains distinct’.12 
The empathic ability Vischer calls a ‘strange knack of confusing our own feeling 
with that of nature’13 as for example when looking at the curves and undulations 
                                                 
10  Wispé, 1986. 
11  Vischer, 1994. P. 104. 
12  Vischer, 1994. P. 104. 
13  Vischer, 1994. P. 107. 
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in a road, the road suddenly ‘seems to hesitate and run impatiently along its 
course’.14 
Vischer’s Einfühlung was adopted and expanded by Lipps, and from Lipps’ 
writings it was translated as ‘empathy’ into English, a translation for which 
usually Titchener is credited15 although it has recently been brought up that the 
word ‘empathy’ was also introduced by Ward.16 What is according to Gustav the 
first mention of the word was in a book by Titchener on experimental 
psychology17: 
Not only do I see gravity and modesty and pride and courtesy and 
stateliness, but I feel or act them in the mind’s muscles. This is, I 
suppose, a simple case of empathy, if we may coin that term as a 
rendering of Einfühlung; there is nothing curious or idiosyncratic about 
it; but it is a fact that must be mentioned.18 
Titchener recognised that the concept can be useful not only in the description 
of the aesthetic encounter between an observer and a work of art, but in the 
context of a psychological encounter too. For example, Titchener used 
‘empathy’ to denote the action where one projects oneself into the mental states 
of others19, since just as one can project oneself into works of art or objects of 
aesthetic contemplation, one can similarly project oneself into other people.20 
Since the English translation of Einfühlung as ‘empathy’ the word has come to 
live a life of its own, no longer restricted to the domain of aesthetics. According 
to Matravers the word largely disappears from philosophical discussion until 
the 1980s21 when it came to populate the debates about how we come to know 
the contents of another’s mind and about the role of empathy in morality. 
                                                 
14  Vischer, 1994. P. 107. 
15  Jahoda Gustav, 2005. 
16  Lanzoni, 2017. 
17  Jahoda Gustav, 2005. 
18  Titchener, 1973, pp.21–22. 
19  Carroll, 2011. 
20  Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004. 
21  Matravers, 2017b. 
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1.1.2. Some interest in empathy before 20th century. 
The short life of the word ‘empathy’ notwithstanding, one might reasonably 
expect that the activity of imagining what it is like to be another has been itself 
the object of analysis of philosophers even before it was called ‘empathy’. 
For example, it has become common to note that in 17th century the word 
‘sympathy’ was sometimes used to refer to something similar to what empathy 
refers to today, and sympathy has notably been the object of attention of moral 
sentimentalists like David Hume and Adam Smith. But there are important 
differences between empathy and 17th century sympathy. 
One less commonly observed difference is that in seventeenth-century Europe 
sympathy carried its own metaphysical burden: it was believed that various 
parts of the world are connected to one another via some mysterious power, an 
occult force. For example, it was widely held that what happens in one place 
can affect what happens in another via ‘sympathetic’ magic and that in the 
Universe there is a ‘hidden affinity’ that draws things together resulting in a 
‘universal sympathy’ of all things.22 Even if the middle decades of the 
seventeenth century witnessed a general rethinking of the vital powers in 
nature including a shift toward the natural interpretations of the ‘sympathetic’ 
or ‘friendly’ powers of nature still ‘sympathy’ carried its metaphysical 
connotations23 which left a trace in the German Idealist tradition, and in 
nineteenth-century Aesthetics. According to the Romantic tradition if I see, for 
example, a willow tree and experience it as sad, this is because there really is 
some sense in which the experience of the willow tree is sad: ‘my aesthetic 
feeling not only is objective but is referentially the same feeling that exists in 
the object. The feeling is literally shared’.24 This understanding was eventually 
                                                 
22  For example at the start of the seventeenth century and continuing for several decades, 
there was a big debate centred on the medical phenomenon ‘the power of sympathy’ - a 
phenomenon in which putting powder on an object stained with blood from a wound (such as 
the sword having caused the wound) would help heal the wound; for more details see Mercer. 
23  Mercer, 2015. 
24  Depew, 2005, p.103. 
20 
 
challenged by the ‘expressivist turn’ in aesthetics according to which forms – 
e.g., the shape of the willow tree – are merely an expression of content that is 
not inherent in them – there is nothing ‘really’ sad about the experience of the 
willow tree.25 
Vischer in 1873 introduced the notion of Einfühlung precisely in order to explain 
how it is that we perceive content in forms (how can I perceive the willow tree 
as sad) since it was no longer tenable to hold that there is any sense in which 
there ‘really’ is sadness in the tree. Vischer’s solution to this question is 
emotional projection: the observer projects their own emotions on the form.26 
Thus, the original notion of empathy was related to the expressive account in 
aesthetics, according to which ‘we press out our feelings onto external objects’ 
rather than external objects ‘pressing their feelings into us’.27 The notion of 
empathy arrived on the scene in order to explain a phenomenon – our 
emotional affectivity by works of art – which sympathy with its too heavy a 
metaphysical burden could no longer do.  
Today the word ‘sympathy’ no longer carries any metaphysical connotations of 
this kind. ‘Sympathy’ denotes a third-personal response and if any word out 
there can be used to denote my feeling of what another person feels, it would 
be ‘empathy’ rather than ‘sympathy’. I will have more to say on the distinction 
between empathy and sympathy below, in Section 2.2.1 but Depew summarizes 
the point well: 
Curiously enough, then, empathy’s current work closely resembles the 
work that sympathy was supposed to do in the heyday of romantic 
idealism, but no longer does. Empathy is to bind us together … in ways 
that Einfühlung originally was intended to dowse in a little cold water.28 
                                                 
25  Depew, 2005. 
26  Harrison et al., 1998. 
27  Depew, 2005, p.104. 
28  Depew, 2005, p.105. 
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Thus, the metaphysical connotations of ‘sympathy’ are one important reason 
why we cannot just say that ‘sympathy’ used to mean what ‘empathy’ does 
today. 
Another reason in support of this point it is to observe that ‘sympathy’ was a 
word broader in scope than ‘empathy’. It used to refer to a few different 
phenomena, and not just to the activity of imagining another’s experience. For 
example both Hume and Smith, in their discussions of sympathy, seem to have 
used the same word to denote what in this thesis will be distinguished as three 
separate things: empathy, sympathy, and emotional contagion (I will discuss 
the distinction between the three phenomena in Section 2.2). And they might 
have meant more things still; for example, Hume in his Treatise understands 
sympathy as ‘a principle of communication that is fundamental to human 
nature’29 – a process which is fast and automatic: 
No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its 
consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathise with others, 
and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, 
however different from, or even contrary to our own.30 
In the Inquiry, Hume argued that imagining oneself into another’s place would 
tend to evoke the same feelings in oneself as in the other person because of the 
similarity between people.31 But he did not understand sympathy itself as being 
the imagining oneself into another’s place; for Hume sympathy was an 
automatic awareness of others’ emotions. By contrast, Smith thought of 
sympathy as a more involved process, involving the imagination32: 
Whatever is the passion which arises from any object in the person 
principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought 
of his situation, in the breast of every attentive spectator.33 (italics mine) 
                                                 
29  Coplan and Goldie, 2011. 
30  Hume, 2012. 
31  Hoffman, 2011. 
32  Coplan and Goldie, 2011. 
33  Smith, 2002. 
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In other words Smith saw sympathy as a more engaged activity. For Smith 
coming to experience others’ emotions involved imaginative perspective-
taking34: 
By the imagination we place ourselves in the other’s situation, we 
conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, enter, as it were, into 
his body, and become in some measure the same person with him and 
thence form some idea of the sensations and even feel something which, 
though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them.35 
This comes much closer to the account of empathy which will be developed in 
this thesis. Smith considered ‘changing places in fancy with the sufferer’ to be 
the source of ‘our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever’.36 
1.1.3. Historical overview: a conclusion. 
In conclusion, whereas empathy has been of some interest to philosophers 
before that, it is only in the second half of last century that philosophers start 
to get more directly interested in the question of whether there is any moral 
worth in imagining what it is like to be another. In the next section I will provide 
a brief overview of some of the more recent scholarship on the topic. 
 
1.2. Current interest in empathy. 
Above I introduced some of the historical interest in empathy. In this section I 
will provide an outline of what accounts of empathy have been given in the 
recent literature. 
There is little agreement in the literature about what empathy is and many 
different accounts of empathy have been proposed.37 The accounts differ along 
various dimensions: on whether empathy is voluntary or automatic; on whether 
it essentially involves the emotions, or not; on whether it is a psychological, or 
                                                 
34  Coplan and Goldie, 2011. 
35  Smith, 2002. 
36  Smith, 2002. 
37  Goldman, 2011, p.31; Cuff et al., 2016; Smith, 2017. 
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an epistemic phenomenon; on whether it essentially involves concern, care, or 
other pro-social attitude, or not; on whether it is a process, or a state38; whether 
it is a specific phenomenon, or an umbrella term for several different 
phenomena39; and others. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I am interested in the role and significance, 
benefits and drawbacks, of empathising in an individual’s life. I am hence 
focused on a more agential perspective on the process of empathising. 
Therefore it makes sense to think of empathy as a lived experience. In the lived 
life, our criterion about whether something counts as empathy is at the 
experiential, felt, and thought level. I am interested in that phenomenon which 
one is able to access upon honest introspection, and which is at least to a large 
degree within one’s control. Therefore what I will be primarily interested in 
here is the experience of empathy more so than, say, the particular sub-personal 
mechanisms responsible for this experience. I will understand empathy as a 
specific kind of activity that an individual can undertake, and what makes 
something count as empathy will be primarily the kind of thing the individual 
does (e.g. imagine what it is like to be someone else) as opposed to, for example, 
the kind of sub-personal psychological mechanisms that are involved in the 
process (e.g. the triggering of mirror neurons). In this sense, I adopt an account 
of empathy that sees it as an epistemic, rather than a psychological, 
phenomenon.40 
 
                                                 
38  Most accounts see empathy as a process; for a state view see  Smith, 2017. 
39  For example, Preston and de Waal describe empathising as a process, which makes 
empathy ‘a superordinate category that includes all subclasses of phenomena that share the 
same mechanism. This includes emotional contagion, sympathy, cognitive empathy, helping 
behaviour, and so on’.  Preston and de Waal, 2002. 
40  I borrow this distinction from Smith: ‘[empathy] is fundamentally an epistemological, not a 
psychological, phenomenon. That is, empathy cannot be identified with any one 
psychological state or process, but is more accurately described in epistemic terms, terms that 
themselves leave it as an open question which psychological states and processes might, in 
any given case, be recruited into empathy’s service’.  Smith, 2015. 
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1.2.1. Experiential accounts of empathy. 
Many accounts of empathy do not see it primarily as a lived experience. These 
accounts are speaking about something different from that which will be the 
main concern of this thesis. Examples include accounts in which empathy is 
identified not with the activity of empathising, but instead with a drive, an 
ability, a tendency, or a capacity. Often empathy is seen in this way in social 
psychology research, where it is supposed to capture certain characteristics of 
subjects. Examples of such definitions of empathy include: ‘the tendency to 
vicariously experience other individuals’ emotional states’41, ‘the capacity to 
understand and enter into another person’s feelings and emotions or to 
experience something from the other person's point of view’42, ‘the ability to 
experience and understand what others feel’43, ‘the ability to perceive another 
person’s point-of-view, experience the emotions of another and behave 
compassionately’44, and many others. None of these accounts defines empathy 
as a lived experience, however, features of what the corresponding lived 
experience is like are apparent from the definitions: the lived experience seems 
to be about vicariously experiencing the emotions of others, entering into their 
point of view, and understanding them.45 
As stated above, I will be providing a particular kind of account of empathy, one 
which is primarily interested in empathy as a lived experience. I will refer to 
this kind of account as ‘experiential’: what makes an account of empathy 
experiential is that it focuses mostly on the lived, experiential side of empathy. 
Examples of accounts in the literature that unambiguously fall within the 
experiential domain are seeing empathy as ‘a sense of similarity between the 
feelings one experiences and those expressed by others’46 or as ‘the experience 
                                                 
41  Albiero et al., 2009. 
42  Colman, 2015. 
43  Decety and Lamm, 2006. 
44  Geer et al., 2000. 
45  Here I assume that there is something that it is experientially like to understand another 
person; the person who reaches an understanding of another can be aware of having reached 
this understanding, in the sense that there is a certain experience associated with things 
‘clicking into place’ as it were. 
46  Decety and Jackson, 2004. 
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of sympathetic emotions and concern for another person in distress’.47 Other 
accounts which can arguably be categorised as experiential are: ‘the attempt by 
one self-aware self to comprehend unjudgmentally the positive and negative 
experiences of another self’48; ‘the act of perceiving, understanding, 
experiencing, and responding to the emotional state and ideas of another 
person’49; some of the standard dictionary definitions of empathy, such as ‘the 
psychological identification with or vicarious experiencing of the feelings, 
thoughts, or attitudes of another’50; the folk understanding of empathy as 
putting oneself in another’s shoes; and also a recent account by Walton to 
which I will return below: ‘using some aspect of one’s current mental state as a 
sample to understand another person, in the way I have described, i.e., judging 
or experiencing the target person to be feeling “like this”’.51 
The distinction between experiential and non-experiential accounts, cannot be 
always, or even often, neatly drawn. I will not be aiming to provide a precise 
delineation between various accounts, nor to provide precise necessary and 
sufficient conditions which will make it possible to draw a line between the 
existing accounts of empathy. Rather, I aim to point attention to a loose cluster 
of accounts which see empathy primarily as a kind of activity or experience 
which an agent undergoes, in contrast to some other accounts, like the ones 
mentioned at the start of this section, which see empathy as a tendency, or a 
neural mechanism, or something else. 
Many accounts are in this broad sense experiential – they see empathy primarily 
as a lived experience. Yet many of these accounts also stipulate that empathy 
only takes place if certain conditions external to one’s experience are satisfied. 
Take for example Deonna’s account. Deonna argues that two conditions are 
necessary and sufficient for empathy: (1) awareness of the other’s emotions, and 
(2) feeling ‘in tune’ with the other.52 These two conditions seem to clearly place 
                                                 
47  Pavey et al., 2012. 
48  Wispé, 1986. 
49  Barker, 2003. 
50  As found in Dictionary.com, www.dictionary.com, accessed 18 September 2017. 
51  Walton, 2015, pp.9–10. 
52  Deonna, 2007. 
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Deonna’s account in the experiential cluster. Still, there is one important thing 
to note: what Deonna means by the second condition is not merely that one 
feels in tune with another, but that one actually is in tune with them, in the 
sense that if one merely feels in tune with another, but actually that other 
person has different feelings from what one has guessed them to have, then 
empathy has not taken place. This is an instance of an often encountered 
veridical condition in empathy accounts, which I will discuss shortly in section 
1.3. For now the point to take is that on Deonna’s account there is a certain 
condition (the condition of one’s actually being in tune with another) that 
needs to be satisfied for empathy to take place, and this condition is such that, 
whether or not it is satisfied is a fact that the empathiser cannot themselves 
access through their own experience. I will shorten this by saying that on 
Deonna’s account there is a condition on empathy ‘external to one’s 
experience’.53 
The same holds for many accounts of empathy: empathy seems to be 
understood as a lived experience, yet empathy only takes place if certain 
conditions external to one’s experience are satisfied. This is not necessarily 
incoherent. Compare with the following example: let us say I want to provide 
an account of seeing red. If I want an experiential account of seeing red, I will 
say that this is like seeing a ruby, a rose, or a ripe tomato; I will not bring any 
external to experience conditions into the picture. But if I do not insist on my 
theory being restricted only to one’s experience of seeing red, I might as well 
say that seeing red also means that certain colour receptors in the retina are 
active. If there is good reason to think that these colour receptors are always 
active when seeing a ruby, a rose, or a ripe tomato, then there is no necessarily 
internal inconsistency in providing the following account: seeing red is when I 
have experience similar to that of seeing a ruby, a rose, and a tomato, and when 
the corresponding colour receptors are active. Of course the second theory 
                                                 
53  I use the phrase ‘external to one’s experience’ to denote a thing which one cannot 
determine by oneself alone. It might be possible for me to ask you to describe how you feel 
and thus determine if I am really ‘in tune’ with you but I have no direct access to your 
experience (I cannot be aware of it in the same way in which I can be aware of the fact that I 
feel in tune with you). 
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seems like it will be more involved, complex, and harder to defend than the first 
theory, because apart from claiming the things about the experience of seeing 
red that the first theory claims, it has the added burden of producing evidence 
in favour of colour receptors and how the activation of colour receptors 
corresponds with the experience of seeing red. Still, this by itself is not a point 
against the second theory; it just means that this theory is more ambitious and 
harder to defend. 
It is the same with empathy: I might provide an account of empathy that sees 
empathy as a lived experience; yet I might also want to put in somewhere in the 
definition of empathy a condition about a particular psychological mechanism 
that I believe is active during empathy. This would not mean that I want to 
identify empathy with the psychological mechanism itself; I might still identify 
empathy with the lived experience, and in this sense my account would still be 
an experiential one. It would just be an account that is more complex in the 
sense of it making more claims that are in need of a robust defence as compared 
to an account that does not add that extra condition on empathy. 
 
1.2.2. Purely experiential accounts. 
The account that I will provide will not involve any external to experience 
conditions on empathy. This I do simply for the reason that my main focus is 
the empathic experience as opposed to anything else. In this sense if I am able 
to speak about empathy without putting an external to experience condition on 
what counts as empathy and what does not, it would make most sense for me 
to do that. I will call the kind of account I provide – one which does not involve 
external to experience conditions on empathy – a ‘purely experiential’ account. 
Let me emphasise that I do not consider it to be the case that a purely 
experiential account is in general preferable to a (non-purely) experiential 
account. Depending on the sort of purpose that one’s account serves, one might 
be better off incorporating an external to experience condition on empathy. For 
example, if one is interested in the question of how we make sense of other 
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minds, and if one thinks it plausible that we do this partly on a sub-personal 
level, one might as well speak of empathy as involving a kind of (low-level) 
simulation. However, I do take issue with a certain kind of non-purely 
experiential account. I will explain this now. 
 
1.2.3. The issue with some non-purely experiential accounts. 
I take it that a certain kind of non-purely experiential account encounters a 
difficulty which I will present now. In particular I take issue with experiential 
accounts of empathy according to which it is possible for there to be two 
scenarios where I experience exactly the same thing in both of them, and yet 
only one of them counts as empathy, and the other does not. 
Let me explain. Let us have two scenarios, A and B, in both of which I am 
imagining what it is like to be you. Let us further say that A and B are 
experientially indistinguishable for the person who imagines what it is like to 
be another: in both A and B I will be having the exact same experience. Yet, 
since the account of empathy is a non-purely experiential one, in order for 
empathy to take place, there will be a certain condition C external to my 
experience, which will have to be satisfied. Let us say that C is satisfied in 
scenario A but not in scenario B. Therefore, on this account of empathy, in 
scenario A empathy will have happened, and in B it will not have happened. Yet 
both A and B will be indistinguishable from my perspective. 
To make this set-up more concrete, let us fill it in with an example of a non-
purely experiential account. Let’s take Goldman’s account as an example: 
according to this account the external to experience condition C is that there is 
an interpersonal mental isomorphism between the states of empathiser and 
target.54 In other words, in order for empathy to take place my mental states 
have to match onto yours. Filling the setup above with Goldman’s account 
would mean that in A I would imagine what it is like to be you, and more 
                                                 
54 Alvin Goldman, ‘Two Routes to Empathy’, in Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological 
Perspectives, ed. by Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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specifically, I would imagine X, and I would achieve a state of mind isomorphic 
to yours. And in B I would imagine what it is like to be you, and more 
specifically, I would imagine X, however, I would not reach a state of mind 
isomorphic to yours because, say, unknown to me, you are actually 
experiencing something different from what I thought you were experiencing. 
According to Goldman’s account I have empathised with you in A, but not in B. 
But the two scenarios are indistinguishable from my perspective since in both 
cases I have imagined X. 
Therefore, it seems that there is a difference between two kinds of accounts of 
empathy: accounts according to which there is empathy in both cases A and B, 
and accounts according to which there is empathy in A only, but not in B. Purely 
experiential accounts would fall within the former category, since according to 
them the internal to experience factor is of sole importance in deciding whether 
in a particular instance empathy has occurred or not. Some non-purely 
experiential accounts would fall within the latter category – those according to 
which there is a certain external to experience condition C that is satisfied in 
case A but not in B. 
Not all non-purely experiential accounts would fall within the latter category. 
All non-purely experiential accounts have a certain external to experience 
condition C that needs to be satisfied in order for empathy to take place. 
However not all non-purely experiential accounts would hold that scenarios A 
and B are both possible; maybe scenario B is not a possibility on such an 
account. If on a particular non-purely experiential account it is not actually 
possible to have the two scenarios A, and B, above, then the theoretically 
inelegant conclusion (that on such an account it is possible to have two 
experientially indistinguishable scenarios in only one of which empathy occurs) 
would not follow. For example, if we consider an account where the external to 
experience condition C is a condition about the triggering of particular patterns 
of brain activity, then on such an account it might be incoherent to hold that 
scenario B is a physical possibility since according to this account it is not 
possible to have empathy without this particular brain activation pattern. If B 
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is not a possibility, then it would not be the case that on this account it is 
possible to have two experientially indistinguishable scenarios in only one of 
which empathy occurs. I take no issue with non-purely experiential accounts of 
this sort – namely, accounts where one of the scenarios is not possible in the 
first place. 
However, for those accounts according to which both scenarios A and B are a 
possibility, I consider there to be an issue. I consider it theoretically inelegant 
to choose to refer to a kind of experience as ‘empathy’ only if certain external to 
my experience conditions have been satisfied. If it is a possibility to have the 
experience occurring without this condition being satisfied, then the moment 
I adopt such a condition I cease to be interested primarily in the experience as 
such and choose to refer to as ‘empathy’ something which is a combination of 
experience and something occurring independently from that experience; i.e. I 
choose to refer to as ‘empathy’ something which cannot be a natural kind. 
Therefore I take any non-purely experiential account which accommodates for 
the possibility of two experientially indistinguishable situations only one of 
which would count as empathy to be a theoretically inelegant one and hence 
problematic. In this thesis I will be interested in developing an account of 
empathy that does not suffer from this weakness. I will choose to stay loyal to 
my decision to investigate the experience of empathy, and hence I will develop 
a purely experiential account of empathy. 
Below, in Chapter 2 I will develop my own account of empathy. Before I proceed 
to doing this, in the following section 1.3 I will discuss one important external 
to experience condition that is common to many accounts of empathy. 
Adopting such a condition would make an account of empathy non-purely 
experiential and inelegant in the way discussed here. However, due to how 
common this condition is, I will dedicate special attention to it. The discussion 
above will be instrumental to showing one weakness of accounts of empathy 
that involve this condition. I will argue against this condition at length in the 
following section. 
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1.2.4. Conclusion. 
In this section I articulated the kind of account of empathy that this thesis will 
provide. This will be an account that sees empathy primarily as a particular kind 
of experience. I showed that many non-purely experiential accounts are 
theoretically inelegant since on these accounts it is possible to have two 
experientially indistinguishable scenarios in only one of which empathy occurs. 
In contrast, according to the kind of account I will be developing – what I called 
a ‘purely experiential’ account - one is always able, based solely upon one’s 
honest introspection, to determine whether one is on a particular occasion 
empathising with someone, or not. 
 
1.3. Why empathy does not involve a veridical condition. 
Above I argued that I will be interested in developing a particular, ‘experiential’ 
kind of account of empathy – one which is interested in empathy primarily as a 
lived experience. I also argued that a certain subset of these accounts – some of 
the ‘non-purely experiential’ accounts of empathy which involve external to 
experience conditions on empathy – suffer from a theoretical inelegance which 
I find undesirable and do not want to have in my account. This I take as a 
justification for my own choice to develop a ‘purely experiential’ account of 
empathy – one which does not involve external to experience conditions on 
empathy and so does not risk inheriting this theoretical inelegance. 
Most of the existing accounts of empathy are not purely experiential, as they 
involve some condition, external to experience, on empathy. In particular, 
many of them involve one or another kind of a veridical condition on empathy. 
I will explain what this condition is below in section 1.3.1. Then, in section 1.3.2 
I will present my reason to resist adopting such a veridical condition in my 
account. Adopting such a condition would make my account theoretically 
inelegant in the way discussed above in section 1.2.3 and also, using an analogy 
with reading a book which I borrow from Baker, I will argue that it would be 
incoherent to put a veridical condition on the kind of phenomenon I am willing 
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to capture. However, since the prevalence of the veridical condition in existing 
experiential accounts of empathy is so large, in section 1.3.3 I will suggest two 
possible reasons why a veridical condition might be desirable, and will conclude 
that neither of the two reasons is sufficiently pressing to conclude that an 
account that does not feature such a condition is lacking in fundamental ways. 
Finally, I will seek to make my case stronger by presenting in section 1.3.4 three 
merits that an account of empathy automatically inherits by virtue of not 
adopting a veridical condition. 
 
1.3.1. What is a veridical condition? 
A common feature of the majority of accounts of empathy is that they have built 
in a veridical condition. To hold that empathy involves a veridical condition is 
to hold that if the veridical condition is not met, then no empathy has taken 
place; the veridical condition is in this sense a necessary condition on empathy. 
I use the phrase ‘veridical condition’ as an umbrella term to refer to any of 
several conditions found in empathy accounts, such as: empathy involving 
imagining what another person is actually experiencing; empathy involving a 
match between the affective states of the empathiser and target; empathy 
involving understanding accurately what another person is undergoing, and 
others. According to a veridical condition empathy only takes place in case of 
an actual correspondence between the state of the (supposed) empathiser and 
that of the target. Sometimes this correspondence is fleshed out as one between 
my representation of your mental states, and your real states; sometimes it is 
about me reaching an accurate understanding of what it is like to be you; 
sometimes it is about my affective states being similar to your affective states – 
this is the affective matching condition which is prevalent among recent 
accounts of empathy.55 
A prime example of a veridical condition is the requirement that one person be 
in a state (e.g., a state of mind or an affective state) which is isomorphic to the 
                                                 
55  Baker, 2016. 
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state of another person. This is the ‘minimal sense of empathy’ account 
provided by Goldman who, following Vignemont & Singer’s definition56, takes 
empathic states to be affective states which are isomorphic to another’s 
affective state and which are elicited by the observation or imagining of that 
other’s affective state.57 In Goldman’s account a decisive criterion for whether 
something is an instance of empathy is whether there actually is some form of 
isomorphism in the mental states of empathiser and target; empathy is 
achieved if and only if this isomorphism has been brought about. 
 
1.3.2. The prime reason to not adopt a veridical condition. 
I will not adopt a veridical condition in my account because I am interested in 
empathy as an epistemic phenomenon. 
I already argued above (section 1.2.3) that there is something theoretically 
inelegant about accounts of empathy that are: (1) identifying empathy with 
something that can be experienced, while at the same time (2) willing to say 
that empathy has happened in only one of two experientially indistinguishable 
possible scenarios, and (3) believing these two scenarios to be both possible to 
happen. 
Adopting a veridical condition would make an experiential (satisfying 
condition (1) above) account of empathy fall within this unsatisfactory category 
of accounts. Having a veridical condition built into them is exactly my issue 
with many otherwise perfectly and even admirably neat accounts of empathy. 
Take for example Walton: he suggests that we ‘count as instances of empathy 
cases in which a person experiences a target as feeling “like this” or is under the 
impression that she does’ (italics in the original) and immediately qualifies this 
statement by saying that the empathy is ‘merely apparent’, ‘if the supposed 
                                                 
56  de Vignemont and Singer, 2006. According to Vignemont & Singer ‘There is empathy if: (i) 
one is in an affective state; (ii) this state is isomorphic to another person’s affective state; (iii) 
this state is elicited by the observation or imagination of another person’s affective state; (iv) 
one knows that the other person is the source of one’s own affective state.’ 
57  Goldman, 2011. 
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empathiser’s impression is mistaken’.58 I do take issue with this last move; if 
empathy is centrally about the experience or impression of the (supposed) 
empathiser, it makes little sense to suggest that empathy has failed just because 
the (supposed) empathiser happens to be wrong about the state of the target. 
To reiterate, in reality it is perfectly possible that one have two cases which are 
experientially indistinguishable from the perspective of the (supposed) 
empathiser: one case which brings about true understanding of the target, and 
another case which does not. It makes little sense, if one is interested centrally 
in the experiential side of empathy, to say that empathy is real in one case and 
merely apparent in the other. 
Baker has recently made a similar point by using an analogy with reading a 
book.59 If I read a book by a reputable author that happens to have false claims 
in it, I will not have gained knowledge. However, this would not mean that I 
have failed to read the book.60 Similarly, if I empathise with you and end up 
failing to understand your actual state, this would not mean that I have failed 
to empathise. In this sense empathy is analogous to reading; it is merely an 
epistemic method. If I fail to get an accurate understanding out of empathising, 
this is not going to make the empathy merely apparent any more than my 
failure to gain knowledge from reading a book makes my reading of the book 
merely apparent. 
In this sense I take it that when thinking of empathy as an experience, it makes 
most sense to consider empathy to have failed to take place not when the beliefs 
it produces have failed to be accurate, but rather when something essential to 
the experience of empathising has failed to take place. 
 
                                                 
58  Walton, 2015, p.9. 
59  Baker is here discussing affective matching, but what he says applies just as well to the 
slightly broader category of a veridical condition. 
60  Baker, 2016, p.17. 
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1.3.3. Why a veridical condition might be nevertheless desirable? 
I hope that the above discussion has provided a strong enough justification for 
not adopting a veridical condition in the presently developed account of 
empathy. However, the veridical condition has been so prevalent among 
experiential accounts of empathy, that one might reasonably wonder if the 
adopting of such a condition does not bring its own explanatory advantages 
that would make adding such a condition to the present account valuable 
despite what was already said. Even Baker who is, to the best of my knowledge, 
the only person who has explicitly produced an argument against a kind of 
veridical condition (namely, affective matching) seems later in the same writing 
to endorse a kind of affective matching.61 
Therefore, I consider it important to give the veridical condition a go and see 
whether there are certain desirable features which it might bring with itself in 
an empathy account. The accounts which I am familiar with and which endorse 
a veridical condition have not produced any arguments in justification of 
endorsing such a condition62; this condition is usually merely stated or assumed 
without being made explicit. Therefore I thought of any possible reasons why a 
veridical condition in an empathy account might be indeed desirable, and came 
up with two reasons which I will present now. 
 
1.3.3.1. In defence of a veridical condition 1: empathy’s value. 
One might believe that a veridical condition captures something essential 
about the way we think of empathy’s value. One of the main reasons we tend 
to consider empathy valuable, one might argue, is its epistemological role in 
helping us understand other people’s experiences. If empathy did not involve 
the veridical condition, then it would not necessarily involve actually 
understanding other people’s experiences. It would be at best no more than a 
                                                 
61  Baker, 2016, p.45. suggests that affective matching is a necessary part of empathy and that it 
is ‘one of several proto-empathies; that is, imaginative projects which need to be undertaken 
in order to provide sufficient grounding for an empathic ascription.’ I find the necessity claim 
to be at odds with his earlier argument against affective matching. 
62  E.g.:  Feagin, 1988; Deonna, 2007; Walton, 2015; Smith, 2017. 
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curious exercise of the imagination. But if so, then empathy could not be 
possibly seen as intrinsically valuable. It would at most be seen as 
instrumentally valuable. And if we normally understand empathy as 
intrinsically valuable, then this seems problematic. 
I would deny that empathy would not be valuable if it did not necessarily imply 
veridically imagining another’s experience. For one thing, the fact that empathy 
does not necessarily involve understanding other people’s actual experiences 
does not preclude the possibility that it is going to result in this understanding 
often enough. In the following chapter I will develop an account of empathy 
that does not involve a veridical condition, and in the later chapters of this 
thesis I will be arguing that this empathy is valuable in various ways, both 
morally and epistemically. Hence I will ultimately be in a position to deny the 
claim that since empathy does not necessarily involve producing an accurate 
understanding of other people’s experiences therefore empathy is not valuable. 
If this means that empathy’s value is instrumental rather than intrinsic, I am 
happy to accept this claim. I cannot think of any argument as to why empathy 
should have an intrinsic as opposed to an instrumental value in this sense, 
except for the claim that this is how we usually speak about empathy. However, 
I do not think that this particular point about labels is significant enough to 
trump the considerations for not adopting a veridical condition already spelled 
out in section 1.3.2. 
 
1.3.3.2. In defence of a veridical condition 2: awkward use of term. 
Another argument in favour of a veridical condition of empathy is to hold that 
our usual usage of the word ‘empathy’ is incompatible with a non-veridical 
account of empathy. This is a point about labels; the claim is that in reality we 
use the term ‘empathy’ to pick out cases that are different from the ones that 
will be picked out if we accepted an account of empathy which did not involve 
a veridical condition. In particular, the non-veridical account of empathy will 
refer to as ‘empathy’ cases in which I completely fail to accurately represent 
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your actual experience and it does seem plausible that we would not want to 
refer to these cases as ‘empathy’. 
The objection can be put in a slightly more formal way like this: 
P1: There are cases which do not count as empathy on veridical condition 
accounts, but do count as empathy on accounts that do not involve a 
veridical condition. 
P2: In quotidian discourse the term ‘empathy’ does not refer to these 
cases. 
P3: A satisfactory account of empathy should respect quotidian 
discourse. 
C: Therefore, an account of empathy that does not involve a veridical 
condition is an unsatisfactory one. 
The first premise is true and cannot be argued against, as the following example 
shows. I am trying to imagine what it is like to be you. I arrive at a certain idea 
in my mind about what it is like to be you; e.g. I come to believe that you are 
upset about a certain matter. This however is wrong – you are not, in fact, upset 
about that matter – in fact, you have not noticed the matter at all. I have put in 
effort and tried really hard to imagine what it is like to be you, and I am 
convinced that I have empathised with you. According to a purely experiential 
account of empathy (which is a kind of account of empathy that does not 
involve a veridical condition) I have, in fact, empathised with you. According 
to a veridical condition account of empathy, however, I could not have possibly 
empathised with you on this occasion since what I have ended up believing 
about you is wrong. Therefore premise P1 is true. 
The only way to deny the conclusion of the valid argument presented above is 
by denying either P2 or P3. Denying the second premise P2 would involve 
arguing that scenarios like the example above can actually be classified as 
empathy according to the common usage of the term ‘empathy’. This does not 
seem a promising strategy. 
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The best strategy is to deny P3. This amounts to a reply that consists in pointing 
out that this objection is all about labels. Perhaps it is true that many of us, 
when we think of empathy, think about this thing which implies veridically 
imagining another’s experiences. In this case maybe I can just bite the bullet 
and instead call what I am interested in with a different name, e.g. ‘empathic 
attitude’ or ‘empathic experience’. What I will be interested in is not necessarily 
‘empathy’ as standardly understood, but rather the experience of empathising. 
This thesis will be arguing that there is a certain value in the experience of 
empathising, even if these experiences do not lead us to an accurate picture of 
another’s experience. 
This reply should not be seen as too problematic. After all, there is no obligation 
for a philosophical account to follow the lay usage of words and examples 
abound where a term’s meaning in colloquial speech differs from one in 
philosophical usage. The fact that a definition of a word in a philosophical 
account does not fully cohere with the colloquial usage of that word is not 
necessarily a weakness of the account. In philosophy discourse words are very 
rigidly defined and this is not the case in common parlance, where one and the 
same word is often used to mean slightly different things. So if one tries to 
capture in a single term (e.g. ‘empathy*’) all the phenomena that are meant by 
all and any applications of a given word (‘empathy’) in everyday speech that 
might not even be possible, and in any case it is probably not desirable. 
Therefore providing an account of empathy which does not exactly correspond 
to the quotidian discourse is not necessarily problematic. 
Further, I think it needs pointing out that labelling of what someone might 
prefer to call ‘empathic attitude’ as ‘empathy’ is not necessarily leading to all 
that different a use of language. On the one hand, most cases where empathy 
has happened according to a veridical condition account of empathy, empathy 
according to a purely experiential account would also have happened. If I 
imagine what it is like to be you, and figure out, correctly, that you are not 
actually upset about that thing about which it seemed initially you are upset 
about, I would have empathised, according to a veridical condition account of 
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empathy. I would also have empathised, according to a purely experiential 
account of empathy, because I have actually imagined what it is like to be you. 
On the other hand, in many cases where empathy has happened according to a 
purely experiential account of empathy, empathy according to a veridical 
condition account would also have happened. If I imagine what it is like to be 
you, I have a high chance of figuring out what this actually is like. This is 
because the imagining I am interested in, and calling ‘empathy’ in this thesis, is 
not some whimsical picturing of another’s situation, but rather a wilful effort 
to understand what another is experiencing. The success rate of such imagining 
would not be so low as to make my use of the word ‘empathy’ completely out 
of place. 
 
1.3.3.3. Conclusion. 
In this section I presented two possible reasons to think that introducing a 
veridical condition in an account of empathy might be a desirable thing. One is 
that it would make empathy intrinsically, as opposed to instrumentally 
valuable, and the other is that it would be closer to lay usage of the word 
‘empathy’. However, I argued that neither of these two points presents a 
sufficiently strong case in favour of overriding the reasoning for not adopting a 
veridical condition spelled out above in section 1.3.2. 
 
1.3.4. Some virtues of a non-veridical-condition account of empathy. 
Above I argued that a veridical condition is not a necessary feature of a 
satisfactory account of empathy. In this section I will point to three features 
that any non-veridical-condition account of empathy has, which might be 
desirable in their own right. These features will be inherited by my own account 
of empathy which I will develop below. 
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1.3.4.1. Empathy with fictional characters. 
I will argue that an account of empathy that does not involve a veridical 
condition makes it less puzzling as to how we empathise with fictional 
characters. 
I would argue that if empathy involves a veridical condition, empathy with 
fictional characters becomes less straightforward to account for. Since in this 
case we can only be said to empathise with someone if we understand what they 
actually experience, and since it is not obvious what the equivalent of a fictional 
character’s ‘actual’ experience is (in the case of a real person there is a real fact 
of the matter as to what the person is experiencing, but one might argue that it 
is not clear what the equivalent to this would be in the fictional case) we would 
need a special way to account for our ability to empathise with fictions. 
This problem is by no means a knock-down argument against empathy 
accounts that include a veridical condition; there are at least a couple of ways 
in which someone who considers empathy to involve a veridical condition can 
reply to this. 
One line of reply is to argue that we do not in fact empathise with fictional 
characters. Indeed, there is no consensus on the question of what the relation 
is between a person engaging with fiction (e.g. a reader of a novel) and the 
fictional characters.63 One might hold that empathy for fictions might be 
explained away by a kind of error theory, and that the common view that we 
empathise with characters of fiction is wrong. For example Carroll has argued 
that empathy is not central to our engagement with fictions and that we do not 
typically empathise with fictional characters.64 
Still, even Carroll would not deny that we do sometimes empathise with 
fictional characters. He concedes that we do sometimes empathise with fictions 
when he discusses that sometimes in our engagement with fictions we simulate 
the states of characters.65 It seems to me that to deny that empathy with 
                                                 
63  Coplan, 2004. 
64  Carroll, 1998. 
65  Carroll, 1998. 
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fictional characters ever occurs is a very strong claim, and I am not aware of a 
convincing argument to that effect. On the contrary it seems that we do at least 
sometimes empathise with fictions; we sometimes imagine what it is like to be 
a certain character in a fiction. This is also evidenced from artists’ first-person 
accounts66 as well as from cognitive science research.67 Further, one might hold 
that there is little reason to suggest that we use a different cognitive capacity to 
deal with fictions from the one we use to deal with our own lives.68 All this 
seems to suggest that the weight of the argument lies with the side holding that 
we do not empathise with fictions, as opposed to it lying with the side holding 
that we do. 
A better line of response is to argue that there is a fact of the matter as to what 
a fictional character is actually experiencing: these are states the characters 
fictionally have. The protagonist in the story is afraid; even if there is no real 
person who is afraid, there might be a real fact of the matter as to what, 
fictionally, is the case. Empathising with the protagonist would then involve 
matching one’s imagined states with the states that the protagonist fictionally 
has. For example, we are happy to say that readers who are not careful miss, 
and that other characters in the same fiction might be misguided about what a 
character is actually experiencing. In this sense then a veridical condition does 
not seem difficult to apply to fictions as well; we empathise with characters in 
fiction only if what we imagine matches what they are fictionally experiencing. 
The second response is probably neater, but in any case there is no shortage of 
ways in which someone who holds empathy to involve a veridical condition can 
account for our empathising with fictions. My point in bringing up the issue of 
empathising with fictions was to draw attention to one relative merit of any 
account of empathy that does not involve a veridical condition. The merit here 
consists simply in these accounts being able to more neatly accommodate the 
fiction case. The fiction case on these accounts would not be in any way 
problematic to begin with, and no special attention will need to be given in 
                                                 
66  Smith, 2011. 
67  Coplan, 2004. 
68  Lopes holds this view. Lopes, 2003. 
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order to explain how we come to empathise with fictional characters. I consider 
this relative simplicity to be a merit of non-veridical condition accounts of 
empathy. 
 
1.3.4.2. Empathy with objects. 
Another potential virtue of an account of empathy that does not involve a 
veridical condition is that it would make it possible to account for empathy with 
objects. This would not be straightforward on an account of empathy that 
involves a veridical condition; on such an account in order to empathise with 
my notebook, say, I have to be able to experience in my imagination what my 
notebook really experiences, but this does not seem obviously like something 
that even makes sense. By contrast, if there is no veridical condition involved, 
this difficulty does not necessarily arise. 
But is there any reason to think that we might want to speak about empathy 
with objects in the first place at all? I think that there is, since the notion of 
empathy with objects would make it possible to accommodate for cases like the 
following. A child loves a teddy bear and treats the teddy bear as if it were really 
alive. If something happens to the teddy bear, e.g., its hand is torn, the child 
cries. Presumably, the cry is not only for the fact that a favourite object has been 
ruined. At least part of the cry is feeling sad for the teddy bear itself, for its 
losing its arm. 
Presumably the child does not really believe that the teddy bear itself actually 
feels bad about its arm being torn. Still, my point is that there is no reason to 
suppose that what the child experiences is qualitatively different from what the 
child would experience at witnessing say another child being in pain. The 
child’s sadness at witnessing the teddy bear’s plight is spontaneous and real – 
even if not coupled with the belief that the bear is actually undergoing pain – 
but the sadness is there as if it was the bear’s sadness itself that made the child 
sad. If a child reacts to the plight of a teddy bear much in the same way in which 
the child would react to the plight of a fellow human, and if we are happy to say 
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that empathy was involved in the latter, it would not seem like a stretch to say 
that empathy was involved in the former as well. 
One might think that the case of empathy with objects reduces to the fiction 
case which I already discussed above. Perhaps each time I empathise with an 
object, what happens is that I empathise with a fiction of this object. Perhaps it 
is possible to think of empathy with objects in this way; certainly it seems 
plausible to think of it in the teddy bear example above, since favourite toys can 
be seen as similar to characters in fiction. However, I would argue that empathy 
with objects can happen spontaneously, even with objects we had never 
encountered before. If I come to my office and see that someone has brought 
in a book, a book that seems in a serious way mistreated – with dog-ears, torn 
pages, writings all over – I could feel bad in a way in which I experience this 
badness on behalf of the book. It seems like it will be a burden of theory if it 
wants to accommodate this case by saying that I empathise with a fiction; a 
make-believe world in which the book has a certain experience; an experience 
which is make-believedly of a certain kind, e.g. a negative experience. It seems 
far neater to be able to directly say that I just empathised with the book – I 
imagined what it is like to be the book with torn pages, without worrying about 
whether there is such a thing as to what a book really experiences, or worrying 
about treating the book like the fiction case. 
In this sense even if an account of empathy that involves a veridical condition 
can accommodate empathy with objects by treating it just like empathy with 
fiction, an account of empathy that does not involve a veridical condition just 
seems to make accounting for empathy with objects a bit easier. 
 
1.3.4.3. Empathy with difficult cases. 
Another virtue of not incorporating a veridical condition into an account of 
empathy is related to an observation Ratcliffe makes that sometimes empathy 
happens in cases when one is not actually able to well imagine what another is 
experiencing. Ratcliffe, a practicing clinician, argues that sometimes sufficient 
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for empathy is a kind of acknowledgement that one cannot well imagine what 
the other is undergoing. He points out that sometimes there are enormous 
differences between the ways two people experience the world – differences 
that are so big as to be unbridgeable, meaning that if I try to imagine what it is 
like to be you I will fail. In such cases, Ratcliffe holds, it is still possible for me 
to empathise with you – what is needed, is for me to acknowledge the existence 
of these differences. 
Ratcliffe uses the example of trying to imagine what the world is like for 
someone with depression69 and argues that there is something in the 
experience of the one suffering from depression that is radically different from 
the experience of those who do not suffer. For example, the depressed person 
feels 'cut off' from the world and other people in it, the metaphor of being put 
under a glass jar being one frequently used to describe the experience. Also 
approaching other people does not seem like a real possibility for the one 
suffering from depression. Further, something common to many depression 
experiences is that people with depression feel that their experience ‘cannot be 
successfully conveyed to others’ and that ‘other people are unable to 
understand the experience or just do not care’ – this is what Ratcliffe calls the 
‘indescribability complaint’.70 Ratcliffe’s proposal is that this complaint is due 
to a ‘broad kind of phenomenological change’71 common to many cases of 
diagnosis. This change consists in ‘alteration of an aspect of experience that is 
seldom reflected upon or discussed’72 because it is an aspect of experience ‘that 
is so pervasive and deeply engrained that it is seldom noticed and even more 
rarely discussed’.73 For example, I might have never doubted the fact that other 
people are, in general, things I can approach and talk to; but in order to imagine 
what it is like to be a particular person who suffers from chronic depression I 
might need to imagine that the possibility of approaching other people to talk 
                                                 
69  Ratcliffe, 2014. Ratcliffe informs us: ‘The label “depression” encompasses a range of 
diagnoses, but the kinds of experience I will address are all consistent with diagnosis of a 
major depressive episode or major depressive disorder.’ P.271. 
70  Ratcliffe, 2014, p.271. 
71  Ratcliffe, 2014, p.271. 
72  Ratcliffe, 2014, p.271. 
73  Ratcliffe, 2014, p.272. 
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is somehow closed to me. Some of us, even if explicitly instructed to do so, will 
still struggle to imagine what it is like to experience people in this way, just 
because it is so different from the way we are used to experiencing them.  
If we want to go with Ratcliffe and label as ‘empathy’ these cases where a 
veridical imagining of your experience has not occurred, then it would seem 
that not adopting a veridical condition in an account of empathy would make 
this easier. Let’s say I am imagining what it is that I think you are experiencing, 
but I figure out that there is something radically different in the way you 
experience the world, a kind of experience which I cannot accurately imagine. 
Just because I have engaged in the activity of imagining, even if I was ultimately 
not able to produce a good picture of what your experience actually is like, I 
will still be said to have empathised with you. This example I hope shows that 
a non-veridical condition account of empathy is not so far from our lay usage 
of the term ‘empathy’ intuitions as it might initially seem. 
Of course a veridical condition account of empathy can arguably accommodate 
this case by pointing out that my realisation that there is something radically 
different in the way you experience the world is itself sufficient to satisfy the 
veridical condition. The defender of a veridical condition account can say that 
in this case I have empathised because I have been able to realise that your 
experience is actually very different from mine, so different that it is hard for 
me to imagine what it is exactly. However, I would argue that the veridical 
condition can survive this example only in a very weakened form. If what is 
sufficient for the veridical condition to be satisfied is for me to have a true 
representation of just one feature of your experience and a feature which is 
quite vague – namely, the realisation that a certain aspect of your experience is 
radically different from mine – this would mean that the veridical condition 
would be a very weak one. However, such a weak condition is not the sort of 
condition that most accounts of empathy which have built in a veridical 
condition have in mind. As noted earlier, a veridical condition is about more 
than just successful tracking of one broad feature of your experience; rather it 
is about a kind of matching, or an isomorphism, between your states and mine. 
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This, stronger version of the condition is what I mean to attack in this section; 
and this stronger version of the condition would not survive the example about 
radical phenomenological differences that was just discussed. By contrast, an 
account of empathy that does not involve such a condition has a far easier time 
accommodating these cases. 
 
1.3.4.4. Conclusion. 
In this section I considered some virtues of a non-veridical condition account 
of empathy. I hope to have done two things: 1) show that adopting such an 
account might be a desirable thing; and 2) point to some characteristics of a 
non-veridical condition account of empathy, which by extension will also be 
features of the experiential account of empathy (since this will be a non-
veridical condition one) that I will develop in Chapter 2. 
 
1.4. Conclusion. 
I started this chapter by introducing some of the historical interest in empathy. 
Then I provided an outline of some of the recent accounts of empathy, and 
pointed to the kind of account I will develop in this thesis – what I called an 
‘experiential’ account of empathy. 
Then I described a feature common to many existing accounts of empathy – the 
veridical condition. I argued that there is a reason to not adopt a veridical 
condition in the account of empathy which I will be developing in this thesis. 
Borrowing an analogy from Baker, I argued that since I am interested in 
empathy as a lived experience and as a particular kind of activity, to say that 
empathy without veridical condition is not empathy would be analogous to 
saying that reading a book full of false claims is not reading. 
Nevertheless, since the veridical condition is so prevalent among empathy 
accounts, I considered some benefits of introducing this condition, but 
concluded that these benefits are not important enough to override the 
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consideration about theoretical inelegance presented above. Finally, I argued 
that not introducing a veridical condition in an account of empathy leads to 
three benefits of its own – making it easier to account for empathy with fictional 
characters and with objects, and also making it easier to account for our 
willingness to say that empathy occurs even in cases where it does not result in 
the empathiser forming a good picture of what the other is undergoing. With 
this I hope to have justified my decision to not introduce a veridical condition 
in the experiential account of empathy I will now proceed to develop in Chapter 
2.  
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2. An Account of Empathy. 
In the first chapter I introduced some of the philosophical interest in empathy 
and I argued in favour of adopting an account of empathy that does not involve 
a veridical condition. In this chapter I will provide an account of empathy. The 
chapter is structured as follows. First I define empathy as the activity of re-
creating another’s experience in one’s imagination and then I examine some of 
the features of this activity. Then I carefully distinguish between empathy and 
two related phenomena: sympathy and emotional contagion. Finally, in the 
third section of this chapter, I speak of empathy as a skill. 
 
2.1. Defining empathy in positive terms. 
I define empathy as the activity of re-creating another’s experience in one’s 
imagination. (I will use this interchangeably with the phrase ‘imagining what it 
is like to be another’.) Here I will examine some features of the activity of 
empathy. First I will specify what I take a person’s experience to involve. Then 
I will say more about what I take the imagining of a person’s experience to 
involve. Finally, I will specify what the activity of empathy involves in some 
more detail. 
 
2.1.1. What does a person’s experience consist in? 
A person’s experience at any point includes various of what I will refer to as 
‘dimensions’, among which: one’s kinaesthetic state, somatic state, occurrent 
thoughts, beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions, affective states which are not 
emotions, and others. At any point of time each of the dimensions of experience 
has a certain ‘value’. For example, yesterday at 6 pm, I was relaxed with no 
tension in my body, I felt tranquil, thought about little to nothing in particular, 
desired to sleep, and so on. This is to say that the value of the emotion 
dimension was tranquillity; the value of the desire dimension was the desire to 
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sleep; the value of the thought dimension was to think about nothing in 
particular, and so on. 
Sometimes philosophers speak of ‘modalities’ in order to capture a similar idea, 
for example when speaking about sensory modalities74 but I will refer to the 
aspects of experience as ‘dimensions’ in order to avoid any theoretical baggage 
that might come with using the term ‘modality’. There are many dimensions, 
for example perception in each of the five senses (vision, audition, touch, taste, 
olfaction), proprioception (the sense of how one’s body is situated in space), 
one’s affective states, somatic states, one’s occurrent thoughts, beliefs, desires, 
and intentions, one’s emotions, one’s feeling of pain (if any), and others. Also 
there are arguably dimensions encompassing some ‘less obvious’ aspects of 
experience, such as the ‘sense of agency’ or ‘sense of control’75, the way one 
experiences the passage of time, and so on. All this is a non-exhaustive list 
describing part of the incredibly rich complex which is a person’s experience at 
any moment in time. 
It is an open question whether or not particular dimensions of experience can 
or cannot be dissociated into simpler ones: for example Pacherie has argued 
that the sense of agency is a compound of the more basic senses of initiation, 
of control, and the experience of intentional causation.76 Whether or not some 
of the dimensions I have mentioned are or are not reducible to others is beyond 
the scope of the present writing. I am concerned not with producing a 
taxonomy of the dimensions of experience, but merely with pointing out the 
fact that experience is multi-dimensional: there are lots of different aspects to 
it. 
 
                                                 
74  Dokic and Arcangeli, 2014. They use the word ‘modalities’ to refer to the various 
dimensions of perception: ‘we can count at least the five senses (vision, audition, touch, taste, 
and olfaction) as sensory modalities’. 
75  For a recent discussion on what the sense of agency involves, see  Gallagher, 2012b. 
76  Pacherie, 2006. 
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2.1.1.1. Dimensions are connected. 
One important premise in my thesis is that the different dimensions of 
experience are related to one another. Dimensions obey their own inner ‘logic’, 
as it were. There are certain combinations of various dimensions that suggest 
themselves as more plausible than others. One would, as a rule, not be feeling 
in a certain way and be walking with a certain gait, unless one is also thinking 
about a certain thought, etc. The dimensions affect one another, and one’s 
experience cannot inhabit all and any random set of dimension coordinates. In 
other words, the space of states a person can be in is to an extent limited by 
certain dependencies among the different dimensions of experience. For 
example, if one aspect of my present experience is having a particular thought, 
then my emotional state and my somatic state would tend to inhabit particular 
coordinates which are compatible with this thought. If I am feeling nausea, I 
would have certain depressing thoughts, and I would feel anxiety, I would have 
no appetite and I would want to throw up. If I am in a great distress, my body 
probably will not feel relaxed, but tense, and on the contrary, if I am in a happy 
mood, it makes little sense to expect my body to feel tense. 
This is to say that the dimensions of experience would tend to come together in 
certain ways, even if the dependency is not very strict. A person’s state at any 
moment has values across all dimensions; if we know what the value of many 
of these dimensions are, we have a reasonably good chance of predicting what 
the value of the dimensions we do not know about, will be. 
A point here which is hopefully not surprising, but still worth emphasising, is 
that the sets of coordinates corresponding to what we could roughly call 
‘cognitive’ dimensions (e.g. one’s occurrent thoughts) and ‘affective’ 
dimensions (e.g. one’s emotions) are also very much interrelated. Of course, 
they are in principle dissociable – it is not impossible to have certain thoughts 
without the ‘corresponding’ feelings and vice versa – however, in general they 
do tend to affect one another. 
The relations between the dimensions of experience are very complex, and each 
one of them can influence the others. For example, it seems uncontroversial 
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that particular belief states can cause in us certain emotions. If I find out that a 
friend has betrayed me, I might feel anger, or sadness, or some combination of 
both, depending on the more specific circumstances of the situation. However, 
it also seems hard to deny that emotions can make particular cognitive states 
salient in us. Maybe I believe that you do not like me; if I am in a bad mood, 
this belief becomes especially salient in my mind, whereas if I am in a good 
mood, this belief is not occurrent. If I am sad, the cognitive states salient in my 
mind would be depressive thoughts. I will think that doing philosophy research 
is pointless because no one outside of a small number of academics will ever be 
interested in this research. If I am happy, I will instead think that I am doing 
something interesting that few people have had the chance to do. Having 
different emotions makes some cognitive states more salient than others. Once 
this point has been made, it hopefully seems fairly obvious. 
 
2.1.1.2. Does experience imply awareness? 
One point to note is that I take it that one’s experience involves all these 
dimensions77 even if one is not at a particular moment aware of them. I might 
be all tensed up but unaware of my somatic or kinaesthetic state, since (say) I 
am preoccupied by and only aware of the troubling thought in my mind. In this 
case my kinaesthetic states will still be a part of my experience, even if I am not 
aware of them. 
Perhaps the choice of the word ‘experience’ is a bit unfortunate here. Often 
philosophers speak about experience in a way that seems to presuppose 
awareness of the subject of experience.78 And it is not only philosophers; in daily 
                                                 
77  The dimensions have a certain value at any time, even if this value is nil. For example, let’s 
say I have lost my sense of agency during a particular interval of time; this does not mean that 
my experience lacks the sense of agency dimension – rather, it means that the value of this 
dimension is empty; the dimension itself does not go anywhere. It is always there and 
available to take on a certain value. The fact that the value of the sense of agency dimension is 
‘none’ is still a characteristic of that experience, it does not fail to convey information about it. 
78  E.g. Dokic and Arcangeli in a footnote assume that ‘experiences are conscious mental 
states’. 
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life it would seem at the very least strange to say, for example, that one 
experiences anything while sleeping (except one’s dreams). 
In this sense one might wonder whether another label would have been better 
suited here: a term that would without an issue capture dimensions of (what I 
call) experience which we are not aware of. For example ‘being’ might be a 
better term. However, ‘being’ seems too broad to me, and I will stick to 
‘experience’ in order to capture an important link with awareness: I am 
interested in what (in the awareness-implying sense of ‘experience’) can be 
called the ‘experienceable’. I am explaining: if awareness of it is not necessary 
for something to be a part of my experience, one might wonder what it is that 
makes certain things parts of experience, and others not. For there are many 
things which can presumably be considered parts of being, yet I would not think 
of them as parts of experience: for example one’s metabolic processes or the 
colour of one’s eyes. The reason some things are not part of experience is that 
we cannot be aware of them (or cannot experience them in the more 
conventional sense of ‘experience’). Hence by ‘experience’ I capture that which 
I can be aware of, even if I happen not to be aware of it at the particular moment. 
This is not the same as saying that by experience I mean that which is in 
principle accessible by introspection, as philosophical accounts of introspection 
are often restricted to being about mental events and do not include, for 
example, proprioceptive knowledge.79 
My motivation for focusing on things beyond a person’s present awareness is 
that I am interested in empathy, which is imagining (in a relevant sense to be 
discussed below in section 2.1.2) being another person; and I want my use of 
‘experience’ to capture the aspects of a person’s being which can be thus 
imagined. Say I am empathising with you, i.e., imagining what it is like to be 
you, who happen to be preoccupied with a certain troubling thought, and who 
are pacing anxiously in the room, body tense up, fists clenched. Perhaps what 
you are aware of (and hence what you experience in a more conventional use of 
‘experience’) is only the troubling thought in your mind; it troubles you so 
                                                 
79  Schwitzgebel, 2016. 
53 
 
much, you cannot be aware of anything else. What I want to claim is that my 
empathising with you, that is, my imagining being you, is not thereby exhausted 
by imagining the troubling thought only. Even if your own awareness is only 
occupied by a single thought, it does not mean that in my empathy with you, 
my awareness should only be occupied by that thought; no, I would imagine 
what it is like to be preoccupied only with a single troubling thought, but I 
would also imagine what it is like to have the fists clenched, the body tense, to 
be anxious in a way that possibly clouds my judgment, and so on. In other 
words: it is important for me that the imaginative activity of empathy be able 
to capture things which the other person is not necessarily aware of, and since 
empathy is re-creating in one’s imagination of another’s experience, I am 
including under the label of ‘experience’ things which one is not necessarily 
aware of. 
 
2.1.2. Imagining an experience. 
I have defined empathy as the activity of re-creating another’s experience in 
one’s imagination. Above I discussed what I take a person’s experience to 
consist in. Now I will say more about the way imagination is put to use in this 
activity. 
Imagination is heterogeneous: there are many different kinds and types of 
imagination. This has led some to doubt that there is such a thing as a single 
phenomenon of imagination; for example, Kind has recently argued that ‘no 
single mental activity can do all the explanatory work that has been assigned to 
imagining’80, a work that involves explaining, among other things: 
mindreading, pretence, engagement with fiction, and modal epistemology. 
However, I will still think of imagination as a single thing, even if I will adopt 
quite a broad definition, one used by Dokic and Arcangeli: ‘imagination is the 
                                                 
80  Kind, 2013. 
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general capacity to produce sui generis occurrent mental states, which we call 
“imaginings”’.81 
Imaginings can come in various kinds, for example they can be vision-like, 
belief-like, desire-like, sensation-like, and many others.82 Attempts to produce 
at least a partial taxonomy of imagination have resulted in the drawing of 
various distinctions, such as the ones between subjective and objective 
imagining83; between active and passive imagining84; and one that I will be 
concerned with now: between experiential and cognitive imagining. 
I take it that re-creating another’s experience in one’s imagination involves an 
experiential kind of imagining rather than propositional imagining. 
Propositional imagining is imagining that something is the case. I can 
propositionally-imagine your experience – this would amount to my imagining 
that you are undergoing a certain experience; I imagine the proposition ‘you are 
undergoing X’ as being true. 
What I take it that empathy involves is a different, experiential kind of 
imagining. This is not just imagining that you are in a certain state, but 
imagining what it is like for you to be in that state; I am imagining having the 
experience. The difference is that in the former case, but not in the latter, the 
imagining can be quite abstract and detached. By contrast, in the latter case the 
imagining involves a particular phenomenology, it has a particular experiential 
quality. Empathy I defined as recreating in one’s imagination the experience of 
another. The ‘recreating’ phrase is supposed to capture precisely this feature of 
the activity – that I am, in my imagination, undergoing a certain experience. I 
am not just imagining that I am playing a sonata; I have imaginings which are 
vision-like, audition-like, and proprioception-like – I recreate in my 
imagination the experience of playing a sonata. 
                                                 
81  Dokic and Arcangeli, 2014. 
82  Kind, 2013. 
83  Dokic and Arcangeli, 2014. 
84  Active when we deliberately imagine something, and passive when we do not, for example 
in cases of mind wandering. 
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With this I hope to have made the distinction between experiential and 
cognitive imaginings clear enough. Experiential imaginings are imaginings of 
having an experience. Therefore the taxonomy of imaginings will be parasitic 
upon that of actual experiences. In speaking about imagination I will borrow a 
move from Dokic and Arcangeli: 
we are going to use phrases of the form “X-like imagination”, or “re-
creating X” in imagination, where X is a type of non-imaginative state 
(as in “vision-like imagination”, or “re-creating a proprioceptive 
experience”).85 
In this way I am not committing myself to a particular account of imaginings 
(Dokic and Arcangeli are using the hyphenated ‘re-creating’ in order to avoid 
using the term ‘recreating’ already used by Currie and Ravenscroft86) and 
neither am I committed to a particular taxonomy of imaginings that requires 
an already existing account of imaginings. The taxonomy I will have is as 
theoretically thin as possible: what makes an instance of experiential imagining 
be of a particular kind (‘X-like’) is that the corresponding non-imaginative state 
that is imagined is itself of a particular kind. 
There are also other features of the kind of imagining that I take empathy to 
consist in. One is that I take this imagining to be an involved activity. It is 
difficult to articulate what this ‘involvement’ consists in. It does seem to make 
the imagining I am interested in different from ‘mere’ supposing, for example. 
Whereas on some accounts there is no sharp distinction between supposition 
and imagination87 it is possible also to see imagination as by definition being 
more involved, Gendler being an example of such a view: ‘imagination requires 
a sort of participation that mere hypothetical reasoning does not’.88 Irrespective 
                                                 
85  Dokic and Arcangeli, 2014. Their aim in this essay is to draw a distinction between what 
they call ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ imaginings. 
86  This is what Currie and Ravenscroft (2002) call the recreative imagination: ‘Let us call the 
imaginative capacity, whatever it is, that underpins perspective-shifting the recreative 
imagination’.  Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002, p.9. 
87  Kind has argued that simulationist treatments of imagination (such as those by Goldman 
and by Currie and Ravenscroft) are of this kind. 
88  Gendler, 2000, p.80. 
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of whether it is possible to have imagining that is not involved at all, it is clear 
that either way, imaginings vary on a scale from being more involved to less 
involved. 
I take it that one thing that would make an imagining more involved would be 
imagining more rather than fewer dimensions of experience. If I imagine 
playing the piano, if my imagining is not very involved, I might just have a visual 
imagining of my fingers on the keyboard. If my imagining is more involved, I 
might also have an auditory imagining of a particular piece I am playing, 
together with a proprioceptive imagining of the position of my fingers in space, 
and an action imagining of myself executing the action of playing the piano, 
and others. Since there are many dimensions to one’s experience, there are 
correspondingly many dimensions to one’s experiential imagination. Every 
dimension of experience, when experientially imagined, will correspond to a 
dimension of experiential imagination. This means that when I imagine having 
a certain experience, I can choose to imagine it more partially or more fully. In 
other words, I might choose to imagine only certain dimensions and not others, 
or alternatively I might choose to engage in a more involved imaginative project 
and try to imagine as many dimensions of experience as I can. An example of a 
less involved imagining is me just shifting my perspective in order to imagine 
what you, sat opposite me, are seeing at this moment. An example of a very 
involved imagining would be an actor who is entering a role and imagining as 
many things as possible about the character they are about to play. 
 
2.1.3. Empathy. 
Above I discussed the multi-dimensionality of a person’s experience. I 
explained what I mean by experience, and I assumed what will be an important 
premise in my argument – that the various dimensions of experience are 
connected, in the sense that they roughly obey the mechanics of a loose kind of 
relations between them. Then I also spoke a little about the imagination, 
arguing that central to empathy is a kind of experiential imagination. 
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In this section I will bring the pieces of the puzzle together, and speak more 
specifically about the activity of recreating another’s experience in one’s 
imagination. I will say what it involves, discussing the relation between 
empathy and the emotions, and proposing a model of how empathy works. 
 
2.1.3.1. Empathy and phenomenal concepts. 
Above I discussed the kind of imaginings I take empathy to consist in – these 
are experiential imaginings, or imaginings what it is like to have a certain 
experience. The assumption is that there is something that it is like to have a 
certain experience, and the imaginative recreation reproduces this what-its-
likeness. This what-its-likeness is also referred to as the phenomenological 
aspect of the experience. Most dimensions of experience clearly have an 
associated phenomenology – emotions, affective states, proprioception, the 
sense of control, and so on. It is debatable but less clear that other dimensions 
of experience – such as thoughts and beliefs – have an associated 
phenomenology too.89 
Empathy involves the making of a demonstrative ascription to the person we 
are empathising with – that the other’s experience feels ‘like this’.90 In this sense 
the judgments resulting from empathy involve phenomenal concepts. Walton 
in his recent and theoretically neat account of empathy identifies empathy with 
using an aspect of either one’s current mental state, or the content of one’s 
imaginings, as a sample for understanding what another person is 
experiencing.91 There are important differences between Walton’s account and 
mine. One is that empathy is on my account not a success term, something for 
which I already argued in Chapter 1. Another is that Walton argues that 
empathy does not always require imagination. What this means is that 
specifically recreating another’s experience in one’s imagination is not 
                                                 
89  Recently philosophers have started to explore the view that ‘purely cognitive’ states have an 
associated phenomenology. For work on this see the recent volume by Bayne and Montague:  
Bayne and Montague, 2011. 
90  This is what Baker has recently referred to as the ‘complex theory’ of empathy.  Baker, 2016, 
p.44. 
91  Walton, 2015, p.14. 
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necessary for empathy; what is sometimes sufficient is something slightly less 
demanding – just using an aspect of one’s current mental state as a sample to 
apprehending that the other feels like this. In fact, Walton considers as the 
primary sense of empathy the case when one uses an aspect of one’s current 
mental state as a sample to understand the other, rather than when one uses 
the content of one’s imaginings, but on my account really empathy is primarily 
about using the content of one’s imaginings as a sample. 
 
2.1.3.2. Empathy and the emotions. 
Some accounts of empathy stipulate a special connection between empathy and 
the emotions. For example according to some accounts I am not empathising 
with you unless I feel (a tuned-down version of) the emotion you are 
experiencing. This is what Matravers takes to be what he calls ‘narrow empathy’: 
Narrow empathy occurs when an empathiser experiences an emotion E 
as a result of imagining what it is like for the target, where this involves 
some information about the situation of the target and some 
information about the character of the target, and E is either the same 
as, or akin to, the emotion felt by the target.92 
I would argue, however, that this view is problematic in that it does not clearly 
differentiate between owning an emotion and just experientially imagining 
having an emotion. On my account empathy involves the latter, whereas the 
former – coming to have an emotion as a result of imagining another’s 
experience – would be usually a case of emotional contagion. I will discuss the 
distinction between empathy and emotional contagion shortly in section 2.2.2. 
But on my view empathy is an activity limited to a certain interval of time; while 
we are empathising we might have emotion-like imaginings, and as a result be 
able to tell that the target feels like this. However, it is not necessary that I 
should feel like this after I finish empathising. 
                                                 
92  Matravers, 2017a, p.80. 
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Of course I can always modify the account of narrow empathy in such a way as 
to reflect the point that empathy refers to the empathiser imagining having a 
certain emotion; and I could also modify it in such a way as to not include a 
veridical condition. In this case I would come up with what I could call ‘narrow* 
emotional empathy’: 
Narrow* emotional empathy occurs when an empathiser experientially 
imagines an emotion E as a result of imagining what it is like for the 
target, where this involves some information about the situation of the 
target and some information about the character of the target, and E is 
what the empathiser believes to be either the same as, or sufficiently akin 
to, the emotion felt by the target. 
What is not clear is why single out emotions, of all the dimensions of 
experience, as being the sole domain of empathy. Emotions are just one 
dimension of experience, and what is said about emotions above applies just as 
well to any of the other dimensions of experience. We just have to substitute 
‘emotion E’ for any other dimension of experience. Narrow* emotional empathy 
has no more claim to being any more special than, say, narrow* cognition 
empathy, or narrow* proprioception empathy, and so on. Maybe narrow* 
emotional empathy would be more important since emotions play such a huge 
part in our lives which some other dimensions like, say, proprioception for most 
intents and purposes do not. But this is merely accidental; there is no 
conceptual argument to say that narrow* empathy is in any way primary 
empathy, or a different kind of activity, or even worse, the only thing that 
deserves the label ‘empathy’ altogether. 
Not everyone thinks that feeling a particular emotion is a necessary feature of 
empathising. Sometimes people distinguish between ‘affective’ and ‘cognitive’ 
empathy; the way the distinction is usually drawn is that affective empathy 
involves recreating your ‘purely affective’ states, and cognitive empathy is when 
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I recreate your ‘purely cognitive’ states.93 I do think, however, that instead of 
thinking that there are two separate distinct activities – that of cognitive 
empathy and that of affective empathy – it makes more sense to think of 
cognitive empathy as the cases of empathy where I recreate only the ‘cognitive’ 
dimensions of your experience; and of affective empathy as the cases of 
empathy where I recreate only the ‘affective’ dimensions of your experience. It 
is easy to see, once we have put things in this way, that both purely cognitive 
and purely affective empathy would by definition be more limited, less-involved 
instances of empathy. For example, any empathy that does not involve the 
affective dimensions at all would be from the start a very restricted form of 
empathy. By contrast, any more involved act of empathising would involve 
recreating both some cognitive and some affective dimensions of experience. 
In conclusion, on my account there is no special connection between empathy 
and the emotions. However, most instances of empathy will involve recreating 
another’s emotions just because of how important emotions are in most cases 
of daily life. If I want to recreate your experience, i.e. imagine what it is like to 
be you, it seems that my recreation will be severely limited if I do not try to 
recreate your emotional state; but perhaps, on most occasions at least, it would 
be less limited if I do not recreate, say, your proprioceptive state. Thus, even if 
on my account there is no special connection between empathy and the 
emotions, the majority of cases of empathy would involve recreating the other’s 
emotions. 
 
2.1.3.3. How empathy works: a model. 
When I recreate your experience in my imagination, the produced recreation 
can be more or less complete in the sense that it can involve more or fewer 
dimensions of your experience. For example, in a certain case I might empathise 
with you by focusing on your current thoughts and beliefs; other times I might 
                                                 
93  The divide between ‘cognitive states’ and ‘affective states’ seems questionable at best, not 
the least because emotions according to many accounts involve judgments, but I will let it 
pass. 
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only focus on your affective states; and yet other times I might be trying to 
empathise as completely as possible, recreating as many dimensions of your 
experience as I can take on board. 
When I empathise with you I take on certain dimensions of your experience 
that I am aware of and I imagine what it is like to be experiencing them. When 
I recreate the dimensions of your experience whose value I know, I will turn my 
awareness to other dimensions of experience whose value is unknown to me. 
My claim is that these unknown values will have been ‘automatically’ as it were, 
filled in, by my embodied intelligence. They would not just feel blank to me, 
but rather, when I turn my awareness to these dimensions of experience, I 
would be inclined to think that they are one way rather than another; I would 
be able to have a certain guess about their value; certain guesses about their 
value would seem more ‘natural’, or more ‘likely’ to me, than others. This is so 
because just as various dimensions of experience go together in certain ways, 
obeying their own loose ‘logic’ as it were, so too would various dimensions of 
experiential imagination go together, mimicking these relations. 
The assumption here is that imagination and reality work similarly, but this 
assumption does not seem hard to grant. Such an assumption seems to 
dominate discourses on empathy, for example Matravers recently assumed that 
'the patterns of causation are preserved when we move from online to offline'.94 
Similar hypotheses exist in the philosophy of imagination, for example the 
‘single code’ hypothesis according to which beliefs and imaginings are 
represented similarly, and processed similarly.95 In a similar vein, I assume that 
experientially imagined dimensions of experience bear the same causal 
relations to other experientially imagined dimensions, as do the non-imagined 
dimensions of experience to other non-imagined dimensions of experience. 
Hence when I am empathising, I am recreating via experiential imagination 
certain dimensions of your experience. I experientially imagine being in a state 
in which these dimensions of experience have the values that I know of. Now 
                                                 
94  Matravers, 2011. 
95  Davies and Bicknell, 2017. 
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that I have recreated a particular experience in my imagination, I can turn my 
awareness to other features of this experience which I am, in my imagination, 
undergoing. Hence I can discover what the values of some other dimensions of 
this imagined experience are. For example, say that I know you have strong 
feelings toward X, and I wonder how you feel when you see a photo where X is 
with someone else. If I recreate in my imagination having strong feelings 
towards X, and seeing this picture of X, if I turn my awareness to other 
dimensions of this recreation, I will figure out that my heart has dropped in my 
chest, and from here would be able to tell that this is what, very likely, you are 
actually experiencing when seeing this picture. 
Of course, I might be able to infer that your heart has dropped in your chest via 
reasoning alone, and without recreating your experience. This is true especially 
in trivial examples like the one above. Reasoning does certainly get me a long 
way in developing an awareness of the experience you are undergoing. But what 
is happening in empathy can get me even further than reasoning alone, which 
is already quite far. When I empathise with you I am using my reasoning, but I 
am also using my embodied intelligence in order to become aware of aspects of 
your experience which I was not aware of. Because I am imagining what it is like 
to have a certain experience, rather than merely imagining that something is 
the case, I have a stronger computational power at my disposal – I do not only 
use my pure reasoning, but also my entire bodily intelligence in order to 
develop an awareness of what it is that you are experiencing. To compare: if I 
know that you are experiencing a certain emotion, in imagining what it is like 
to experience this emotion, I do not merely infer from my body of knowledge 
what kind of aspects of experience this emotion is likely to be associated with; 
rather my affective states feel in a certain way, and my body tenses in a certain 
way too. And in this way, for example, I might be able to become aware that 
you are experiencing a certain kind of emotion or somatic state, or cognitive 
state. My instruments in the endeavour of figuring out what you experience are 
not limited to drawing relations between propositions. I draw from more, and 
more varied, resources, in the case of recreation. In fact I draw from as many 
resources as I possibly could – I involve my whole bodily intelligence. Thus we 
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are more likely to be able to ‘solve’ how another person feels/thinks/etc. in any 
particular moment, just because we draw from everything we have at our 
disposal. 
I take it that my model here resembles what is usually seen as a virtue of 
simulation theory in the debate about how we make sense of other minds.96 
What makes simulation theory elegant is that it does not need to postulate an 
additional mechanism for how we come to be able to understand other people 
– we use our own selves for that. If I want to predict what you are going to do 
next, I do not need to have an (implicit) theory for how people in your situation 
tend to react. I merely need to imagine being in your situation, and see what ‘I’ 
would do next. What I take from this discussion is that predicting others’ 
behaviour can be very similar to predicting one’s own immediate behaviour, 
and in this case what does the job is not only inferential reasoning. It seems 
that rather it is our entire selves that produces the predictive ‘output’ which we 
can often just ‘feel’ without actually inferring it. The elegance of simulation 
theory is that according to it we use our own selves as ‘devices’ on which to ‘run’ 
a ‘simulation’ of another’s experience. Since our own selves are already ‘devices’ 
on which we ‘run’ our own experiences, and since we are similar to other people 
in important ways, this ‘simulation’ is likely to give reliable results. 
One hidden premise in this model is the assumption that people are wired 
similarly in important ways. But I think that this assumption is easy to grant. 
The fact that fictions work, for example, that people tend to understand 
characters in fiction, and to experience similar emotions towards similar things, 
show that really, despite subtle differences between individuals, there are 
important senses in which the way dimensions of experience are related in the 
case of one individual would be similar to the way they are related in the case 
of another individual. Of course, sometimes differences in, say, the psychology 
of two individuals would be so big that empathy could fail to produce accurate 
results. However, this does not mean that the accurate results are in principle 
                                                 
96  For an overview of the simulation theory versus theory theory, see  Barlassina and Gordon, 
2017. 
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not achievable by empathy. It is just that, in this case, I will perhaps need a 
much more detailed input in order to recreate your experience accurately. 
In this section I provided a model of how empathy works. According to it, 
empathy does not just consist in recreating dimensions of experience whose 
value I know to begin with (the ‘input’); rather, empathy can also provide me 
with a better awareness of other dimensions of your experience that I was not 
aware to begin with. 
 
2.1.3.4. Can imagination surprise us? 
One possibly controversial assumption in the model outlined above is that it is 
possible that I am not aware of everything going on in my imaginative re-
creation; rather I just become aware of things which I am already recreating, 
but I was not aware of before. I described the way in which I turn my attention 
to various dimensions of the recreated experience and ‘find’ what some of the 
values that have been ‘automatically’ assigned to these dimensions were. But 
one might be sceptical of this; one might suggest that it is not possible to 
recreate something without being aware of it. 
I hope to assuage this worry with an example. If you are an actor entering a 
character you might discover things about your character after you have 
entered the role, from the way you have yourself acted that character. This is 
due to the fact that the various dimensions of experience are interrelated, and 
with them, the various dimensions of imagining an experience. Thus, when I 
imagine feeling, say, grief, and if I act out – in my mind, or in reality – that grief 
it will manifest itself with my walking in a certain way, holding my hands in a 
certain way, and so on. Some of this will, of course, be initiated by my conscious 
directing myself. However, some of it will also come ‘naturally’, as it were, 
‘intuitively’ in such a way as I might not be aware that I am, say, positioning my 
hands in a certain way which is consistent with the emotion of grief; perhaps I 
am consciously attending to other dimensions of the character’s experience, 
such as the thoughts which I imagine the character to be having right now, or 
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the phenomenological feel of the emotion of grief. I need not be explicitly aware 
of all the dimensions of experience; some of them might be merely on the verge 
of my awareness, since they have created themselves ‘naturally’ from everything 
else that I am imagining; and as such, dimensions which are clearly a result of 
the imaginative project, yet not necessarily part of my awareness and not 
necessarily initiated intentionally by me. 
Presumably it is more likely that this happens in a more involved, full-fledged 
imagining rather than in a non-involved or more superficial imagining. If I have 
only a couple of dimensions of experience as inputs, they will be compatible 
with so many values along the other dimensions, it would be harder for my 
simulated experience to be able to ‘automatically’ choose just one value among 
all the possibilities. If all I know about you is that you are sitting in a neutral 
position, talking with an even voice, since this is compatible with you 
undergoing a range of experiences, maybe I have little chance of inferring via 
empathy what the other dimensions of your experience might be like. In this 
case the data I am presented with as an input is compatible with too many other 
possibilities. However, once I start having a more solid body of input, then the 
possibilities for the other dimensions of your experience will become fewer, and 
eventually a particular set of values for these dimensions might naturally 
suggest itself. 
 
2.2. Defining empathy in negative terms. 
Here I will define empathy in negative terms by contrasting it with two 
phenomena related to but distinct from empathy: sympathy and emotional 
contagion.97 In the following two sections I will contrast empathy with 
sympathy and with emotional contagion in turn. 
 
                                                 
97  Vignemont and Jacob, 2012. 
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2.2.1. Empathy and sympathy. 
Almost any contemporary account of empathy begins by drawing a distinction 
between empathy and sympathy.98 This is not surprising given that as we saw 
above ‘sympathy’ was once used to refer to something similar to what ‘empathy’ 
refers to today. Also the word ‘sympathy’ comes from Greek sympathes ‘having 
a fellow feeling, affected by like feelings’99 and if indeed one thinks that a fellow 
feeling is at the heart of sympathy, there is little wonder that the distinction 
between empathy and sympathy is not straightforward and in need of special 
attention. For example sometimes it is difficult to say whether something is an 
instance of sympathy or empathy. If I feel sad as a result of being told that you 
are suffering and in pain, have I experienced sympathy or empathy? It could be 
sympathy if I feel sad for your situation. It could also be empathy if my sadness 
is a result of attending to your experience of suffering. Perhaps I am both 
sympathising and empathising, but which is which? 
It seems important to draw the distinction between empathy and sympathy 
carefully. As already discussed empathy is here understood as the activity of 
recreating another’s experience in one’s imagination. By contrast, I will 
understand sympathy as a particular type of emotion, akin to pity, usually felt 
at witnessing another’s suffering. This is in line with common usage of the word 
‘sympathy’ today.100 From this, as well as from definitions of sympathy in the 
literature, there emerge at least three dimensions along which sympathy and 
empathy differ.  
First, sympathy, unlike empathy, is restricted to cases of misfortune.101 You do 
not express sympathies with one’s happiness. The case of feeling for another’s 
good fortune is sometimes referred to as ‘sympathetic joy’ or ‘symhedonia’.102 
                                                 
98  Cuff et al., 2016, p.145. 
99  As found in the Online Etymology Dictionary, www.etymonline.com, accessed 18 
September 2017. 
100  For example the Oxford Dictionary of English definition of ‘sympathy’ is: ‘Feelings of pity 
and sorrow for someone else's misfortune’. Oxford Dictionaries English online, accessed 18 
September 2017. 
101  Some want to extend the term ‘sympathy’ to include cases where the target is undergoing a 
positive experience, see e.g.  Maibom, 2014. 
102  Royzman and Rozin, 2006. 
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By contrast, when I empathise with you, I am experiencing in my imagination 
an experience like yours and there are no restrictions about the nature of your 
experience; it can be a positive or a negative experience, and in either case I 
would be able to empathise with you. 
Second, sympathy is characterised by an interpersonal distancing, a kind of 
separation between the sympathiser and the ‘target’ of sympathy.103 This has led 
some philosophers to characterise sympathy as a third-personal response.104 
One way to succinctly capture the intuition here is to say that whereas empathy 
is feeling with another, sympathy is feeling for another. Related to this point, as 
I will argue later in Chapter 5, empathy can provide us with what I call a feeling 
of ‘togetherness’ and in this sense sympathy is a third-personal response, 
whereas empathy is not. 
Finally, in empathy one imagines what the other is feeling, whereas in sympathy 
one does not.105 Therefore the difference between sympathy and empathy is 
sometimes spelled out by introducing something like what Vignemont and 
Jacob call the 'interpersonal similarity condition' which is the condition that 
'the empathizer's affective state stands in some relevant similarity relation to 
her target's affective state’.106 Only if this condition is met we can say that 
empathy has taken place. Whereas I agree with the intuition here, I would be 
wary of introducing an interpersonal similarity condition in the way in which 
Vignemont and Jacob propose. For it might be possible that when I sympathise 
with you I happen to have very similar affective states to yours, for example if I 
am sad about you, and you happen to feel sad about your own situation at the 
same time. But this would not be enough to make what I am doing empathy 
rather than sympathy. 
Therefore I find that a better way to draw the distinction between empathy and 
sympathy is to focus on the fact that empathy is an imaginative activity which 
                                                 
103  Meyers, 2017. 
104  A proponent of this view is Goldie who stresses the separation in the cases of sympathy 
which is unlike cases of empathy, where there is ‘identification’ with the target of empathy.  
Goldie, 2002. 
105  Meyers, 2017. 
106 Vignemont and Jacob, p.305. 
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has a particular aim – to recreate another’s experience; sympathy, on the other 
hand, does not have an aim – it is an affective response. Even if the two might 
occasionally result in my having the same thoughts, feelings, and experiences, 
the ways I have arrived at these would be different in the two cases. For what I 
am doing in empathy is trying to imagine your experience and what I am doing 
in sympathy is feeling a particular way towards you which might or might not 
result from my having an experience like your experience. Also from this it is 
easy to see why it would be inappropriate to think of empathy as an emotion 
even if some philosophers speak of empathy as a ‘moral emotion’.107 Sympathy, 
on the other hand, can be more plausibly described as an emotion.108 
This way to differentiate between sympathy and empathy – observing that 
empathy, unlike sympathy, is a very specific kind of imaginative project – is one 
from which the other differences mentioned above can be inferred. For example 
if I see a beggar, sympathy would be my feeling sorry for them, whereas 
empathy would be to imagine what itis like to be them, which might or might 
not result in my feeling sorry for them. 
Empathy might or might not bring sympathy about. Empathy can lead to 
sympathy, but it need not. After I empathise with you I might realise that you 
are in pain, and feel sympathy. Also sympathy can lead to empathy: I might be 
told you are in pain, feel sympathy, and this might prompt me to empathise. 
However, empathy and sympathy are independent: I might empathise without 
feeling sympathy and vice versa.  
With this I hope that the delineation between empathy and sympathy has been 
made clear. 
 
                                                 
107  See for example,  Gruen, 2015. 
108  For example Goldie is a proponent of the view that ‘sympathy is the quintessential moral 
emotion because it combines concern for the other with a disposition to help’. Meyers, 2017. 
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2.2.2. Empathy and emotional contagion. 
Another phenomenon which is sometimes conflated with empathy or seen as a 
kind of empathy is emotional contagion. Emotional contagion occurs when I 
catch another’s emotional state; it is called contagion since 'we catch the 
emotion of the other much like we can catch a contagious disease from the 
other'.109 An example is being in the presence of someone who is in panic, and 
picking up that panic ourselves; or starting to feel cheerful just by virtue of 
being in cheerful company. 
Emotional contagion typically happens without the knowledge of the subject.110 
It can happen to us without our awareness of the cause of the emotion, or even 
without our awareness of our being in a particular emotional state at all. Let us 
say I am in the company of certain people and start feeling anxious as a result 
of emotional contagion. I might be aware of my anxiety, but not be aware that 
I have picked up the anxiety from the people around me who are themselves 
anxious about something. Alternatively I might not become aware of my own 
anxiety at all. Finally, it is also possible that I am aware of my anxiety and 
correctly identify it as the result of emotional contagion from those around me. 
However, my awareness usually comes after the change of my emotional state 
as a result of contagion, instead of it guiding that change. In this sense, 
emotional contagion operates at the sub-personal level.111 
As in the case of sympathy, a good way to differentiate between contagion and 
empathy is by virtue of the fact that empathy is an imaginative activity with a 
particular aim whereas contagion is not. We can say that contagion is simply 
that which happens to us whenever we take on another’s emotion 
unintentionally; contagion is not an activity. If I deliberately decided to take on 
your emotion, and managed to do so via guiding myself in this process, we 
would not call that an instance of contagion. Contagion is not an imaginative 
project, whereas empathy is. 
                                                 
109  Hardy, 2017, p.896. 
110  Gallagher, 2012a, p.359. 
111  Matravers, 2017a, p.21. 
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Still, if we think of empathy as something that can occur at the sub-personal 
level too, emotional contagion would be similar to this kind of empathy, since 
both of them would involve taking on another’s emotions without one’s 
awareness. In this thesis empathy is understood as an involved, voluntary 
activity, but on some accounts empathy happens when a spontaneous and 
occurring without our awareness sharing of another’s emotions takes place. In 
light of this it is not surprising that some consider contagion to be a basic form 
of empathy.112 
But even in the cases of empathy accounts where empathy can be spontaneous 
and occurring at a sub-personal level, there is still a relevant distinction that 
can differentiate between this sub-personal empathy and emotional contagion. 
This is the important fact that in the case of emotional contagion, unlike in the 
case of empathy, I end up owning the emotion. Consider the example where 
you enter the room, beaming with happiness. There are two different things 
that might happen to my emotions as a result. One is that I might, as a result 
of emotional contagion, start feeling happy myself. In this case I will own the 
emotion of happiness. The other is that I might empathise with you and as a 
part of that imagine feeling happy. But this is not my own happiness, and after 
I am done empathising, I will not necessarily feel happy myself. My momentary 
experience of the emotion of happiness was merely part of the activity of 
empathising, and the happiness is not something I own, or that I can ascribe to 
myself. Therefore contagion and empathy can be clearly differentiated by the 
fact that in the case of contagion, unlike that of empathy, I always end up 
owning the emotion. 
I take it that there is a clear distinction between experientially imagining being 
in an emotional state and owning that emotion. Aspects of existence and their 
imagined versions are sufficiently alike but also they are hard to confuse with 
one another. Imagining feeling sad is different from actually feeling sad. This is 
perhaps not uncontroversial. For example, Currie and Ravenscroft hold that 
emotions are ‘transparent to imagination’ and if I read them right, what they 
                                                 
112  See e.g. Gruen, Maibom, Prinz, Slote. 
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are saying is that imagining having a certain emotion can be the same as 
actually having that emotion. For example, they say: '[t]here is no imagining 
that has an amusement-like character; there is only being really amused'.113 
However, I do not find this claim convincing. I think that emotions that I 
imagine are clearly to be distinguished from emotions that I own. Goldie 
already noted that Currie and Ravenscroft’s view seems quite implausible for 
the case of at least certain emotions, e.g. fear.114 I can imagine what it is like to 
be afraid, but this does not mean that I am actually afraid. However, one might 
think that Currie and Ravenscroft’s point holds for other kinds of states, 
perhaps some of the other emotions, like their own example of amusement. 
But I think that even in the case of amusement I can imagine being amused 
without actually being amused, e.g. I can imagine being amused at a joke which 
I actually find boring and predictable. I think Currie and Ravenscroft’s 
suggestion might be partially right, in that there are perhaps certain aspects of 
emotion that might indeed be transparent to imagination. I am inclined to 
think that certain phenomenal features of emotions might carry over from the 
real emotion to the imagined emotion, and what I have in mind is certain 
affective states, perhaps best thought of as feelings or sensations. For example, 
I would suggest that the warm fuzzy feeling in one’s chest which accompanies 
certain positive emotions like love or joy, might be present in equal measure in 
the imagined, as well as the real emotion. It seems to me plausible to suggest 
that experientially imagining these kinds of love or joy might involve creating 
this warm fuzzy sensation in one’s chest which sensation itself might be 
indistinguishable from the sensation when one actually owns the emotions of 
love or joy. However, this occurrent feeling is just one feature of the emotion, 
and there seems to be little doubt that imagined love or joy are different from 
love or joy that one owns. Therefore I take it that even if certain aspects of 
emotions are transparent to imagination, there are still significant differences 
between owning an emotion and imagining having that emotion. 
                                                 
113  Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002, p.190. 
114  Goldie, 2004. 
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So I take it that for the case of emotions, there is a clear distinction between 
owning an emotion and imagining being in an emotional state. Therefore 
empathy and emotional contagion can be clearly distinguished on the basis of 
ownership of the emotion. 
In fact, contagion might even co-occur with empathy, but the two things would 
still be distinct. Empathy might occasionally result in our owning the other’s 
emotions for ourselves. Empathising can end up affecting one’s own emotions 
in a way in which one is not necessarily aware of the change of one’s own 
emotional state, resulting effectively in a kind of emotional contagion. For 
example, sometimes one can get so engrossed in recreating another’s 
experience that one starts owning some of the recreated emotions for oneself. I 
will discuss this possibility further in Chapter 4 where I discuss criticisms 
against empathy. But even in this case the activity of empathising is clearly 
distinguishable from emotional contagion which is merely one of the effects of 
this activity. 
In conclusion, contagion and empathy are two distinct things that should not 
be confused. 
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2. 3. The skill of empathy. 
In this section, I will discuss empathy as a skill. I will begin by outlining what a 
skill is. Then I will discuss what exactly it is that a skilled empathiser is skilled 
at, in other words, what the skill of empathy involves. 
 
2.3.1. What is a skill? 
Skill has received relatively little attention as the object of analysis within 
contemporary analytic philosophy.115 Only recently skill has become of interest, 
and mostly with regards to the question of how skill relates to knowledge.116 For 
example reductive virtue epistemologists have sought to define knowledge in 
terms of skill, an example being Sosa’s account of knowledge as apt 
performance; to this contrasts the view that skill is definable in terms of 
knowledge, an example being Stanley and Williamson’s claim that skill is a 
disposition to know.117 Another question that has been asked of the relation 
between skill and knowledge concerns not whether one is definable in terms of 
the other, but whether one is prior to the other in the order of explanation, that 
is whether skill requires knowledge, or knowledge requires skill. Known as 
intellectualism is the view that knowledge is prior to skill, an example being 
Stanley’s view that skilled action is guided by propositional knowledge.118 The 
opposing view, which Dickie has termed ‘anti-intellectualism’, reverses the 
order of explanation and holds that skill comes before knowledge – the 
knowledge that the skill manifests is explainable only in terms of the skill and 
not in any other way.119 
Even in this recent discussion little has been said about what skill is. A lot of 
what has been said about skill has been in terms of a negative definition, e.g., 
contrasting skill with propositional knowledge. Thus Ryle who arguably 
equates skill with knowing how, famously argues that knowing how cannot be 
                                                 
115  Stanley and Williamson, 2017. 
116  Pavese Carlotta, 2016. 
117  Stanley and Williamson, 2017. 
118  Stanley, 2011. 
119  Dickie Imogen, 2012. 
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defined in terms of knowing that. In an essay where he famously distinguishes 
between knowing that and knowing how, he seems to identify skilful actions 
with actions that manifest know how.120 Since a skilful action is an action that 
manifests skill, Ryle appears to be using skill and know how interchangeably.121 
In terms of a positive account of skill, little more has been said than that a 
skilled agent is one who non-accidentally does the action well. Thus, Ryle says 
that an agent who knows how to do something, is the agent that, when they do 
that thing, do it well: 
What is involved in our descriptions of people as knowing how to make 
and appreciate jokes, to talk grammatically, to play chess, to fish, or to 
argue? Part of what is meant is that, when they perform these operations, 
they tend to perform them well, i.e. correctly or efficiently or 
successfully. Their performances come up to certain standards, or satisfy 
certain criteria.122 
This is the commonsense observation that a skilled agent is one that performs 
or can, at will, perform the action they are skilled at well. More recently, Dickie 
provides a 'bare-bone' account of practical skill which is what she takes to be 
the 'uncontroversial fragment' every full account of practical skill will share.123 
According to this account, you are a skilled agent at X if your intention to X 
reliably generates a pattern of behaviour which, unless your situation is 
unlucky, will result in success.124 A skilled action is just ‘an action arising in an 
appropriate way from the skill of a skilled practitioner'.125 
One feature of one’s being a skilled agent is the reliability of the result of the 
action. Skill implies a certain degree of success. As Dickie phrases it, if you are 
skilled at X, you can reliably generate a pattern of behaviour that, unless you 
are unlucky, will result in a successful X. 
                                                 
120  Ryle, 2009. 
121  Pavese Carlotta, 2016. 
122  Ryle, 2009, p.17. 
123  Dickie Imogen, 2012, p.738. 
124  Dickie Imogen, 2012. 
125  Dickie Imogen, 2012, p.739. 
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There are other features commonly associated with skill. One of them is that 
skill is usually associated with a non-reflective character; for instance Stanley 
and Williamson hold that it involves knowledge states one can act on 
automatically.126 The view that a skilful action is one executed automatically is 
not without controversy; there is debate as to whether this performance is truly 
automatic, or involves a degree of reflection.127 But even the more intellectualist 
accounts of skill agree that skill involves and depends on some automatic non-
knowledge based components. Also it seems uncontroversial that the skilled 
action is one executed relatively ‘effortlessly’ with less deliberation than its non-
skilled counterpart. E.g. on Dreyfus’ view, the distinction between a merely 
proficient, and an expert performance, is that the latter is void of the agency; 
the expert does not need to deliberate what to do; they just ‘see’ it.128 
Another feature of skill is that skilled actions are situation-specific, i.e. skill 
involves more than just repeating the same action over again. Skill entails being 
able to respond skilfully ‘in an infinite number of ways to the infinite number 
of possible situations’.129 In particular it involves being able to respond to novel 
situations.130 
Finally, even though the way skills are acquired is a matter of debate131, one 
thing which is definitely not questioned, is that skill is the paradigm of a thing 
which can be improved with practice.132 
My account of skill is fairly minimalist. It embraces all of these features without 
committing to an intellectualist or anti-intellectualist picture of skill. I am not 
committed to the intellectualist claim that in order for an action to be skilful, 
                                                 
126  Stanley and Williamson, 2017. 
127  See e.g. Stanley and Krakauer (2013) for an argument for the view that skill involves 
reflection. 
128  Stanley and Krakauer, 2013. 
129  Toner, 2017, p.3. 
130  Stanley and Williamson, 2017. 
131  E.g., Stanley and Krakauer (2013) hold that skills require instruction or observation of 
someone else. 
132  Stanley and Williamson, 2017. 
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it has to be guided by knowledge. And I am not making a commitment to the 
anti-intellectualist picture either. 
I will merely mean, by saying that one is skilled at X, that one is able to reliably 
do X well, where ‘well’ means effortlessly and successfully, in all kinds of 
possible, including novel, situations. 
By extension, to say that one is skilled in empathy here means no more than 
that: if you try to empathise, you will reliably, unless unlucky, do this well 
(effortlessly and successfully), and you will be able to do this well in various, 
including novel, situations. 
However, empathy is a complex process involving many things, and even 
though I have said what I mean by the claim that ‘you are a skilled agent’, there 
is the question to ask of what, more specifically, it means to be skilled at 
empathy? I will turn to this question now. 
 
2.3.2. What it means to be skilled at empathy? 
Separate from the question of what a skill is in general, there is the question of 
what the skill of empathy is, more specifically. I will address this question now. 
Empathy is the recreation in one’s imagination of another’s experience. In the 
previous section I claimed that to say that one is skilled at X means that one 
reliably does X well (effortlessly and successfully) whenever one does X. But it 
is not clear what it means to say that one is skilled at recreating another’s 
experience in one’s imagination. To be skilled at empathy would mean that one 
reliably empathises well. 
Given the model of empathy provided above in section 2.1.3 there are a couple 
of things that can be said about empathising well; that is, there are a few factors 
that can distinguish between instances of relatively better empathy and of 
relatively worse empathy. First, better empathy would presumably involve the 
recreation of more rather than fewer dimensions of the other’s experience. One 
ability that would help with making this the case would be the ability to 
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perceive these dimensions in the first place, so that the input to one’s 
empathising be more multi-dimensional; for example, if you tell me what you 
are going through, I could empathise by merely recreating the things that you 
tell me; but presumably my empathy would be even better if I also, 
independently, perceive certain aspects of your experience, e.g., the intonation 
of your voice, your posture, and other things can tell me more about what you 
are going through. Second, better empathy would involve some grasp of how 
the various dimensions of the other’s experience go together; it would not be 
enough simply to recreate various dimensions of another’s experience but 
presumably this recreation would be accompanied whenever possible by some 
kind of grasp of the connections between the dimensions. One way in which 
this grasp can be manifested is in the ability to fill in gaps in the other’s 
experience – that is, to infer information about the dimensions of the other’s 
experience that one does not have information about to begin with. Third, 
better empathy would involve relatively fine-grained distinctions between 
different values of the dimensions of experience. For example, whereas in a 
relatively worse instance of empathy, I can recreate your emotional dimension 
as having the value ‘sadness’, my empathy would be better if I recreate your 
emotional dimension in a more fine-grained way, having a more specific value, 
like ‘misery’, or ‘depression’, or ‘melancholy’. This requires the ability to 
differentiate between the phenomenology of different experiential states even 
where the differences between states might be subtle. 
From these three factors which can be used to distinguish better empathy from 
worse empathy we can infer a few empathy-specific abilities that would enable 
one to be a skilled empathiser. Since empathy is a complex process which 
involves many different things, to be skilled at empathy would mean that one 
is also skilled at some, or all, of these things. Here is a potentially inexhaustive 
list of abilities that enable one to empathise well: 
1. The ability to detect experiences in others; 
2. The ability to differentiate the phenomenology of different experiential 
states; 
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3. The ability to see connections between various aspects of a person’s 
experience, manifest in the ability to figure out dimensions of another’s 
experience where information about these dimensions was not available 
as an input. 
Any of these three abilities enable one to empathise well. 
2.3.2.1. The ability to detect experiences in others. 
It seems reasonable to suggest that in order to be able to recreate another’s 
experience well, one should be able to reliably generate inputs to this 
recreation. For example, in a face-to-face interaction, it seems very important 
that one is able to ‘read’ another person well, to accurately infer their 
experiential state from e.g. body language, facial expressions, intonations, 
gestures, and so on. In general in order to recreate well another’s experience, 
one has to be sensitive enough to have the right input to one’s imaginative 
enterprise. And this ability to detect things which are not served on a plate, as 
it were, seems to be something we can become better at with practice, it can 
become spontaneous and effortless, and we can just come to just ‘see’, say, the 
emotion in another’s face, or the discomfort in that twitch of the hand, and so 
on. Being better able to immediately ‘see’ the other’s emotion, rather than 
needing to infer it in some process, seems like a good candidate for being an 
instance of perceptual learning – perhaps there is a skill of attentional weighting 
and or stimulus imprinting which is involved there. Perception can be learned, 
and the way we see and hear things can be modified.133 Whether or not an 
instance of perceptual learning, or of a perception-based skill (the distinction 
is sometimes hard to draw134) the ability to pick up dimensions of others’ 
experiences seems to enable one to empathise well. 
This perceptiveness is sometimes a necessary prerequisite for good empathy. I 
cannot empathise if I do not have inputs hence the skill of obtaining inputs is 
important for empathy. However, I do not think that this skill is essential to 
empathy, since empathy is about recreation rather than detection of inputs, 
                                                 
133  Goldstone and Byrge, 2015. 
134  Connolly, 2017. 
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therefore the skill of empathy does not essentially involve the skilful detection 
of others’ emotions. This is similar to the way in which an important 
prerequisite for skilful empathy might be that one is, say, an attentive person, 
or someone who has good powers of concentration; yet neither of these two is 
essentially a part of the skill of empathy as such. For example, I can in principle 
empathise well with you even if am terrible at reading faces, body language, and 
so on. If you had told me directly what you are going through in sufficient detail, 
say, in a written letter, I would still be able to empathise well. Therefore 
perceptiveness to inputs is not part of the essence of empathy. 
Yet, the person skilled at empathy will be one good at detecting dimensions of 
the other’s experience for themselves prior to empathising. This is so because 
the skilled empathiser is one who is able to empathise well in a range of 
circumstances, including in novel situations, and since the overwhelming 
majority of situations would be situations where the inputs to empathy would 
not be served on a plate to the empathiser, the ability to detect experiences in 
others will be crucial if one is to become a skilled empathiser. It is the 
empathiser rather than someone else, who is the person seeking out inputs to 
their recreation of the other’s experience. Nor are these inputs limited to the 
very beginning, before one has started empathising. For example if I start 
empathising with you and as a result figure out that you are anxious, I will 
actively seek out features in your behaviour that might betray the level and kind 
of anxiety you are experiencing; these features might have escaped my notice 
had I not already figured out you are anxious in the first place. In this sense the 
importance for good empathy of the ability to detect experiences in others 
cannot be disregarded. It is an ability important not only prior to empathising 
but during empathising as well, and even if it is in principle possible to have an 
instance of good empathy where no detection of the other’s experiences took 
place (and in this sense the detection of inputs for one’s recreation is not 
essential to empathy), a skilled empathiser will have the ability to detect the 
other’s experiences. 
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2.3.2.2. The ability to differentiate between different experiential states. 
Skilled empathy involves being able to represent in one’s imagination with a 
fine enough detail what another’s experience feels like135. This involves being 
able to differentiate between (the phenomenology of) subtle nuances of 
feelings, between slightly different thoughts, and being aware of all kinds of 
bodily sensations, subtle changes in affection, differences between seemingly 
similar beliefs, and so on – that go hand in hand with this experience. This skill 
is important, since many emotions cannot be clearly distinguished between 
without the help of actually recreating the entire complex of affective and 
cognitive state. It is not just fear, it is a specific kind of fear, at a specific thing, 
experienced in a specific way. Therefore in order to be able to put one’s finger 
on what another is actually feeling, it might be needed that one accurately 
represents inside the way another’s state feels like. 
The ability to make fine-grained distinctions between different experiential 
states has two merits. One is that my recreation of your experience would have 
the chance to better represent your experience, because I would represent it in 
a higher resolution, as it were. Say you are being positively excited about 
something. If I am empathising in low-resolution mode, which is a worse 
instance of empathy, I might just recreate a general emotion of happiness 
together with expectation. Alternatively, if I empathise better, I would 
empathise in higher resolution mode, and will recreate the specific kind of joy 
you are experiencing. I will be sensitive to the fact that while one kind of joy 
feels like this, another feels like this, and the two feelings, albeit similar, are 
actually distinct. 
The second merit of this ability is that I would be able to interpret well the 
outputs of my own recreation. Again, I would be able to produce a high-
resolution image of the unknowns of your experience. In a worse instance of 
empathy, the output of my recreation would be that you are experiencing a kind 
                                                 
135  Like Baker, I use ‘feel’ in a broad sense here: ‘the “feeling” referred to in the empathic 
ascription is not intended to stand for merely the affective states or emotions of the target, 
but rather the indeterminately wide-ranging phenomenal character of what it is like to be the 
target.’  Baker, 2016, p.44. 
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of negative affect. This is a fairly broad-brush suggestion of what you are going 
through. However, in an instance of better empathy, I would produce a higher-
resolution image of what you are going through. If I am good at differentiating 
between the phenomenology of different experiences, I will be able to do that, 
since I will be able to be aware of the state in a finer detail – e.g. I will 
differentiate between different kinds of misery, melancholy, anguish, and so on. 
 
2.3.2.3. The ability to see connections among various aspects of the human experience, 
manifest in the ability to fill in gaps about the other’s experience. 
Skilful empathy involves one’s having a grasp of how various elements of the 
human experience interact with one another. For example, how one emotion is 
likely to impact another, what kind of emotion goes with what kind of 
judgment, what kind of thought generates what kind of bodily feeling, and so 
on. This grasp need not be anything more than an intuitive grasp of how 
different aspects of a person’s experience fit together. 
Even though skilful empathy might manifest such an understanding, I think it 
is hard to speak about ‘the skill of understanding’ as such. This is so because in 
the case of empathy (as opposed to, say, the case where one’s goal is to build a 
theory about the human experience) it seems that this understanding is not 
manifested in any other way apart from one’s being able to accurately portray 
another’s experience, and to accurately ‘fill in’ any unknowns in another’s 
experience. So even though it might be reasonable to suggest that skilful 
empathy is a manifestation of a deeper understanding, I think there is little that 
can be said about it apart from how it is manifested more concretely through 
the ability to fill in the unknown ‘gaps’ of the other’s experience. 
Empathy is the activity of recreating another’s experience in one’s imagination. 
As already argued, one’s experience is multi-dimensional. Part of empathy is 
the recreation of dimensions of experience which are known to the empathiser 
at the start of the activity – they are the ‘input’ for empathy – but this does not 
exhaust the activity of recreation. An essential part of empathy is also the 
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recreation of dimensions of experience which are not initially available to the 
empathiser as an input. Essential to the skill of empathy is the ability to ‘fill the 
unknowns’ of what another person’s experience is like. 
The skill to figure out the ‘extra’ information which one did not have to begin 
with, follows from one’s grasp of the complex ways in which different aspects 
of a person’s experience can affect one another. Arguably, through practice one 
can come to have a kind of intuitive understanding of how the machinery of 
one’s experiences holds together. One becomes better able to just imagine 
certain dimensions of another’s experience and see what values along the other 
dimensions of experience would fit in the unknowns of the equation. 
This skill is related to the ability to differentiate between different experiential 
states. In a skilled imaginative recreation the ‘extra’ information will somehow 
‘fall off’ almost automatically, of itself, as it were. And what helps with that is 
one’s being able to internally accurately imagine just how a particular 
experiential state feels like. The idea is that one does not use only one’s 
knowledge-that in order to figure out what a particular, unknown, aspect of 
another’s experience ‘must be’ like. One uses the intelligence of one’s entire self, 
one’s embodied intelligence. For example, if one begins by knowing particular 
dimensions of another’s experience (e.g. that the other is undergoing a certain 
emotion) one then recreates these dimensions in one’s imagination (I imagine 
having that emotion), and then turns one’s awareness inward, to become aware 
of what the other dimensions of the state one has just recreated would be like 
(e.g. what sort of desire I, the person having that emotion, would have). 
Therefore the ability to differentiate between the phenomenology of different 
experiential states is an important part of the skill of ‘filling in unknowns’ in 
another’s experience. 
The kinds of ‘unknowns’ that empathy would aim at filling can be various. They 
can be any of the dimensions of experience. But also, temporally, these 
unknowns can be simultaneous with the known dimensions of experience, or, 
alternatively, they can be in the future or past to the known dimensions of 
experience. This would result in three different projects that empathy can help 
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us achieve. One, the primary one, is to fill in the unknowns in the present 
moment – I know about certain dimensions of your experience at a point in 
time t, and am figuring out what the other dimensions of your experience at the 
same point in time t, are. 
However, empathy can also help us achieve any of two other projects – about 
the past or the future. 
2.3.2.4.1. Using empathy in order to predict the future. 
In one case I have information about your experience now, and am using my 
re-creation of your present experience in order to predict what experience you 
would have in the future. This would only be possible in so far as your future 
experience depends on your present one. Usually this would be the case when 
predicting the immediate future. 
Of course, filling in gaps as regards the future is less reliable than filling in gaps 
as regards the present because at any moment in time a lot of factors might 
intervene and change one’s state. The phone might ring, or one might suddenly 
have a thought that does not in any obvious way relate to anything one was 
experiencing up to this moment. However, this does not make prediction 
hopeless. 
I would argue that when it comes to predicting the immediate future there is 
little distinction between predicting another’s immediate action, and the 
already discussed filling in the gaps of another’s current experience. In both 
cases we start with what we know and work our way toward filling the 
unknowns of another’s experience with what seems intuitively the thing that 
will best ‘fit’ the model. The only difference is that in the case of prediction the 
unknowns are situated in the immediate future as opposed to being about the 
present moment. But in both cases the mechanism of inference is the same. 
At least for some of the dimensions of experience, there is a sense in which one’s 
immediate future actions are already somehow encoded in the present. As 
argued by Gordon declarations of our own immediate intentions are not 
products of inferences from premises; a rather more plausible explanation of 
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our success rate in predicting our own immediate behaviour is that our 
predictions are ‘causally tied to some actual precursor of behaviour’.136 If we are 
able to predict our own immediate behaviour, it seems that if I recreate in my 
imagination your present state, I could be able to figure out what you are likely 
to do next. There is no disjunction, no ‘gap’ between the present moment and 
the immediate future, that we need to bridge in order to know what will happen 
next – the immediate future is somehow contained in the present. If in my 
recreation of your experience I have recreated the dimensions of your 
experience which would be a psychological spring of immediate action, I would 
be as well placed as you are, to predict what your next experience would be like. 
Therefore, empathy seems like it could be useful for predicting the immediate 
future. The skilled empathiser would almost inevitably be someone who is able 
to do that well enough. Perhaps, in the case of certain particularly gripping 
experience, empathising with these experiences well might enable a skilled 
empathiser to predict another’s state even beyond the immediate future. 
However, this is beyond the scope of what the skill of empathy as such involves. 
 
2.3.2.4.1. Using empathy in order to reconstruct the past. 
In the other case I have information about your experience now, and am trying 
to figure out what your experience was in the past, preceding your present 
experience. Say you were very angry with someone today; can I use empathy in 
order to understand what it is that caused this anger? I think the answer is yes. 
In this case the use of empathy is more laborious than in the previous one; I run 
various possible scenarios of what your preceding experience could have been 
like, and see which of these would result in my having the same experience as 
you are having now. 
In this sense using empathy in order to reconstruct the past is secondary to 
using it in order to predict the future. We only experience time passing 
forwards; so when I start with a recreation of your experience right now (being 
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angry at someone) it would be more natural for me to predict what you are 
going to experience next, as opposed to what you have experienced already. 
In order to use empathy for reconstructing the past, I will need to empathise 
with a few different hypothetical versions of your past self. Each version will 
have an experience which I suspect you might have had. Then in each of these 
activities of recreation, I will try to predict whether ‘I’ am likely to end up having 
your current experience. 
Matravers has recently made a similar distinction between two kinds of project. 
One is where we know the other person’s situation and we want to figure out 
what they will decide to do, e.g. if we see a friend outside a restaurant window 
reading the menu, and we are trying to figure out if they will choose to walk in. 
The other is where we know the other’s reaction and from it try to figure out 
what the other’s experience was, e.g. a friend who turns around during a hike, 
and we are supposed to infer that they have seen a grizzly bear. In the former 
project (the ‘process strategy’) we imagine being our friend and try to see what 
they will decide, whereas in the latter project (what after Goldman he calls the 
‘generate and test strategy’) we have the end-result of a state and are trying to 
figure out what triggered it.137 The former case exemplifies what I would call the 
primary use of simulation, and the latter might involve running many 
simulations, and running the former project many times – I hypothesise what 
your initial state might be, and then use simulation to see whether it would lead 
to the behaviour I have actually observed. 
Even if being skilled at empathy might result in us being good at action 
prediction (predicting the future or reconstructing the past), still prediction is 
not essential to what empathy is since prediction is not part of empathy. One 
might be a skilled empathiser and empathise well with another, yet fail to 
predict their next steps because this is not their goal, and also because 
sometimes one’s subsequent experiences are not intimately connected with 
one’s present one. 
                                                 
137  Matravers, 2017a, p.33. 
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2.4. Conclusion. 
In this chapter, I provided an account of empathy as recreating another’s 
experience in one’s imagination. On this account empathy is experientially 
imagining having the experience of the other. I pointed to the fact that 
experience is multi-dimensional and I made the important assumption that 
various dimensions of experience affect one another in ways which obey their 
own inherent loose ‘logic’. Therefore I argued that since experiential imaginings 
are parasitic on experiences, they are also going to be multi-dimensional, and 
they are going to mimic the loose logic in which various dimensions of 
experience affect one another. Hence I proposed the following model of how 
empathy works: when I empathise with you, I input in my imaginative 
recreation of your experience those dimensions of your experience about which 
I have information (i.e. whose value I know) and then, when I recreate in my 
imagination those dimensions of your experience, certain values of the other 
dimensions would suggest themselves, because the experientially imagined 
dimensions of experience would obey the loose logic which dimensions of 
experience obey. 
In this chapter I also distinguished empathy from sympathy and from 
emotional contagion, and finally, I spoke of empathy as a skill. I argued that 
being skilled at empathy would involve being skilled in three things – detecting 
experiences in others, differentiating between different experiential states, and 
seeing connections among various dimensions of experience. The final skill 
manifests itself in the ability to figure out what certain dimensions of another’s 
experience must be like, given what one already knows about other dimensions. 
In the following chapter I will argue that empathy has epistemic value. I will 
argue that this activity of imaginative recreation allows us to attain some 
epistemic goods.  
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3. The epistemic value of empathy. 
In this chapter I will argue that empathy is epistemically valuable in three ways: 
it is valuable as a source of information about (1) other people, (2) objects in the 
world that are independent of the experiences of other people, and (3) oneself. 
As regards how these values relate to one another, the second kind of value is 
parasitic upon the first. It is in this sense a secondary value. Because of what 
empathy is – recreating in one’s imagination the experience of another – the 
‘direct’ or primary epistemic value of empathy is related just to understanding 
what the other person is experiencing. Empathy as a tool for learning things 
about the world is valuable only by virtue of one’s having already understood 
how another person feels. 
I will discuss the three different values of empathy in the three sections that 
follow. 
 
3.1. Empathy as a method for understanding others. 
In this section I will argue that empathy is a valuable tool for understanding 
other people. 
In daily life we seem able to understand each other 'on different levels, without 
always being able to explicate what it is that we understand, or why we feel a 
certain way for this or that person'.138 In what follows I will try to capture certain 
aspects of this understanding. 
What sorts of things about another person can we learn when we empathise? 
According to the model outlined in Chapter 2, we start with a certain input 
about another’s experience, i.e. information about some of the dimensions of 
their experience, then we imaginatively recreate that person’s experience, and 
the output of the process is information about what some of the other 
                                                 
138  Straver, 2007, p.43. 
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dimensions of that person’s experience are like. Via empathy we can learn that 
certain dimensions of the other’s experience feel like this. 
In what follows I will argue that empathy is a useful tool for understanding 
others since it is a powerful and user-friendly method of navigating the 
complexity of the human experience. First, I will argue that the epistemic goods 
obtained by empathy are better thought of as understanding rather than 
knowledge. Then I will argue that empathy is a user-friendly tool for attaining 
an understanding of others. Finally, I consider three challenges to empathy as 
a reliable method of attaining understanding of others. 
 
3.1.1. The status of the epistemic goods we arrive at via empathy. 
First I will discuss the epistemic status of whatever it is that we arrive at via 
empathising. I will here argue that these epistemic goods are better thought of 
as understanding rather than as knowledge. 
A reductionist would disagree with this move since reductionism about 
understanding treats understanding as a species of knowledge.139 An example 
of a reductionist position is a view common in philosophy of science, according 
to which understanding is seen as a knowledge of causes.140 
There are other views apart from reductionism: for example many 
epistemologists deny that understanding is a species of knowledge at all.141 For 
example Pritchard argues that understanding and knowledge of causes can 
come apart in both directions - one can have knowledge about the cause of X, 
without understanding why X, and vice versa.142 He argues that understanding, 
unlike knowledge, is a cognitive achievement, and is harder to acquire than 
knowledge.143 
                                                 
139  Sliwa, 2015. 
140  Pritchard, 2014. 
141  Grimm, 2006. 
142  Pritchard, 2014. 
143  Pritchard, 2014. 
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There are positions that sit somehow in between the two views of reductionism 
and non-reductionism. Grimm, on his ‘grasping account’ of understanding144, 
argues that understanding is essentially a knowledge of causes, but a non-
propositional one. Because of the knowledge element in this account, one 
might be tempted to classify Grimm’s position as a reductionist one, however, 
according to Grimm, it is also the case that understanding requires ‘a distinctive 
excellence of the mind’ which is one different from ‘introspection or memory, 
or rational inference, or perception’ or anything which is required for 
knowledge as standardly understood.145 Therefore I am more tempted to think 
that Grimm is really expanding the extension of the term ‘knowledge’ rather 
than arguing that understanding is something reducible to other, more familiar 
kinds of knowledge, such as the justified true belief model. 
It is not my intention to partake in the debate between reductionism and non-
reductionism about understanding. Rather, I merely want to claim that the 
nature of the epistemic goods obtained via empathy seems to be better captured 
by that which on several accounts counts as ‘understanding’ rather than 
‘knowledge’. Whether or not this ‘really’ is, for example, just a special kind of 
non-propositional knowledge, is of little interest to me here. But it seems to me 
safer to adopt the term ‘understanding’ when speaking about the epistemic 
goods obtained via empathy, because the term ‘knowledge’ might carry 
connotations of something more specific, and because, as I will now show, at 
least a couple of accounts of understanding seem quite suitable candidates for 
capturing the nature of the epistemic goods obtained by empathy. 
One of these accounts is Grimm’s account which I already mentioned. On this 
account understanding is seen as ‘grasping’ a ‘modal space’ around an event146 
– the essence of understanding lies in our ability to entertain possibilities of 
differences. This contrasts with knowledge, which could be more atomistic: 
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145  Grimm, forthcoming. 
146  Grimm, forthcoming. 
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Thus you might know that Trenton is the capital of New Jersey, or that 
you had eggs on toast for breakfast this morning, but it would sound odd 
to say you understand these things. It is also not obvious that if you 
bundled several items of knowledge together—at least, items of 
propositional knowledge—that this would magically yield 
understanding. Thus you might know a lot about the sport of cricket, or 
about helicopters, without really understanding cricket or helicopters. 
Understanding thus seems to require not just holding several related 
things before the mind, but in some way “seeing” or “grasping” or 
appreciating this relatedness.147 
To use Grimm’s example, I understand why a helium balloon rises in the air if I 
am able to appreciate that it is the helium, rather than something else, that 
made the balloon rise. I am able to appreciate some relations of dependence 
that hold in the world: that if the balloon was filled in with a different gas, it 
would not have risen; that if the balloon was of a different colour, that would 
not have made a difference to its rising; and so on. It is in this sense that 
understanding is, according to Grimm, knowledge of causes: understanding is 
about appreciating ‘how changing the value of some variables will lead to 
changes in the focal event, while changing the value of other variables will 
not’.148 I think that this captures something central to the epistemic goods 
which empathy yields. When I imagine what it is like to be you, what I gain, 
epistemically, is an appreciation of how certain dimensions of your experience 
affect others; of what certain dimensions of your experience could be like, given 
what I already know about the others. Since what I seem to grasp is some kind 
of relation of dependence, it seems proper to say that, on Grimm’s account, via 
empathy we ‘understand’ people, rather than that we ‘know’ them. 
Another account of understanding which seems to capture something essential 
about that which empathy gives us access to, is that of Zagzebski. According to 
her, understanding, unlike knowledge, is not directed at a discrete proposition, 
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but it is about seeing relations between various parts in a bigger scheme of 
things; it is about ‘seeing how the parts of that body of knowledge fit 
together’.149 Grimm refers to Zagzebski’s account as ‘internalism’ about 
understanding – a view according to which understanding is ‘a matter of 
grasping or seeing connections among one’s beliefs’.150 On this view, 
understanding lies in the relation of mental states, rather than in some actual 
correspondence between my mental states and the world outside of me. In 
other words, something is an understanding not in virtue of being an accurate 
representation of how things actually are in the world, but rather in virtue of 
fitting in with one’s own system of beliefs. In this sense on Zagzebski’s account 
understanding has ‘internalist conditions for success’.151 According to her, 
understanding is not directed at a discrete proposition, but it is about seeing 
relations between various parts in a bigger scheme of things. This makes 
understanding a suitable candidate for what we obtain via empathy. 
Given that Grimm’s and Zagzebzki’s accounts both seem to capture features of 
the epistemic goods obtainable via empathy, from now on I will refer to the 
epistemic goods attained via empathy as ‘understanding’ rather than as 
‘knowledge’. 
 
3.1.2. Empathy as a user-friendly method of understanding another. 
Here I will argue that empathy is a user-friendly method of understanding 
another’s experience. Empathy’s particular value lies in its allowing us with 
relative ease to navigate the complex landscape of human experience. In this 
regard I will now try to show that empathy compares favourably, as a means for 
obtaining understanding of another person, with the alternative means of 
merely reasoning about another’s experience. 
Empathy is just one particular method for attaining understanding of another 
person, and in Chapter 2 I already provided a model of how empathy works. 
                                                 
149  Zagzebski, 2001, p.244. 
150  Grimm, 2006, p.518. 
151  Zagzebski, 2001, p.246. 
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Briefly, according to this model, when I empathise with you, I ‘input’ 
information about certain dimensions of your experience, I recreate these 
dimensions of experience in my imagination, whereby I figure out that it feels 
like this to be you, where ‘this’ is not limited to the dimensions of your 
experience I already had information about at the start, and the ‘output’ of 
empathy is information about certain other dimensions of experience about 
which I did not know to begin with. 
I already argued above in section 2.1.1.1 that the different dimensions of 
experience influence one another in complex ways. In light of this complexity, 
it is not a straightforward task to figure out, from information about what 
certain dimensions of another’s experience are like, what other dimensions of 
another’s experience are like. I would argue that empathy is better suited for 
achieving this task than reasoning alone is. 
The argument for this is that, given the complexity of the human experience, 
for any two dimensions of experience there is a low likelihood that I am able to 
help myself to a good theory about how certain dimensions influence others. 
Granted, there are cases where pure reasoning alone might be well suited and 
sufficient for me to be able to ‘fill in the gaps’ of your experience. Sometimes 
dimensions of experience are related to one another in ways of which we are 
well aware, and with which we are very familiar. For example, I do not need to 
empathise with you in order to know that your hunger would make you angry 
if you discover that someone has had your lunch. In certain cases reasoning 
alone seems to be a very good method of attaining a certain understanding of 
you.  
However, I would argue that the use of reasoning is limited to a restricted range 
of scenarios. It is only in some cases that I will be able to reliably help myself to 
my reasoning in order to ‘fill in the gaps’ of your experience because we can 
only reason about scenarios about which we have certain theories about how 
different dimensions of experience go together. By contrast, in empathy I am 
making use of my own bodily intelligence, hence there is no restriction on the 
sort of situation I can empathise with, because all that is required is for me to 
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imagine having the same experience. No matter what the input dimensions are, 
and no matter what the output dimensions I am interested in learning about, 
empathy would in most cases result in me having at least some guess about 
what way your dimensions of experience may be like. In this sense empathy 
would be likely to give me an output, no matter what the initial conditions of 
the scenario are. The reason for this is that whenever I imaginatively recreate 
certain dimensions of experience, my recreation would always result in my 
having a certain guess about what the other dimensions of experience are. This 
is so because I myself am a being who has multi-dimensional experiences, and 
whenever I recreate certain of the dimensions of a possible experience, I will 
‘automatically’ as it were fill the rest of the gaps. The human experience does 
not tolerate vacuum; as long as my recreation is a recreation of a real human 
experience, my imagination will fill in the gaps of all dimensions of experience. 
Hence empathy is particularly useful in attaining an understanding of others 
because it allows us to ‘see’ connections between dimensions of human 
experience even in cases where we have no relevant ‘theory’ about how the 
particular dimensions fit together. 
One thing that could strengthen the case for empathy as an epistemic method 
of attaining understanding of others is the observation that human experience 
is so complex that for the most part, we are in no possession of a theory of how 
different dimensions of experience fit together. When I want to learn 
something about dimensions of your experience, it might be better for me to 
empathise with you rather than rely on reasoning alone just because reasoning 
alone might sometimes not yield much information and I might risk ‘missing 
out on’ some ways in which certain factors are relevant to how you experience 
things. What I have in mind here is something similar to one of the arguments 
put forward by simulation theorists. According to this argument, simulating the 
states of others is a more plausible candidate for making sense of them than 
theorising about these states, because there is no theory of relevance that we 
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can appeal to in order to figure out which of their thoughts are relevant at a 
particular moment.152 
There is no theory which can tell us which of our vast web of beliefs 
might bear on our thoughts. That is, there is no theory of relevance. 
However, we have the remarkable ability to follow a train of thought and 
judge ‘from the inside’ whether or not a thought is relevant.153 
The simulationists therefore believe that in order to figure out which of the 
other’s beliefs are relevant, we use ‘the same ability as we use to spot which of 
our innumerable beliefs are relevant’.154 This ability does not consist in appeal 
to a theory. If it is plausible that there is no theory of relevance, one can argue 
in a vein similar to that of the simulationist argument, that theorising about 
another’s experience might not often help us make sense of how various 
dimensions of that experience go together. If so, empathy would seem 
particularly valuable for making sense of another’s experience. 
Another value of empathy as a method of attaining understanding of another’s 
experience, is that it is ‘user-friendly’. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, 
that I can help myself to a theory about how the various dimensions of your 
experience go together. In other words, let us assume that I would not ‘miss out 
on’ any possible connection between the different dimensions of your 
experience that I am interested in. In this way, I know from the start that 
empathy and pure reasoning are two routes that would take me to the exact 
same destination, where I would have, in the end, the exact same understanding 
of your experience (I will discuss in the following section why this is a 
controversial assumption to make, but I am making the case for empathy hard 
here for the sake of argument). My claim that empathy is more ‘user-friendly’ 
in this analogy amounts to the claim that one of the two routes is smoother, or 
easier to follow. In particular, what I have in mind, is that empathy makes use 
of the entire ‘machinery’ of myself. I am already this complex system – this 
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153  Matravers, 2017a, p.31. 
154  Matravers, 2017a, p.31., italics mine. 
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being, which has multi-dimensional experience. Since I already have this 
‘machinery’ for outputs at my disposal anyway, it seems a neater and more user-
friendly tool for my producing information about your experience, than 
attaining and making use of a theory of human experience. This theory will be 
incredibly complex, if it is possible to produce at all, and it does not seem like 
the most ‘efficient’ way of making use of the tools that I already have at hand – 
my own complex of bodily intelligence, that I have. Instead, if I only use 
reasoning in order to attain an understanding of your experience, I will need to 
have produced a ‘duplicate’ mechanism in order to reply to the very same 
questions to which I could have replied by not producing such a theory in the 
first place. 
In this sense there are two points here. One is that helping myself to such a 
theory would be needlessly burdensome, given that the theory will have to be 
very complex. If I want to make use of this theory in an efficient way, I will have 
to simplify it and hence run the risk of over-simplifying. The second point is 
that empathy is just ‘easier’ and more ‘natural’ to us, in a similar way in which, 
say, looking at a diagram explaining something might be ‘easier’ and more 
‘natural’ to us than reading a couple of pages explaining the same thing. 
The point that we can use our own selves, rather than a theory, in order to 
understand others, is one of the main strengths in the simulation theory versus 
theory theory debate about the way in which we ‘mindread’. Part of the elegance 
and appeal of ST is precisely in the fact that it does not stipulate an additional 
body of knowledge – a theory – in order to make mindreading possible. All we 
need to have is all that we already have anyway – our own minds, equipped with 
the imagination which we use already anyway in order to make plans and/or 
predictions about our own selves. There is no need for analogical inferences 
since in the case of simulation we use ‘the same intentional scheme that makes 
our endogenous responses intelligible to ourselves’.155 
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With this I hope to have shown that empathy is a more user-friendly means of 
attaining understanding of another person than pure reasoning is. I also hope 
to have shown that empathy is less epistemically risky than not empathising in 
attaining an understanding of another person. Of course, in practice this latter 
point does not amount to much. If I am interested in attaining an 
understanding of you, and if I have the time resources to empathise with you, I 
probably also have the resources to theorise about your experience – this is so, 
because theories we employ in reality are likely to be sufficiently simple 
anyhow. 
This mode of apprehending is particularly ‘user-friendly’: according to 
Steinberg experience is 'not the exclusive reservoir of certain kinds of facts, but 
rather is a particularly colourful and user-friendly mode of apprehension'.156 On 
this account part of the epistemic value of empathy comes from its user-
friendliness. 
 
3.1.3. Does empathy give us extra understanding? 
Above in section 3.1.2 I argued that empathy is a user-friendly tool of attaining 
an understanding of others. I assumed that empathising with you is just one 
route of getting to an understanding of you, and understanding is in principle 
achievable via alternative routes as well. 
In this section I will discuss the question of whether empathy actually generates 
a special kind of understanding which is not one usually achievable via 
alternative means. Following Steinberg I will refer to the view that empathy is 
the exclusive way for us to acquire a certain understanding of others, as 
‘exclusivism’.157 
There is one sense in which exclusivism might seem trivial to defend. After all, 
empathy gives us access to phenomenal facts, which are ‘facts that are uniquely 
tied to an experiential perspective, which cannot be captured from the third-
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person impersonal perspective’.158 One feature of subjective experience is that 
certain states, such as seeing red, have the property that it is like something to 
be in them; typical examples of such states include ‘perceptual experiences, 
bodily sensations, felt emotions, and felt moods’.159 These states have 
phenomenal content, or ‘what-its-likeness’ which is arguably a property not 
reducible to other properties. Empathy involves recreating your experience in 
my imagination, and hence it involves an access to the what-its-likeness of your 
state; it involves my appreciation that your experience feels like this. If I am 
grasping your experience without trying to feel the ‘what-its-likeness’ of it, I am 
trivially missing an aspect of your experience. Unless I recreate the what-its-
likeness of your experience in my imagination, and am able to make the 
demonstrative ascription that you feel like this, there will be something about 
your experience that I am not appreciating – namely, that you feel like this. I 
cannot get at this phenomenal content via mere theorising. 
This much seems uncontroversial. Empathy involves entertaining phenomenal 
content in our imagination. In so far as having access to the what-its-likeness 
of your experience is seen as itself being epistemically valuable, then there can 
be little doubt that empathy has special epistemic value, since unlike alternative 
means of learning about your experience, it provides me with the epistemic 
good of having access to the what-its-likeness of your experience. 
A different question is whether, leaving aside any potential epistemic value of 
having access to the what-its-likeness of your experience, empathising with you 
leaves me in any sense epistemologically better than merely having true beliefs 
about what it is like to be you. Does empathy aid me in gaining access to 
epistemic goods (beyond learning about the what-its-likeness of your 
experience) to which I would otherwise not have been likely to gain access? 
At least for certain aspects of experience the answer to this question seems 
negative. Sometimes it seems that there is little if anything that I can learn from 
empathy over and above what I can already learn via theorising alone. This is 
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so in particular when I am concerned with dimensions of experience of which 
we do not usually think as having an associated phenomenal character. For 
example, thoughts, beliefs, and certain desires are of this kind. Therefore I do 
not need to empathise with you in order to appreciate how your various 
thoughts and beliefs fit together. If I know that you like ice-cream and that you 
heard the ice-cream van parking outside, I will know that you want to go 
outside now. I do not need to recreate your experience in order to be able to 
tell this. 
However, for other dimensions of experience it seems more plausible to suggest 
that empathy is especially valuable epistemically. It is best to consider the case 
of emotions here, both because they are so complex, and because they play such 
a crucial role in the human experience. We might reasonably wonder whether 
the recreation of the phenomenological aspect of an emotion is not 
epistemically better in order to learn about your experience, than merely 
theorising about this experience. I will now argue that yes, in general, this is the 
case. 
The way an emotion ‘feels’ is an important feature of emotional experience. 
According to the largely rejected ‘dumb view’ of emotions, emotions just are 
dumb feelings, which are not related to any ‘content’.160 Presumably, if we adopt 
such an account of emotion, as long as I am aware of the content of your 
emotion, I would gain nothing by imagining its phenomenological feel as well. 
However, this view is largely rejected; and on virtually any other account of 
emotion, the feel of an emotion is in some essential way tied to the content; it 
either makes us aware of this content, or carries this content itself. If something 
like this is correct, then it would be hard to deny that empathy, which involves 
my recreating having the emotion in my imagination – a task that involves 
imagining the phenomenal feel of an emotion, as opposed to just reasoning 
about its contents – would leave me in a better epistemic position than merely 
theorising about the emotion. If I do not empathise with you, I would just fail 
to grasp something essential about your emotional experience, and this will 
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leave me with smaller chances of understanding how the various dimensions of 
your experience fit together. 
However, even if one adopts a view according to which knowing about the 
content of an emotion is sufficient for me to understand the emotion fully, 
there is still a reason why recreating the feel of an emotion might be valuable. 
Recreating the feel of an emotion might help me understand your experience, 
since the feel of your emotion will likely play an important part in your 
experience, for example, it might affect other dimensions of your experience. 
Hence if my task is to understand you, it seems that taking on board the 
phenomenal feel of your experience could be of help in this understanding, by 
virtue of the simple fact that the ‘feel’ of certain dimensions of your experience 
would affect other dimensions of your experience. For example, if you are sad 
and depressed, you might not be able to eat for no other reason than that you 
are feeling nausea. The inability to eat is not part of the content of your sadness 
in any way. But the mere feel of nausea would stop you from eating. Hence, 
insofar as recreating the phenomenological feel of various dimensions of your 
experience is helpful in order to appreciate how various dimensions of your 
experience fit together, then recreation is epistemically valuable. 
I take it that Matravers makes a similar point when he argues that in order to 
be able to predict another’s actions, it is better to actually empathise than 
merely theorise about them, since 'the causal properties of a mental state 
depend on more than its propositional contents'.161 Since the phenomenal feel 
of an emotion might have some causal properties, empathising is helpful if we 
want to replicate the causal role of an emotion. 
Despite what I have just said, empathy still seems in many cases not necessary. 
For example, Matravers argues that, provided that I am already familiar with a 
given emotion then it could be the case that merely believing that you have the 
emotion is just as good, epistemically, as my undergoing it.162 This is so because, 
presumably I am not going to learn anything new about the what-its-likeness 
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of undergoing this emotion so I might be able to theorise about any of the 
relevant properties of the emotional experience without recreating in my 
imagination your having the experience. Maybe feeling the what-its-likeness of 
the emotional experience would not help me understand you better, in this way. 
Perhaps it is enough to have sufficiently specific descriptors of the experience 
instead; if the descriptor of the emotion is as specific as it needs to be in order 
to capture the particularity of the emotion163 it seems that theorising about it 
would not ‘lose’ information relative to our recreating it in our imagination 
anew. For example imagine the situation where one talks to a close friend who 
is experiencing a similar emotional episode several times. Perhaps one does not 
need to empathise anew in each and every case; one already knows one’s friend 
well enough, and let us say that one is familiar first-hand with a very similar 
emotion. Then, perhaps, merely talking with the friend and obtaining true 
beliefs about their emotional states might be just as good, epistemologically, as 
empathising and having the experience of their emotion. In this case I think 
that Matravers is right to suggest that, if the observer is already familiar with 
another’s emotion, their undergoing it would not be placing them in an 
epistemologically better position than their having merely beliefs about it. 
I think that it is true that recreating another’s experience in many cases does 
not put one in an epistemically better position than had one not recreated this 
experience. However, this does not mean that as a general strategy, 
empathising is not less epistemically risky. After all, in most cases we are 
dealing with, there will be no way of knowing in advance whether the emotion 
the other is undergoing is something we are already familiar with. And in most 
cases our existent theories of how various dimensions of experience affect one 
another would not be precise enough. Thus, unless we empathise, there will be 
a risk of us missing out on attaining some understanding. Even if it turns out 
that in certain cases we could have had the same epistemological data had we 
merely entertained beliefs about the other’s emotions, rather than empathised, 
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this is not something we could have known at the moment of deciding whether 
to empathise with them, or not. So, in a way, empathising is always a safer 
epistemic strategy, in the sense of there will be a lesser risk of missing out on 
understanding of others. 
 
3.1.4. Does one need to adopt a distinctive methodology in order to make sense 
of human beings? 
There is one other avenue one could explore if one wants to hold that empathy 
grants us exclusive access to a certain understanding of others. Namely, it is 
possible to hold the view that something in understanding people in particular 
essentially depends on our recreating their experiences rather than merely 
theorising about them. I will discuss this briefly now. 
One can hold the view that understanding people requires a distinctive 
methodology from that required to understand other things in the world, such 
as natural phenomena, or how a bicycle works.164 This refers to a sphere of 
understanding that Heal calls our ‘personal-level account of psychological 
understanding’165 – in other words, understanding something about others at 
the personal level, as opposed to, say, the biological level. Grimm refers to the 
view that ‘there is something distinctive about understanding human beings’ as 
the ‘humanistic stance’.166 This contrasts with the ‘naturalist stance’ – the view 
that there is nothing special about understanding people as opposed to 
understanding other things, as for example, how a bicycle works. 
A reason to find this view appealing is that people have first-person 
perspectives; therefore, in order to get as full a picture of another as possible, 
one might need to ‘see’ from the perspective of that person’s point of view, 
instead of satisfying oneself with merely looking at them ‘from the outside’. In 
other words, one might need to empathise. If what I learn about you when I 
empathise is not reducible to what I learn about you via merely looking at you 
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‘from the outside’, understanding people via empathy seems to be a good 
candidate for a distinctive methodology suitable for understanding other 
people. In this sense empathy might have a special epistemic value; perhaps it 
is this activity that can uniquely give us access to a full-fledged understanding 
of others. 
In a similar vein Gordon argues that there is a limit to a third-person, spectator 
approach to understanding human behaviour and there are certain facts that 
we only get to know via simulation as opposed to seeing someone from the 
outside.167 He uses the following example: we notice that Sam runs on certain 
nights, and discover that those are the nights when there is a gibbous Moon. 
To spot the correlation between there being a gibbous moon and Sam running 
at night is not sufficient to understand why Sam is running on these nights. We 
will only understand why Sam is running on these nights when we gain access 
to that which is Sam’s reason for running on these nights. And being able to 
understand how something could be a reason for Sam requires us to be able to 
see it as a reason ourselves, if we were Sam. If we ask Sam why he runs on certain 
nights, and he just tells us that he runs because there is a gibbous Moon, we 
still would not be able to understand why he runs on these nights. In order to 
understand we have to be able to climb into Sam’s head, as it were, and 
understand how the connection between running and a gibbous Moon makes 
sense to him. I take it that it is in this sense that Gordon argues that simulation 
is necessary to represent other minds; arguably this is so since a necessary part 
of representing something as having a mind is to represent it as a subject of 
experience, or as a ‘generic “I”’. But: 
To represent something as another “I” is to represent it as a possible 
target of self-projection: as something one might (with varying degrees 
of success) imaginatively put oneself in the place of.168 
If it is indeed essential to our understanding of others as minded to see them 
‘as another “I”’ this would necessitate the possibility to self-project into them. 
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Thus, according to Gordon, simulation is essential to our seeing others ‘as 
another “I”’. Thus, one might wonder whether there is not something central 
about being minded that is somehow ‘missed’ by alternative means to 
understanding someone, means other than recreating them ‘from the inside’. 
However this might be, empathy as understood in this thesis certainly does not 
seem necessary in order to understand others as minded, since presumably, in 
order to empathise with someone, one already understands them as minded in 
the first place. 
 
3.1.5. Understanding different people. 
One of the challenges that has been levelled at empathy as a means of attaining 
an understanding of others is that it cannot account for differences between 
different people. The thought is that if my psychological make-up is very 
different from yours, my imagining what it is like to be you will not yield any 
understanding of you that accurately represents your experience. Matravers 
considers this to be one of two main challenges to empathy as a route to 
knowledge.169 It is that the person we are empathising with might be very 
different from us: they might have an entirely different make-up, different 
character, and some of their properties might be properties we have no access 
to - as for example, their having undergone a trauma in their childhood which 
left them reacting to a particular situation in an idiosyncratic way. I will borrow 
Goldie’s notion of ‘characterisation’ in order to refer to this complex of 
psychological dispositions: 
Aspects of characterisation go beyond the thin notion of rational agency, 
which includes not only traits of character and of personality, but also 
intellectual traits and abilities, such as open-mindedness and quick-
wittedness, and emotional dispositions, such as being compassionate 
towards the homeless, or loving one’s spouse.170 
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Following Goldman, Matravers distinguishes between empathetic perspective-
shifting and in-his-shoes perspective-shifting, and suggests that only the latter 
is epistemically reliable.171 The distinction between empathetic perspective-
shifting and in-his-shoes perspective-shifting captures the difference between 
two activities of imagination: one in which I am imagining being you, and the 
other in which I am imagining being myself in your situation. Empathetic 
perspective-shifting is of limited epistemic reliability because people differ in 
their characterisations. Characterisations influence people’s experiences in 
ways in which they are not necessarily aware of; they act as a background to 
one’s experience, and influence one in such ways that if someone else was in 
my exact same situation, they would experience things differently. For example 
if I am confident person, I might not consider speaking in public as something 
that I could be anxious about. This confidence is part of my characterisation 
that I might not be aware of. Hence if I try to empathise with someone who 
lacks this confidence, I might find it hard to tell that this person might be 
feeling anxious because of an upcoming speech they are to give. Hence 
differences in characterisation are in general an obstacle to empathic 
understanding. 
One can read the claim that differences in characterisation are an obstacle to 
empathic understanding in a strong way, as meaning that this difference in 
characterisations between people leads to a conceptual limitation to what 
empathy can help us understand about others. This is because it seems that as 
an empathiser I will be aware of characteristics of which you are not aware of. 
To use an example Matravers gives: ‘If we are timid, and the other is brave, we 
cannot simply re-enact their thinking, as their thinking will not include the 
thought of bravery, and ours will’.172 The point is that if you are brave, you might 
not be, and are likely not, aware of the way your action is brave, whereas I, in 
recreating your experience, would necessarily be aware of that. Goldie has 
generalised the idea: ‘A cannot, as part of a consciously willed project, keep B’s 
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characterisation in the non-conscious background in her imaginative exercise 
of wondering what B will decide to do in a certain situation’.173 
I consider it to be a valid observation that differences between people will yield 
inaccuracies in empathic understanding, and that the greater the difference 
between you and me, the smaller the chance I have of understanding you 
accurately via empathising. However, I would argue that the claim about there 
being a conceptual limitation in understanding someone with a different 
characterisation is wrong. Empathy is better able to deal with differences in 
characterisation than it is given credit for. 
This much is true. Of course, if I want to recreate you, I will make myself aware 
of some of your features which you are not thinking about at this particular 
moment. However, I do not think that this makes it impossible for me to 
recreate your thinking. Even if I keep your characterisation in mind while 
empathising, there seems to me no conceptual barriers to me still pretending 
to be you; I can keep the thought of your characterisation in the background of 
my thinking, but this would not mean that my recreated version of you is aware 
of this characterisation. It seems to me that it is possible to imagine what it is 
like to be someone who is not aware of something which one is actually aware 
of; similarly, I see no impossibility in imagining what it is like to be someone 
who has a particular characterisation without that person – the recreated 
version of you in my mind – being aware of that characterisation. What does 
the trick here is role-playing. Even if I the empathiser, am well aware of your 
characterisation, the character I enter – which is a different persona – might 
not be aware of this characterisation. I agree that one cannot be not conscious 
of certain things, in adopting another's characterisation. However, one can still 
keep these things in the background; one can imagine 'forgetting' them; this 
seems to me to illustrated, say, by what actors are doing when they enter a 
character. 
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Therefore, I would say that there is no conceptual barrier that makes it 
impossible for me, a very different person than you, to understand your 
experience. Sure, this can be very difficult, and cognitively and emotionally 
tasking. However, the fact that it can be difficult does not make it unachievable. 
Good empathy can, I would argue, at least in principle allow us to recreate the 
thinking of another person – provided, of course, we have the right information 
about their characterisation. 
Once the claim about there being a conceptual difficulty in using empathy to 
understand others has been put aside, one can still claim that there are barriers 
to empathy as a route to understanding others. Maybe this task, even if not in 
principle unachievable, is too demanding and in reality with a very low 
likelihood of success. For example, the reason Matravers thinks that the only 
epistemically reliable activity is in-his-shoes perspective-shifting is that 'we are 
good at thinking counterfactually about different possible states of affairs, but 
not so good at taking on other value systems, or in making ourselves sensitive 
to those things which would trigger our affective states'.174 The thought would 
be that because we are not good at this, the imaginative recreation would not 
often enough yield accurate understanding of the other’s experience to make 
the practice of empathy as a way of understanding others epistemically robust. 
Heal seems to assume a similar thing to what Matravers holds in her discussion 
of simulation theory of mindreading: according to Heal simulation is good for 
simulating cognitive states but less good for affective states; she seems to infer 
this from the observation that we are better at thinking about cognitive than 
about affective states.175 
The observation that we are better at thinking about cognitive than about 
affective states seems right to me. But I would draw from it precisely the 
opposite conclusion – that when it comes to understanding others’ ‘purely 
cognitive’ dimensions of experience, it is then that we can dispense with 
empathy since we can successfully theorise about these experiences. On the 
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contrary, when understanding another’s affective states it seems that recreating 
another’s experience is much more valuable since it can allow us access to 
something that we are not so good at theorising about. 
In other words, where I am concerned merely with dimensions of your 
experience that have no associated phenomenal feel to them, I do not need 
empathy in order to understand you. I take it that this happens because some 
of these dimensions are transparent to imagination – for example, there are no 
differences between my imagining what it is like to be thinking a thought, and 
really thinking it. This is the intuition on which Descartes’ famous cogito ergo 
sum lies – if I am having a thought, I really am having it; my having of a thought 
cannot be in a relevant sense merely an illusion.176 
But whereas I agree that we are better at thinking about cognitive states than 
about affective states, I do not think that this goes against empathy as a route 
to understanding others. On the contrary – it seems to me that recreating 
another person’s experience is much more indispensable in the case of 
understanding their affective states, than it is in the case of understanding their 
cognitive states, just because we are not so good at reasoning about affective 
states, and we need all the help we can get, i.e. to recruit all our capacities as 
opposed to merely theories about them. 
In fact I take it that one of the reasons that there is no conceptual barrier to 
recreating in my imagination the experience of someone very different from 
me, is that I take there to be no conceptual difference between in-his-shoes and 
empathetic imaginings. Both cases can be seen as lying on a spectrum; the 
empathetic imagining is just the imagining where we take on board more 
dimensions of experience. Empathy is useful and especially so when we have to 
take another’s character on board. Character is just an added layer of 
complexity, it is more demanding empathy, but in essence it is still the same. 
For simple imaginings it makes little difference who the ‘I’ is; the ‘I’ is a generic 
‘place-holder’ as it were. Take for example the thought experiment with Mr. 
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Tees and Mr. Crane.177 Both of them arrive late at the airport and miss their 
flights. However, on arrival at the airport, Mr. Tees hears that his flight has been 
delayed and his plane has taken off only 5 minutes ago, whereas Mr. Crane’s 
plane took off one hour ago. The question is who would be more annoyed. If 
we put ourselves in the shoes of Mr. Tees, and of Mr. Crane, it would be easy 
for us to figure out that Mr. Tees is probably more annoyed about missing his 
plane than Mr. Crane is. True, one can arrive at the same conclusion in other 
ways, e.g. by observing that people in general tend to be more frustrated by 
missing things by a little bit than by a lot, but arriving at it via empathy seems 
an efficient and quick way to do it. 
In this example, in which Mr. Tees and Mr. Crane are both ‘place-holders’ as it 
were178, there is no difference between in-his-shoes and empathetic imaginings, 
because we know so little about Mr. Tees and Mr. Crane anyway. They are no 
more than points of view. In this case the identity of the subject does not need 
to be built into the imagining. In this sense Dokic and Arcangeli’s recent notion 
of subjective imagination can be very useful: ‘That the action is my action, or 
someone else’s, is an additional fact in the imaginary world. In other words, 
subjective imagination can be neutral as to the identity of the self that occupies 
the relevant internal perspective.’179 Again, ‘Subjectively imagining oneself 
swimming and subjectively imagining another person swimming both rest on 
the same type of imagining, i.e., the recreation of an internal experience of the 
action of swimming.’180 In cases such as these it is enough to imagine oneself in 
a particular situation. 
In more complex cases, where we are dealing with more ‘fully drawn’ characters, 
by contrast, where we have personalities and characterisations, there are more 
inputs we have to put into our imaginative recreation of a subjective experience. 
However, this does not make the act of imagining in any qualitative way 
different; and as such I do not think that only the latter case should count as 
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empathy, whereas the first should count as something else. On the contrary, it 
seems to me that empathy is about recreating a subjective experience in one’s 
imagination, and whether this experience is one in which I have to also take 
another’s characterisation on board would be an incidental fact. It would not 
drastically change the nature of the kind of task I am engaged in – recreating a 
subjective experience in my imagination. 
In conclusion, empathy in cases where the other is very different from us will 
be complex, and there will be larger scope for misunderstanding, because I will 
need to consider the other’s characterisation and more dimensions of 
experience, and I will need to take more things on board. Therefore, I am overall 
in general less likely to reliably predict what you are going to do than what I am 
going to do in certain circumstances. But there is no conceptual barrier here to 
empathy as a route to understanding others. 
 
3.1.6. Similarity between imagination and experience. 
There is another difficulty that Matravers identifies for empathy as a route to 
understanding others. It relates to the observation that there are properties of 
dealing face to face with a situation, which might not be something the 
empathiser has access to.181 Matravers uses Ravenscroft’s much discussed 
example of the rock climber here. Imagine you are witnessing a rock climber 
facing a difficult situation in which there is a high risk for their life. Many of us 
would probably think that if we empathise with this rock climber, we will feel 
morbid fear for one’s life. However, many people when they are faced with a 
situation in which their own life is endangered, report being calm, 
concentrating all their efforts on figuring out how to save their life – in other 
words, it does not seem like they experience fear of the kind an empathiser 
might imagine. Hence Matravers observes that empathy cannot give us 
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adequate understanding of another, since the situation one is dealing with 
might have properties which the empathiser has no access to.182 
But I do not think that the rock climber example goes anywhere near to 
showing that empathy cannot give us adequate understanding of another. It 
seems far more plausible to suggest that those who think that the rock climber 
would experience morbid fear are not empathising well enough. There is no 
reason to consider it impossible or in any way unlikely, that a good empathiser 
figures out that the person facing the perilous situation is perhaps too 
consumed by figuring out how to get out of it in order to spend their energies 
worrying about it. The only way to deny this is to claim that a situation has 
properties which are at the very least extremely unlikely to be accessed by a good 
empathiser, and this seems to me a very strong claim. On the contrary, it seems 
much more plausible that given a sufficiently good imaginative effort, one 
should be able to not miss the important elements in a situation. 
Of course, imagining an experience would perhaps never be as phenomenally 
rich as actually undergoing the experience. But again it seems to me that there 
is no conceptual barrier that would pre-empt a skilled empathiser from picking 
out the most important features of an experience, and recreate those in their 
imagination. 
 
3.1.7. The ‘no new information’ objection. 
In this and the following section I will present two more arguments that 
challenge the epistemic reliability of empathy as a way of understanding others. 
One is that we cannot imagine things the likes of which we had not experienced 
before. I will deal with this challenge in this section. The second challenge is in 
a way precisely the opposite of the first one – namely, that imagination is not 
restricted to reality and we can imagine just about anything. I will deal with this 
challenge in the next section. 
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One might worry that imagination is limited to what we have experienced and 
therefore, via empathy we cannot gain an understanding of how certain 
experience feels if we had not experienced something similar before. This would 
make empathy’s epistemic value limited as we would only be able to recreate 
features of another’s experience the likes of which we have had before. 
The first thing to note is that this challenge can be more worrying, or much less 
so, depending on how much similarity my past experience has to bear to your 
experience in order for it to be similar enough. If we allow a sufficiently broad 
notion of similarity to be at play here, then this challenge is not much of a worry 
at all, since it seems likely that any adult person would have a sufficiently big 
palette of experiences from which they can recreate almost any other 
experience. Thus, even though in a very basic sense it is uncontroversial that 
imagination is parasitic upon experience, this is not obviously diminishing the 
power of imaginative recreation. I will try to make the case now as strong as 
possible, for the claim that imagination is too restricted by what we have 
experienced before. 
For some dimensions of experience, it seems a bit harder to claim that we 
cannot imagine what we have experienced before. For example, visual 
imaginings: we tend to be good at describing features of visual experiences, and 
hence have in general little trouble imagining things which we have not visually 
experienced before. The things that we experience visually have, for the most 
part, certain features, like colour, shape, and size. If I am told to imagine that a 
pink elephant is walking on my desk, I need to juxtapose the shape of the 
elephant, the colour pink, and to reduce the size; thus, even if I have not in 
reality visually experienced a pink elephant walking on my desk, I have 
experienced things with similar features – elephant, smallness, pinkness – and 
can juxtapose these features together; in this sense, I have had a similar 
experience. Since most visual experiences will have the same features – size, 
palette, and shape (and we are good at describing shapes) – I will in general be 
able to imagine almost any visual experience. Because we are good at describing 
shapes and sizes, and because our world today is saturated with all kinds of 
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colours to the extent that it does not seem wild to suggest that we have no 
trouble imagining almost any colour183, perhaps no visual experience is 
sufficiently dissimilar to any other we have not already experienced before. 
However, the claim that we can only imagine things the likes of which we have 
experienced, seems more plausible if we are speaking about other dimensions 
of experience. For example, it does seem more plausible that we cannot imagine 
tastes or smells the likes of which we have not experienced before. How do I 
imagine the taste of Marmite when, as a European, I have not ever tasted 
anything quite like it (and quite as disgusting)? Would I be able to imagine 
nauseating if I had not experienced it before? The case of subtle emotions can 
be quite complex. Could I even actually imagine what jealousy is really until I 
am in love with a guy whom I suspect to be interested in someone else? Perhaps 
I would be able to imagine some kind of jealousy, but more likely than not its 
ravaging power would be lost to me. 
Therefore, it does seem that there is certain sense in which we cannot imagine 
things which we have not experienced before. However, I would claim that this 
does not reduce the epistemic value of empathy by much. This is for two 
reasons. One is that what counts as ‘similar enough’ experience in this context 
is quite broad: just as the visual imagining example above shows, as long as we 
have the basic ‘bricks’ of experience (idea about basic shapes, colours, tastes, 
and feelings) we can reconstruct almost any experience. The second claim is it 
seems plausible that most human agents, at least adult ones, usually have a 
sufficiently varied collection of such basic ‘bricks’ of experience. In this sense 
no experience is too new or too different as to be inaccessible to someone who 
has had a decent range of experiences. For example, Matravers who in a 
discussion where he is interested particularly in the emotions, holds that 
empathy can give us knowledge of feelings the exact likes of which we have not 
previously experienced, since 'for an emotionally mature person there are no 
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altogether novel feelings'.184 Having a new experience is usually not analogous 
to Mary the colour scientist seeing red for the first time. Rather, it is comparable 
to building an entirely new structure out of the same Lego bricks that we 
already have. 
Therefore, although some basic experiential repertoire seems necessary in 
order for empathy to be epistemically useful, overall even in cases where the 
experiential repertoire is limited, empathy could still be useful, even if not to 
the same extent. 
 
3.1.8. The ‘no restrictions to imagination’ objection. 
Another reason one might be sceptical of the epistemic reliability of empathy 
as a method of attaining understanding of others, is that imagination is in 
principle not tied to reality in the same way in which perception is. This is a 
challenge identified by Jackson as the ‘up to us’ challenge to the epistemic 
usefulness of imagination. It relies on the claim that since imaginings are under 
our voluntary control, therefore they cannot provide us with justification.185 
Presumably we can imagine just about anything we fancy, and it is exactly this 
fact about imagination that makes it hard to lend any epistemic authority to 
something we have imagined. Jackson compares the justification provided by 
imagination unfavourably with that provided by perception. Perception is tied 
to reality in a systematic way: unless something has gone wrong, my seeing a 
red apple in front of me tells me something about the structure of reality – that 
there really is a red apple in front of me. By contrast, my imagining a red apple 
in front of me does not tell me anything about reality, or about the way apples 
could be – maybe I can imagine a golden apple instead; but this does not mean 
that golden apples exist, and so on. Imagination, Jackson observes, is not tied 
to reality in a systematic way, and therefore what we imagine cannot have 
epistemic authority over the way things are. 
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Since empathy is an activity of imagination, the up-to-us challenge can be 
applied to empathy too. One can worry that what I imagine about you is not 
tied to reality in any systematic way and that in this sense empathy cannot 
provide me with any epistemic justification. How can I be sure that when I 
empathise with you, and try to ‘fill in the gaps’ of your experience, that the 
output of my empathy has more of a claim to accurately represent your state 
than, say, my randomly imagining you having a certain experience? Thus one 
can hold that since the recreative imaginative endeavour of empathy is in a 
sense under our control, that is, it is ‘up to us’, therefore its output cannot 
possibly be epistemically justified. 
Balcerak Jackson’s own response to the Up-to-us challenge is to put forward a 
reliabilist account of recreative imagination. She points to the fact that 
recreative imagination and perception have a lot in common; she thinks of 
imagination as a 'recreative capacity that stands in a close relationship to our 
perceptual capacities'.186 Imagination is, in the case of recreative imagination, 
mimicking reality in important ways. Part of ‘recreativism’ about imagination 
is the claim that 'imaginings stand in a particularly close relation to specific 
other types of mental states; this relation is described as one of recreation, 
simulation, mimicry, or being a facsimile of'.187 The aim of recreative 
imagination is 'capturing the character of possible experiences' and thus 
imagination mimics the structural regularities that govern perception.188 
The crucial move in Balcerak Jackson’s response to the Up-to-use challenge is 
her distinction between a cognitive capacity and a method of inquiry that 
systematically exploits this capacity. It is true that imagination is a capacity to 
imagine whatever; however, when this capacity is exploited in a certain 
systemic way, as for example when we are recreating reality, this capacity will 
not result in just anything. Thus, if we are speaking about the systematic 
                                                 
186  Balcerak Jackson, Forthcoming. 
187  Balcerak Jackson, Forthcoming. According to Jackson, several philosophical accounts of 
imagination fall within the recreativist camp, such as Currie & Ravenscroft 2002, Goldman 
2006, and also Williamson 2008 and Yablo 2002 (although the latter two are not recreativists 
explicitly). 
188  Balcerak Jackson, Forthcoming. 
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method of inquiry – recreative imagination, and in particular, empathy – then 
we can respond to this challenge by merely denying that an activity of re-
creative imagining would result in flights of fancy that are not in any systematic 
way tied to reality. Even though imagination is in general voluntary, up-to-us, 
when we are engaged in the specific project of recreating someone’s experience, 
there is a distinct sense in which things are not entirely up to us; if I want to 
recreate reality, I will not imagine a golden apple; imagining a golden apple 
would not be ‘up-to-me’ in this sense. The case is similar with empathy; what is 
up to me in empathy is the choice of which dimensions of your experience to 
draw my attention to, and which dimensions of your experience to use as 
‘inputs’ in empathising. However, which ‘output’ would suggest itself – whether 
I will ‘figure out’ that you are sad, or happy, for example – would not be up to 
me. It would be something that suggests itself to me as a ‘fitting in’ answer to 
the question of what your experience is like, rather than something that I just 
construct out of sheer fancy. 
 
3.2. Empathy is valuable for understanding the world beyond the 
person we are empathising with. 
In the previous section I argued that empathy is a valuable tool for 
understanding other people. In this section I will argue that empathy can also 
be epistemically valuable for understanding things about the world which are 
independent of other people’s experiences. 
In what follows, I will first explain how via empathising with you I can learn 
things about the world beyond your experiences. In the second section I will 
consider and reply to two worries one might have with the reliability of 
empathy as an epistemic tool in this sense. 
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3.2.1. A model: empathy as a tool for understanding objects. 
Empathising with you gives me an insight into your experience. Since the way 
you evaluate a certain object189 might form a part of your experience, empathy 
would allow me to understand how you evaluate this object, and thus indirectly 
provide me with an understanding of it myself. In what follows I will explain 
how this works. 
Let us say that you are telling me about an episode of confrontation with one 
of your colleagues. If I empathise with you I will be able to form the judgment 
that you felt like this about them. What I have already learned, is that your 
colleague has the sort of features to which you would react in this way. From 
this, and from my knowledge of you, I might be also able to form a picture of 
what kind of features your colleague is likely to ‘objectively’ possess. 
Note that there are two steps to this inference. First, when I figure out, via 
imaginative recreation, that you feel like this towards an object X, then I would 
have also figured that X is the kind of object that incites this feeling in you. This 
is the first step. It is a further step from this to form a judgment about what 
kinds of features X might ‘objectively’ have, or at least what kinds of features I 
might perceive X as having. In order to do the latter I need to know enough 
about the extent to which you are likely to react to the relevant objects in a 
similar way as myself. Sometimes this might be a relatively ambitious task, as 
for example when X stands for certain features in a person’s character, or, even 
worse, when X stands for a whole person. If I form the judgment that you feel 
like this towards a person as a whole, unless I know you very well, I would not 
be able to infer reliably almost anything about X, because of the complex ways 
in which people’s characters react to one another. At other times, however, 
when X stands for a singular feature of a character, or, say, a physical object in 
the environment to which most people are likely to have similar responses, the 
possibility of inferring things reliably about X is not so far-fetched. For example, 
if you feel like this, and ‘this’ involves something like unease, about visiting a 
                                                 
189  I use ‘objects’ in the broadest possible sense: what counts as an object would involve 
physical objects, but also ideas, people, situations, and other things. 
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particular unknown to me, bar, perhaps I do not need to know you too well to 
be able to infer that I, too, am likely to feel like this about visiting that place, to 
also consider the place as dodgy, and so on. 
With the above examples I hope to have given a rough picture of how empathy 
can contribute to my understanding things about objects in the world. In order 
to be a bit more specific, and to be able to see what is distinctive about empathy 
as a route to understanding here, I will now need to say more about what your 
evaluations of objects are. 
The model I presented above is neutral with regards to what sort of account of 
evaluation one holds. Because of my broad account of experience, your 
experience would at any moment consist of various dimensions, including your 
beliefs and emotions, among others. Your evaluations, on any account of 
evaluation, could form part of your experience. Empathy, being a recreation of 
your experience, would, no matter what account of evaluation one holds, in 
some cases at least, involve a recreation of your evaluation, and as such would 
provide me access to your evaluation. Once I have this access to your evaluation 
of X, I will know that X is the sort of thing that would cause you to evaluate it 
in this way, and as such I will have learned something about X. I might also take 
the second step of inference, but right now this does not concern us. What is in 
need of explanation is my gaining access to your evaluations, and, of course, 
what evaluations are. 
I take it here that an evaluation can be any of a range of things. For example, a 
certain belief can be an evaluation. Maybe you believe that swimming in the 
river is dangerous; your evaluation of the swimming in the river is that it is 
dangerous. These beliefs might have no associated phenomenal feel 
whatsoever. If such is the case, it is not clear what is, or could be, distinctively 
useful about empathy as a means to getting access to these evaluations. Perhaps 
it is much easier for me to just ask you what you think about swimming in the 
river; since the content of your evaluation could be captured in a propositional 
form, nothing from the content of your evaluation will be lost if you just told it 
to me. 
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The interesting case is when evaluations have a phenomenal feel to them. If 
part of your evaluation is that you feel like this about X, then via empathy I will 
be able to capture aspects of your evaluation which could be lost to me if I relied 
on alternative means of getting at them. A prime example of evaluations with a 
phenomenal feel to them is emotional evaluations.190 Emotional evaluations 
carry information about some of the properties of the object they are directed 
to; for example, ‘the evaluation of a situation as desirable or dangerous … 
[entails] that desire or fear is viewed generally as an appropriate response to the 
situation’.191 These are evaluative properties; evaluative properties are 
properties ‘whose recognition merits a certain sort of response’.192 For example, 
dangerousness is an evaluative property; the response merited by something 
dangerous is fear ‘with all that this emotional experience involves, including 
thought, feeling, and action’.193 In this sense emotions provide the experiential 
basis for values.194 
Emotions have intentionality; they are about objects, and represent the world 
as being in a certain way.195 One’s emotions often reflect some kind of 
evaluation, or appraisal, one has of a certain object. In the most rough form 
possible: if I fear X then I believe that X is a kind of object that causes fear in 
me; if I trust Mr X, then I believe that (or judge that) Mr X is the kind of person 
that inspires trust in me, and so on. Virtually all accounts of emotions agree 
that emotions represent the world as being a certain way.196 
An important aspect of emotional experience is its phenomenological feel. This 
is so on literally all accounts of emotion, excluding what Prinz calls ‘pure 
cognitive theories’.197 Different accounts of emotion assign different role to this 
                                                 
190  I am neutral on the question of whether, apart from emotional evaluations, there are other 
kinds of evaluations of objects which have a distinctive phenomenological feel to them, or 
whether all such evaluations could be considered emotional evaluations. 
191  Jaggar, 1989, p.160. 
192  Goldie, 2002, p.30. 
193  Goldie, 2002, p.30. 
194  Jaggar, 1989, p.159. 
195  Scarantino and de Sousa, 2018. 
196  This is in contrast to the now largely rejected ‘dumb view’ on emotions, according to 
which emotions are just feelings. See, e.g.  Jaggar, 1989. 
197  Prinz, 2006, p.10. 
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phenomenological feel in the emotional experience, and offer different answers 
to how this feel relates to one’s evaluation. For example, according to Prinz’s 
view emotions are embodied appraisals – they represent objects in the 
environment, and the phenomenal feel of an emotion is what can make us 
aware of this representation.198 Emotions are not 'compounds of judgments and 
embodied appraisals', but instead are 'embodied appraisals that have been 
recalibrated by judgments to represent somewhat different relations to the 
environment’.199 
Why this matters is that depending on the account of emotion one adopts, 
empathy would be more valuable or less so as a tool for understanding objects 
in the world. What is distinctive about empathy as a tool for understanding 
objects in the world, is that it is accompanied by a phenomenal feel; in empathy, 
unlike other methods of my attaining an understanding of objects in the world, 
I know that you feel like this. I have access to the phenomenal feel of an 
emotion, rather than merely to, say, its propositional content – the latter being 
something I can access via other methods too. Therefore, if one adopts a view 
of emotion according to which the phenomenal feel gives us information that 
is not codifiable in another way, it would seem that empathy would be even 
more valuable as a tool for understanding objects, since it would be the only 
way to attain certain information about objects; whereas, if one sees feelings as 
a convenient ‘shortcut’, as it were, then empathy would be still user-friendly, 
but perhaps it would not be worth, as an epistemic strategy, to engage in it. 
In other words, the view we hold of emotions would influence just how valuable 
it is for me to recreate the phenomenal feel of your emotion, in particular, 
whether it would be any more valuable than, say, my thinking about the 
emotion you are undergoing without recreating it. If an emotion’s 
representational content can be well captured merely by entertaining 
propositions, then empathy would not be of any special value if I want to learn 
about that object X which caused a particular emotion in you. If, by contrast, 
                                                 
198  Prinz, 2006. 
199  Prinz, 2006, p.99. 
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an emotion’s feel can tell me about the representation over and above that 
which can be captured by considering the emotion in a third-person way, then 
empathy would be very valuable as a tool for understanding X. 
To give a very crude example, let us say that you are feeling love towards X. On 
a very simplistic model, there are two aspects to the emotion of love: the feel of 
a warm fuzzy feeling in your chest and the belief that X is beautiful and smart. 
If I wanted to understand X, it is not obvious whether experientially recreating 
the phenomenal feel of love would have any epistemic value to me. If I am able 
to access the non-phenomenal aspect of the emotion, say, your belief that X is 
beautiful and smart, it is not clear that recreating the warm fuzzy feeling would 
add anything of epistemic value to me. I have, as far as I am concerned, learned 
everything about the way you see X, merely by entertaining the propositional 
content of the emotion. Would my recreation of the phenomenal feel of your 
emotion give me, at least usually, something of epistemic worth, to make 
empathy a worth-while endeavour? 
In general it is largely agreed that bifurcating emotions in two aspects – what 
sometimes is referred as their ‘content’ and their ‘phenomenology’ or ‘feeling’ – 
is problematic.200 This bifurcation is an example of what Prinz calls ‘the 
problem of plenty’ – the problem of figuring out how it is that all the different 
components in an emotional episode hang together in a coherent whole.201 In 
particular, this bifurcation between the feeling aspect and the content of an 
emotion is problematic if it implies that the feeling of the emotion does not 
carry a content. This does not seem to do justice to the fact that we can say that 
feelings can be appropriate or inappropriate to a certain judgment; it is not clear 
how to make sense of that if the feeling aspect is not bearing any content 
itself.202 Also, global emotions, such as Angst, existential nausea, general 
contentedness and others, seem hard to capture by such bifurcated views of 
emotion (which seem to be most cognitivist accounts of emotion).203 
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201  Prinz, 2006. 
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203  Jaggar, 1989, p.155. 
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Therefore, on many accounts of emotion the feeling and the content are tied 
together. An example would be Goldie’s view of ‘feeling toward’. According to 
Goldie, emotions are not just reducible to two separate dimensions – the 
content and the feeling; it is a mistake to capture the intentionality of emotions 
only in terms of beliefs or desires. Instead, he suggests that there is a ‘more 
fundamental to emotional experience’ intentional element which ‘involves 
feelings which are directed towards objects in the world, typically towards the 
object of the emotion’. Goldie refers to this element as ‘feeling toward’ which is 
‘thinking of with feeling’.204 According to Goldie feelings have intentionality: 
‘No degree of bodily feeling can alone reveal to you what your emotion is about; 
[…] if you do not know what your thoughts and feelings are directed towards, 
you cannot find out merely through introspection of your bodily feelings’.205 He 
takes it to be the case that, ‘the content of the recognition in feeling towards is 
different from the content of the recognition where no emotion is involved’.206  
If something like Goldie’s picture is a good model of emotions, then it seems 
that it is important, in order to capture the content of an emotional evaluation 
well, to ‘feel’ it as well, rather than merely think about it without feeling. I am 
not arguing for the stronger claim that the evaluative properties of objects are 
only available via the feeling of an emotion and not accessible via other 
means207; even if they are in principle accessible via other means, it is still the 
case that the feeling of an emotion could provide us a user-friendly access to 
these properties. 
What this means is that since empathy gives me access to the phenomenal feel 
of your emotional evaluation, it can make me understand your evaluations 
more fully than if I merely relied on your assertion. 
What is distinct about empathy as a means of attaining understanding about 
things in the world, is that my route to attaining this understanding will be 
recreating in my imagination the experience you are undergoing. I recreate the 
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205  Goldie, 2002, p.58. 
206  Goldie, 2002, p.36. 
207  An example of such a view is Johnston, 2001. 
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phenomenal feel of your experience, rather than merely theorising about it. I 
am able to infer not only that you evaluate X in a certain way; but that you feel 
like this about X. With my discussion of evaluations above I hope to have shown 
that having access to the phenomenal feel of evaluations of objects in the world 
has an epistemic value. 
Importantly, what I can learn in this way is limited to evaluative aspects of 
objects. There are a lot of things that I cannot learn via empathy, as for example, 
physical facts about objects like the fact that the chair is green or that water is 
H2O. I cannot learn these things because they are not the sort of things that 
would normally evoke an evaluative response in you which has a distinctive 
phenomenal feel. They are not the sort of thing to which I could plausibly 
expect you to react in a certain way as to form a certain evaluation that would 
have a distinctive phenomenological feel to it. Therefore, recreating in my 
imagination your experience is unlikely to give me information about such 
things. I can only learn similar facts from you if you tell them to me explicitly. 
What I can learn via empathising with you concerns features of objects that 
would provoke an evaluative response in you with certain distinctive 
phenomenology, as for example, emotional response: I can learn that a certain 
work of art or a certain person’s deed is admirable, that swimming in the river 
is fearsome, that a certain meal is disgusting, and so on. 
In conclusion, when I empathise with you I can learn about evaluative features 
of objects. This is so because the phenomenal aspect of your evaluation is 
something I can recreate via empathising with you, and from this I can infer 
that the objects in question are the kinds of objects to which you would react 
in a certain way, which, barring any reason to suspect your evaluation is 
inappropriate or needs to be adjusted, I can use in order to learn about the 
objects. 
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3.2.2. Challenges to the model. Learning via empathy and learning via testimony. 
As already mentioned, there are two steps in the process of learning about 
objects via empathy. The first step is using empathy to gain access to your 
evaluation of the object X. Once I have done that, I can already form the 
judgment that X is the kind of object that would elicit in you the evaluation in 
question. In so far as this amounts to a kind of learning about X, I do not need 
to take an extra step in order to have learned something about X. However, I 
could do that: the second step is inferring from the fact that you evaluate X in 
a certain way, some kind of judgment regarding X, or alternatively, deciding to 
adopt the evaluation of X for myself. 
Above I discussed how the first step works, and I hope that there is little in that 
model that could be challenged. Therefore, the minimal claim that I hope to 
have already defended, and that cannot be argued against, is that empathy can 
be used as a tool to learn a certain kind of fact about objects: namely, that they 
are the kinds of objects that would elicit in you the kind of evaluation you are 
having of them. 
Here I am going to discuss potential challenges to the second step in this 
process. One might wonder to what extent I could be justified to infer, from the 
fact that you evaluate an object X in a way E, that X is actually an appropriate 
object of such an evaluation. If the answer is that I cannot be justified to infer 
any kind of proper belief, or I cannot be justified in adopting (a modified version 
of) your evaluations as my own, at least most of the time, one might think that 
the epistemic practice of learning about objects via empathy is in this sense of 
little worth; after all, learning that X is an object that would cause in you a 
certain kind of evaluation is in most cases of little use to me, unless I am able 
to infer from this something about X, or about the way I should evaluate X. 
In what follows I will seek to defend the value of empathy as a tool for learning 
about objects via comparing it to the practice of testimony: since we think of 
testimony as a potentially reliable epistemic practice, I will argue that we should 
think the same about empathy. Then I will consider and reply to two possible 
reasons why the testimony analogy might fail. 
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3.2.2.1. Empathy is like testimony without the middle man. 
I would argue that using empathy as a tool for learning about objects is 
analogous to using testimony as a practice to learning about the world.208 In the 
case of testimony, I rely on your evaluation of X, which you share with me via a 
speech act. In the case of empathy, I rely on your evaluation of X, which I access 
myself via re-creating your experience. In this sense empathy is like testimony 
without the middle man. In testimony I rely upon your assertion, your telling 
me a certain thing. In empathy you need not tell me anything – I rely upon my 
empathic feeling, my recreating of your experiences, in order to gain epistemic 
access to certain features of objects. And if we think that testimony is 
sufficiently often a reliable source of epistemic benefits, so we can think about 
empathy. Just as in testimony, the fact that I have not attained the knowledge 
first-hand is not itself sufficient to discredit empathic learning as a justified 
source of knowledge. 
We rely on testimony a lot in our daily life. Testimony is ubiquitous source of 
knowledge and our dependence on it is far-reaching.209 Since ‘we do typically 
or, more strongly, uniformly accept ordinary informative testimony’210 
testimony is a robust practice, and it is one of our sources of knowledge 
together with perception, memory, and reasoning. Normally, it is infeasible 'for 
hearers to seriously check or confirm either the speaker’s reliability or sincerity 
within the normal constraints of testimonial transmission and exchange'.211 
There is a debate about when and under what conditions is testimony a justified 
source of knowledge. According to non-reductionists, what is required is only 
the absence of undefeated defeaters whereas according to reductionists more is 
required - some actual positive reasons to accept the testimony of speakers.212 
                                                 
208  Thanks to Aaron Meskin for suggesting the comparison to testimony and the phrase 
‘testimony without the middle man’. 
209  Lackey Jennifer, 2006; Adler, 2017. 
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However, everyone agrees that we can, and that we do, attain knowledge from 
what others tell us. 
Thus, if it is undeniable that our practice of testimony is, as a matter of fact, 
epistemically robust, and if it is true that there is an analogy between empathy 
and testimony, then it would seem that our epistemic practice of arriving at 
epistemic benefits via empathy would be justified. The hope here is that 
whatever it is that justifies testimony as a source of knowledge, can justify why 
empathy too is a source of knowledge. Your evaluative knowledge of certain 
objects in the environment is transmitted to me – it is just that it happens 
without your explicit assertion. 
However, one might wonder whether the analogy between testimony and 
empathy is justified. There are two reasons one might reject the analogy. I will 
consider these challenges now. 
 
3.2.2.2. Challenge 1 – testimony about evaluative properties is controversial. 
The first reason is that there is an important disanalogy between the domain of 
things I can learn by empathy and the domain of things it is usually agreed that 
I can learn via testimony. For example, via testimony I can attain knowledge of 
facts – that water is H2O or that the museum is behind the corner. However, 
this is not the sort of thing I can learn via empathising. Via empathy I can only 
attain knowledge about evaluative aspects of objects. 
Therefore, empathy is at best like testimony about evaluative properties only. 
And one might wonder about the extent to which evaluative testimony – unlike 
testimony for physical properties of mid-sized objects, directions in a city, or 
train times – can be a reliable and justified epistemic practice. If testimony 
cannot be seen as a reliable and justified source of epistemic goods in this sense, 
then one might be reasonably sceptical as to why empathy should be seen as 
one. Perhaps evaluative aspects of objects are just not the sort of thing about 
which we can rely on attaining knowledge about via either testimony or 
empathy. 
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One reason to hold this is if one thinks that there are essential dissimilarities 
between having beliefs and having evaluations. Perhaps evaluations are more 
‘subjective’ and personal, and whereas I can take your word for statements such 
as ‘the museum is behind the corner’ and ‘water is H2O’, perhaps I cannot take 
your word for statements such as ‘the picture is beautiful’ and ‘John is 
trustworthy’ since these evaluations would have an important subjective 
element – in other words, they are the kind of things that it is possible that are 
true for you, but might not be true for me.  
It seems to me that this is a valid point, and indeed evaluative knowledge is less 
straightforward to attain than knowledge of facts. However, it is a step from 
here to deny that we can learn about evaluative properties of objects via 
testimony. Granted, learning about evaluative properties might not be as 
straightforward as attaining knowledge of facts, where we can just adopt the 
belief that indeed, the museum is behind the corner. However, this does not 
mean that, after suitable adjustments, we cannot learn about evaluative 
properties of objects via testimony at all. 
If it is indeed the case that the appropriateness of an evaluation is relative to 
the person who evaluates an object, I might still be able to adjust for differences 
between your taste and mine and infer what kind of evaluation I should be 
having of that object. For example, you might tell me that a coming Maths exam 
which you are worried about, is difficult. But this does not mean that I should 
either infer that the exam is an appropriate object of worry in general, or that it 
would be one for me, were I to take it. Perhaps it is just that you have not 
touched Maths in months and the exam would be easy for me. This is different 
from you telling me that, say, the chair is green. There does not seem any kind 
of ‘adjustment’ that I need to make in this case. But it is not clear whether there 
are good equivalents of this uncontroversial inference in the evaluative domain. 
Again, from your evaluating an object in a certain way I cannot 
straightforwardly infer that I should evaluate it in this way because of the 
subjective element that you bring in with your evaluation. However, if I know 
you well enough, assessing what kind of evaluation I should have might still be 
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possible. I can accommodate the subjective element via taking into account 
your peculiarities, e.g., by taking into account differences between you and me. 
And taking these differences into account it does not seem unlikely I will be 
able to infer from evaluations you are having about certain objects, what 
evaluations I should be having about these objects. 
Taking another’s evaluation to reflect an object’s features might not be as 
straightforward a matter as taking their beliefs concerning that object to reflect 
an object’s features. And I concede that it is possible that in some cases people’s 
emotions towards the same objects would differ very drastically in a way in 
which we would not normally expect their beliefs to differ. 
So, the answer I gave is that I can at least in some cases adjust for differences 
between you and me. If I know sufficiently many things about you, I would 
know for example where you and I differ, and what adjustments I need to make 
to your evaluations in order for me to be able to accept them as epistemic 
evidence of certain evaluative aspects of objects. I might have independent 
reasons to discredit your evaluation. Say, for example, that you are terrified by 
a spider in the kitchen. If you have a phobia of spiders and I know you, I would 
know that you have a phobia, and I would not take your emotional evaluation 
as direct evidence of the scariness of that spider. The opposite can also be true 
– I might have independent reasons to allocate especially large epistemic 
credibility to your evaluation. If I know that you are a zoologist without 
phobias, and if you are particularly alarmed by a spider in the kitchen, I would 
infer that the spider in the kitchen is perhaps a poisonous one and I should 
beware it. 
Perhaps the least controversial case of me learning about the world via empathy 
is the case where I know you particularly well. Say you are my best friend, my 
sibling, my partner, or someone else who is really close. If I know you 
sufficiently well it seems that it will be very easy for me to infer from your 
emotional evaluations whether or not certain features about the objects of these 
evaluations hold. Say you and I are very similar in our appraisals of people – we 
find particular features in people morally repugnant, we hold particular values 
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in high regard, and so on. If you react emotionally to a certain person I do not 
know in a particular way – say, with a kind of derision, or admiration – I will 
know that this person is more likely than not a person who I would consider an 
appropriate object of derision, or admiration. I doubt it that someone would 
deny that in these specific cases, where we empathise with people we know very 
well, we can learn something about the world from them. 
The question now is to what extent this learning can happen in other cases. 
One might object that in order to do the appropriate adjustments reliably I need 
to know you well. However, whereas for more complex emotions it is likely that 
I indeed need to know you well in order to interpret your evaluation in a 
sensible way, for more basic emotions it seems a good bet to take on board your 
emotion even if I do not know you well. If you are very excited and looking 
forward to seeing a particular movie, I need not know you very well in order to 
infer that perhaps there is something of value in that movie. But even though I 
consider the criticism somehow unjustified – I believe that in some basic senses 
people are quite alike – I am happy to bite the bullet and accept that empathy 
works well as a source of epistemic goods about the world only in the limited 
cases of people we know well. I think this does not reduce its value since we 
interact with people we know well a lot of the time. My claim is a weak one – 
insofar as I have shown that learning about the world via empathy happens 
sometimes, I have shown what I was aiming to. 
 
3.2.2.3. Challenge 2 – testimony does not work without the middle man. 
There is a second reason to doubt that the analogy between testimony and 
empathy holds. One can hold that that which makes testimony a justified 
source of knowledge has fundamentally to do with the speech act of assertion 
itself. If this is so, then there is a crucial disanalogy between testimony and 
empathy – the difference between the two is not just an incidental, but an 
essential property of what makes testimony the epistemically robust practice 
that it is. Therefore, one would not be able to infer, from the fact that testimony 
is a justified epistemic practice, that empathy is one too. 
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How can one substantiate the view that what makes testimony a justified 
epistemic practice is the speech act? One might hold that it is the norms of the 
conversational practice, and something about assuming responsibility for what 
I have said to you, that makes testimony reliable: 
To use Kant’s example: If I start to pack my suitcase in front of you, but 
I have no plan to leave then I intentionally deceive you by giving you 
evidence that I plan to leave. But I do not invite you to notice or to 
understand what I am doing. By contrast, if I said to you either “I am 
leaving town” (a lie) or “Do not worry if you do not find me here 
tomorrow” (an intentionally misleading assertion), I do invite you to 
understand and believe me. Thereby, I assume responsibility for the 
truth and veracity of my assertion, though arguably less so for the 
implicature that “I am leaving town”.213 
Even if the speaker is a stranger to the hearer, assertion conforms to certain 
norms of conversational practice. There are sanctions if someone lies, and we 
remember unreliable testimony far more than reliable one, the reliable one goes 
unnoticed.  
This is importantly unlike the case of catching on someone’s emotions – I have 
no responsibility to you to show certain emotions, at least not in the way in 
which I might be assumed to have in the case of conversational practice. Unlike 
cases of testimony, empathy does not seem to dwell in a specific social practice. 
At least it is not obvious what the equivalent would be. I might feel whatever I 
want to feel. I will not be sanctioned in any way if I feel an inappropriate 
emotion towards something. After all, I have not taken the step of explicitly 
asserting something. In taking this step is where my responsibility lies. In taking 
this step is when I become part of this conversational social practice. Whereas 
the same is not true if I do not assert anything. Therefore, one might hold that 
I have not shown that sourcing information from others’ emotional reactions, 
is a reliable source of epistemic goods. 
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One line of reply might be to push the line that there is some kind of equivalent 
to the conversational practice in the case of empathy after all. For example, if I 
deliberately display a different emotion from the one I am actually 
experiencing, in order to deceive you, this is arguably just as bad as verbally 
lying to you. If you figure out that I have done this, you will be justified in not 
trusting me anymore. This can be supported by the idea that one reason we like 
and value spontaneous people is that spontaneity is one of the things that is 
hard to fake. We do value genuine emotional expressivity and perhaps – it is to 
be hoped – to a certain extent sanction people who fake their emotions. So one 
might think there is some kind of equivalent for empathy of the norms of 
conversational practice. We read each other’s emotions all the time and to a 
certain extent we rely on others’ expressions of emotion being genuine and this 
does make it likely that my empathising with your experience, which includes 
your emotions among other things, would be a reliable guide to what you really 
feel right now. 
But I will not take this line of response any further. Even if there is an equivalent 
between expressing emotions and answering queries, it is not obvious. And, 
after all, empathy is ideally getting not only at what you express – even if you 
do not express it consciously – but at what you do not express. One might think 
it is required of a stranger to answer my request for directions in a way in which 
it is not required of him to show a certain emotion. And in the rare cases where 
we consider it is required for someone to ‘show’ certain emotion – we consider 
this a matter of etiquette and do not put so much value on it. This does not 
seem to be so obviously parallel to the case of speaking. 
Another line of response is to turn the objection on its head – to agree that there 
is a disanalogy between cases of learning via testimony and cases of learning via 
empathy, but to claim that it is precisely in the disanalogy between speaking 
and emotions, that makes learning via empathy a valuable source of knowledge. 
Let me elaborate. 
As a speaker I know that there are certain rules of conversational practice by 
which I better abide. I know that you, as a hearer, are on the look-out for what 
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I say. This might make me carefully calculate what I am saying, and thus, by 
merely listening to what I say, you might not be able to get at what I really 
believe. Empathy, by contrast, offers us more of a window into what your actual 
evaluations of things are. You might say one thing but feel another, and if I do 
not empathise with you, I will not get what it is that you actually feel, which 
seems an important part of your evaluative judgment of things. This is based 
on the assumptions that (1) it is harder to fake an emotion rather than assert an 
untruth, since the former requires to put on an act, which is very involving, and 
most of us are not very well trained in controlling carefully our emotional 
expressions and our body language, among others; and (2) that I will not be so 
careful in orchestrating my emotions, or even think about doing it, because 
emotions are not part of a conversational practice in the same way as words are, 
so I would not be so likely to begin monitoring them in the first place. If these 
assumptions are any likely, in empathic transmission of information you have 
less opportunity to deceive me and empathy would allow me to ‘hear’ your 
honest evaluations of things, which I might not get at merely via testimony. 
Of course, now a further question presents itself. To what extent it is valuable 
for me to know your honest evaluations of things, as opposed to the ones you 
would have shared with me merely by speaking? I think that most of us would 
intuitively think that it is obvious that we want to know what people ‘really’ 
think, but perhaps one might object to this. 
One might think of cases where you yourself do not know something very well. 
Perhaps you honestly believe what you tell me, it is just that you cannot bring 
yourself to feel about it in a certain way. Say you have become totally convinced 
that a certain art-work is a work of genius – it is just that you do not really feel 
it. Or that you know what ‘the right thing to do is’ – to be polite and accepting 
of someone’s view – it is just that you do not really feel you should do anything 
of the kind, perhaps the person in fact annoys you greatly. Now, will there be 
any value in my ‘getting at’ these evaluations of yours? Perhaps it is undeniable 
that getting at them makes me know you better. But is getting at them valuable 
in terms of me learning something about the objects of your evaluation – of the 
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art-work, and of what the right thing to do is in confrontation with that person? 
If one holds that one’s emotional evaluations might lead someone astray, 
whereas one’s ‘purely’ reason-based evaluations are more often guaranteed to 
be on the right track, one might be seriously worried by these cases. 
However, I do not think that even people who have this worry would be justified 
in holding that one is better for not knowing what another’s actual emotional 
response to something is. This just seems to be a weird epistemic claim in need 
of justification. 
Still, this line of response which pushes the initial objection on its head relies 
on quite a few assumptions. I will respond in a third way below. 
A third way to reply to the initial objection is to deny the claim that testimony 
takes all its epistemic credentials from the speech act. I will argue for this now. 
What I claim is that testimony is at best partly justified by the existence of a 
conversational practice. What makes testimony justified is that via it we get 
access to the speaker’s knowledge. And this is all that matters. To say that a 
conversational practice exists is not to add much to what makes testimony 
justified. The core idea is that you end up believing things which other people 
already believe. And what makes this a justified way to attain knowledge is 
something about people being good enough epistemic agents, and that, for 
many things, it makes sense to take another’s belief and this is a better strategy 
than coming to deduce each and every belief by yourself. To use Godfrey-
Smith’s terminology of two kinds of reliability, the latter strategy might have 
greater Cartesian reliability – for each belief attained via this strategy, it is likely 
that it is a true belief – but the strategy of testimony has a far greater Jamesian 
reliability – for each true belief out there, it is likely that I attain it.214 What is 
relevant here is that in testimony the norm is such that I should only assert 
things that I know. In this sense, there is a selection procedure – what I can 
acquire via testimony should, ideally, only be things that the other person 
believes they know. This filter certainly increases the epistemic credentials of 
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testimony as a means of attaining knowledge. By contrast, in the case of 
empathy, there does not seem to be any such filtering effect; I could learn just 
anything about the way you evaluate things. Therefore in the case of 
empathising with you, I should be less expected to take on your evaluations of 
objects. 
Further, to show that the existence of norms in conversation does not add that 
much to the credibility of testimony, one can take the fact that in many ordinary 
cases of testimony, the speaker rarely thinks a few times before they produce 
an assertion. On the contrary, many of the assertions that we take to be good 
examples of testimony are often spontaneous. For example, most of us would, I 
think, take as a reliable piece of testimony a statement if it was one we 
overheard someone speaking to themselves. So there is no special step that the 
speaker takes in order to become intentionally a part of the social 
conversational practice. There is no reason, in many ordinary cases of 
testimony, to believe that something qualitatively different happens when the 
speaker is speaking to you, rather than were they merely to assert something to 
themselves aloud, or were they to write their words down in a notebook they 
do not intend for anyone to read. This is not an altogether strange view of what 
testimony is. For example, Sosa takes that all testimony requires ‘a statement of 
someone's thoughts of beliefs, which they might direct to the world at large and 
to no one in particular’.215 
If this is true, then perhaps it is awkward to place all the epistemic justification 
in testimony on the existence of conversational practice alone. In other words, 
if a conversational practice did not exist, but we still were able to get access to 
people’s beliefs about certain matters, that would still be a reliable source of 
epistemic justification. Imagine we had a device by which we could tap into a 
people’s thoughts without their being aware of it – that would be a reliable 
source of epistemic justification. One way to see this is to observe that, in 
general, what people assert is not miles removed from what they would have 
asserted to themselves, in the privacy of their thoughts. And if we take the 
                                                 
215  Sosa, 1991, p.219. 
134 
 
former – testimony – to be epistemically justified, then there is no reason to not 
take the latter to be so, too. 
Therefore, it seems hard to deny that testimony works not only because people 
abide by certain conversational practices alone but also because whatever it is 
that the speaker has ‘in stock’ in his mind, ready for assertion, will be in general 
reliable. It is hard to see how even the most rigid conversational practice would 
be able to produce epistemic goods, if the latter were not the case. 
But if part of the justification for ordinary testimony comes from the fact that 
whatever beliefs a speaker has ‘in stock’ are likely to be reliable, then, since we 
rely on testimony so much, we need to grant that, in many cases, what the 
speaker has ‘in stock’ is likely to be reliable. 
And if this claim is true, then it is hard to see why the same would not hold for 
the case of emotions. If we can accept that people are good enough sources of 
beliefs and epistemic knowledge, why deny that they are good enough sources 
of evaluations? In other words, it seems difficult to doubt that, in general, most 
people would have roughly appropriate emotional evaluations of certain 
objects. 
 
3.3. The epistemic value of empathy for understanding oneself. 
Above I argued that empathy is a valuable tool for understanding others, and 
for understanding objects in the world beyond the experiences of other people. 
Here I will argue that empathy has epistemic value for understanding oneself. 
First thing to note is that one can use empathy to learn about oneself just as 
one can use it in order to learn about others - one can empathise with one’s past 
or future self, just as one empathises with others. In the same way in which 
empathy can be valuable as a method for understanding others, already 
discussed in section 3.1, empathy can be useful for understanding oneself. I will 
not dwell on this point any further here. 
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Second, what can be of epistemic value can be attaining the skill of empathising 
rather than one-off instances of empathy. In discussing this kind of epistemic 
value of empathy, I do not claim that it is likely that a particular instance of 
empathising will itself be valuable for the empathiser’s better understanding of 
themselves. Rather, I am claiming that developing the skill of empathy has 
epistemic value for the individual. 
In section 2.3 I discussed in some detail what the skill of empathy involves. I 
argued that the skilled empathiser is skilled in three things: (1) detecting 
experiences in others; (2) differentiating between the phenomenology of subtly 
different experiential states; and (3) seeing connections between various 
dimensions of experience in a way which allows them to ‘fill in’ any unknowns 
in the other’s experience. I would argue that the latter two skills are valuable 
not only when it comes to understanding other people, but also for 
understanding oneself. 
First, cultivating empathy makes one better able to differentiate between subtly 
different experiential states. This ability is beneficial for understanding oneself 
since it means one is able to be better aware of the kind of experience one is 
undergoing at any moment. I take it that being better aware of one’s own 
experience can mean two different things. In one, weaker reading, it means that 
one has an increased awareness of the states one is going through. In this sense 
better awareness is like enhanced perception, being able to better see things 
which are already there, in a higher resolution, as it were. There is another, 
stronger reading of the claim. One can argue that the skill to differentiate 
between subtly different experiential states has a formative value; we come to 
have certain experiences which we would not have come to have otherwise. 
Perhaps via developing this skill we come to be more refined in our own 
experiences. We become able to distinguish in ourselves experiences with a 
certain degree of subtlety that did not exist before; and, in this sense, arguably, 
we would come to have experiences which we otherwise would not have had. 
Second, the ability to see relations between dimensions of experience can have 
epistemic value for understanding our own experiences. We will be better 
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aware of how different dimensions of our own experience go together, and 
would be able to use this understanding in order to guide our actions and 
choices in an informed way. For example, this skill would be useful when we 
are planning ahead and considering possible scenarios that can occur to our 
future selves. We will be in a better position to appreciate how various things 
can influence us. 
With this I hope to have shown that developing the skill of empathy has 
prudential value for understanding oneself. As already argued in section 2.3 
cultivating empathy makes us able to well appreciate how various dimensions 
of experience influence one another and makes us more refined in our 
awareness as it makes us able to differentiate between subtly different 
experiences. In the present section I merely pointed attention to the fact that 
having these skills is overwhelmingly likely to be beneficial for understanding 
one’s own experiences. Knowing oneself is desirable for all sorts of reasons, not 
the least because it put one in a better position to make more informed choices 
about oneself. With this I hope to have shown something which, once pointed 
to hopefully seems obvious – that there are prudential reasons for one to 
develop the skill of empathy. Even if one is not interested in the experiences of 
other people in themselves, there are still instrumental reasons why one would 
want to empathise with others – because developing a good understanding of 
the experiences of others might teach one a lot about how to live one’s own life. 
 
3.4. Conclusion. 
In this chapter I argued that empathy has three kinds of epistemic value. First 
I argued that empathising with another allows us to understand them. Then I 
argued that empathising with another allows us to understand objects in the 
world via giving us access to their evaluations of these objects; I compared 
empathy to testimony and argued that if we consider testimony as a source of 
epistemic goods, then we must consider empathy to be one too. Finally, I 
argued that attaining the skill of empathy has the epistemic value of allowing 
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us to better understand our own experiences – to better interpret our present 
experiences, as well as to be better aware of how different dimensions of our 
experience affect one another. 
All this suggests that there are prudential reasons to empathise with others, and 
to cultivate the skill of empathy. I have argued that empathy has epistemic 
value. In the next two chapters I will turn to what has more traditionally been 
the focus of discussions of empathy; I will argue that empathy has moral value. 
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4.  The Moral Value of Empathy: 
Answering Criticisms. 
 
In this chapter and the following I will defend the claim that empathy is morally 
valuable. Importantly, I subscribe to the view that in order to evaluate empathy 
in the right way, we need to evaluate a cultivated form of it. Empathy is a tool 
which, just like any other, should be cultivated and used in the right way. 
Therefore, instead of merely observing what empathy can result in in a set of 
very particular contexts, a proper evaluation of empathy’s moral and epistemic 
worth should discuss empathy which is applied intelligently and in conjunction 
with other faculties, like beliefs and judgments. In this vein, in this and the 
following chapter I will argue that empathy which is cultivated and deployed in 
the right ways is morally valuable. In the following chapter I will make a positive 
case about the moral value of empathy, and in this chapter I will reply to 
arguments to the effect that empathy is morally problematic. 
Even though empathy is usually considered beneficial for morality216, some 
thinkers have argued against this. The most sustained critiques of empathy 
have been given by Goldie and Prinz. In this chapters I will address theirs and 
other existing criticisms about empathy. I will also raise a concern with 
empathy of my own, in the final section 4.6. 
The first two sections 4.1 and 4.2 are criticisms according to which empathy 
interferes with lucid moral judgment. Then in 4.3 I consider the criticism that 
empathy, even if it does not interfere with our judgment, might do so with our 
action. In 4.4 I discuss the attack on the ‘politics of empathy’ by Bloom and 
Prinz. In 4.5 I consider the worry that empathy is unhealthy for the empathiser. 
In the final section 4.6 I formulate an original criticism of empathy: I suggest 
that empathy gets in the way of our imaginative resistance, and at the same 
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time I argue that we might have independent reasons to consider imaginative 
resistance morally desirable. 
I proceed now to addressing the criticisms aimed at empathy. My conclusion 
will be that neither of these criticisms can be taken to show that empathy is 
more morally worrisome than useful. 
 
4. 1. Empathy is prone to bias. 
The most serious criticisms of empathy are that it leads us to treat preferentially 
people with whom we empathise more, and thus results in unfairness towards 
people with whom we empathise less or not at all. This I will in general address 
as the worry that empathy is prone to bias. 
This section is structured as follows. In the first subsection 4.1.1 I will present in 
some detail what is probably the most sustained critique of empathy in this 
regard, that of Prinz. Unpacking the actual claim of the argument against 
empathy will take some work since, as I will show, the criticism that Prinz airs 
at empathy is not unambiguous, and can be interpreted in one of a couple of 
ways. I show that two interpretations in particular present a worry for empathy 
and discuss these worries in subsections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3. Finally, in the fourth 
subsection 4.1.4 I speak about how a cultivated form of empathy makes these 
worries less problematic. 
 
4. 1. 1. Prinz’s criticism. 
Prinz worries that empathy is subject to bias in four different ways. He worries 
that we have more empathy for: 1) cute or attractive agents; 2) members of the 
in-group; 3) the near and dear; and 4) salient events.217 All these worries have a 
similar structure: we empathise for certain individuals more than we do for 
others, and this seems unjust. 
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I think it is important to observe that this claim is not unambiguous and it is 
not immediately clear what exactly claims Prinz is making. He does not 
elaborate much on them, since he presents them as part of what he himself calls 
a ‘laundry list’ of worries about empathy.218 But as I will now argue, his claims 
are ambiguous, and can mean any of several things. 
 
4. 1. 1. 1. The ambiguous talk of ‘degrees of empathy’. 
A systemic worry which I have with Prinz’s criticisms is his talk of ‘degrees of 
empathy’, namely, his talking of ‘more empathy’, and ‘less empathy’. I think that 
it is not clear what the degrees of empathy talk means, and so it is difficult to 
know what Prinz means by his claim that empathy is prone to biases. I suggest 
that the moment we unpack the meaning of ‘degrees of empathy’ the worries 
he airs seem less grave than they otherwise appear. 
I can find no evidence of which of the following interpretations is the one most 
likely that Prinz has in mind, but I suggest that talk of ‘degrees of empathy’ 
might mean any of four things: 1) willingness to empathise; 2) empathising with 
only aspects of one’s experience as opposed to empathising fully with one’s 
experience; 3) success at empathising; and 4) stronger emotional response. The 
fact that Prinz himself does not seem to be clear on the ambiguity is shown by 
his seeming to switch between different meanings in the same short paragraph 
where he introduces the cuteness worry. 
First, to say we have ‘less empathy’ for someone could mean that we are less 
likely to empathise with them. This would refer to what Prinz in another place 
calls the ‘selective nature’ of empathy which he suggests could be overcome if 
we ‘empathise with a broader range of people’219 and he seems to have the same 
worry in mind when he speaks about ‘allocation of empathy’ which, he claims, 
‘can vary dramatically as a function of morally arbitrary concerns’.220 Here what 
seems to be the issue is that one does not consider other people to be 
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appropriate targets of empathy in the first place. There does indeed seem to be 
a worry, and I will consider it below in section 4.1.2. 
The second interpretation of ‘less empathy’ is that it means empathy which is 
less involved, in the sense that I empathise with certain aspects of your 
experience, as opposed to empathising with your experience more fully. 
Recreating another’s experience in one’s imagination is always partial, and 
perhaps I am willing to be more involved in my imaginings if you are part of the 
in-group. The worry therefore would be that morally irrelevant factors, such as 
whether you are a member of the in-group, or not, or whether you are cute or 
not, would influence the extent to which I am willing to empathise with 
different aspects of your experience. For example I might be willing to try to 
imagine certain aspects of your situation, but not many of them, if you are a 
member of the out-group; whereas if you are a member of the in-group I would 
be more willing to imagine additional aspects of your situations. I consider this 
to be on a par with the first interpretation of ‘less empathy’ I considered above. 
The problem here seems to be that of lacking a willingness to go a certain length 
in the empathic exercise. Therefore I will address this challenge in the same 
section where I address the problem of ‘the selective nature of empathy’. 
Third, ‘less empathy’ for someone could mean that we are less likely to succeed 
at empathising with them, even if we try to do it. Prinz might be having this in 
mind when he brings in support of his claim that empathy may be subject to 
biases, a study by Ickes at al. which finds that we can more accurately identify 
the emotions of attractive agents.221 This I see as a more serious challenge to 
empathy than the previous interpretation. After all, if our empathic accuracy is 
doomed from the start to be low when empathising with certain people then 
perhaps empathy is not the best heuristic to use when making decisions which 
involve these people. I will address this below as the empathic accuracy worry 
in section 4.1.2.2. 
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Fourth, ‘less empathy’ for someone might mean that our emotional response to 
their situation is less strong. This is something that Prinz also suggests in the 
same cuteness effects paragraph, when he says that ‘we would feel more 
vicarious sadness for a dying mouse than a rat’.222 Since Prinz defines empathy 
as experiencing another’s emotions, cases where these emotions are somehow 
less intense would be indeed cases where empathy itself is somehow dimmed. 
But this would not be so on the present account, which does not see empathy 
as merely an emotional response. If we compare two cases – one where I 
experience in my imagination your emotions very intensely, but am unable to 
appreciate your thoughts very well; and another where the opposite is true, i.e., 
I have a very deep understanding of your thoughts yet can barely feel what you 
feel – it is not clear on my account which of the two would be a case of ‘less’ 
empathy. This is one point. Second and more important, it is not clear that the 
intensity of the affective response should have a moral value itself. It seems to 
me that in order to claim that a less intense emotional response is a morally 
undesirable outcome, one has to justify why intense emotional responses are 
desirable. The only possible justification I can think of is the claim that the 
intensity of emotions makes them more motivating – if I am more angry, rather 
than less angry, I am more likely to act on my anger and bring up the good that 
will follow from it. However, it is still not clear how this could apply to the case 
of empathy. Empathy is an exercise in imagination throughout which I keep in 
mind that the emotions that I recreate in my imagination are yours and not 
mine. Therefore, by definition I will not act on the emotions that you have, so 
it would not matter much whether I vicariously feel your emotions more 
intensely or less so. 
One might here claim that what Prinz has in mind is not the intensity of the 
vicarious emotion, but rather of my overall emotional response. You might not 
at all feel sad about your situation, but after I empathise with you, I might feel 
sad for you, and this sadness can be more or less, depending on morally 
irrelevant considerations, like for example how attractive you are. But if this is 
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Prinz’s worry, again it is not clear how this is a worry about empathy itself. 
There does not seem to be anything in the nature of empathy that would result 
in my feeling more sadness for an attractive A than an unattractive B. I cannot 
think of a mechanism that would explain how my recreating another’s 
experience in my imagination, provided I have done it for both A and B in equal 
measure, would result in my feeling more sadness for A than for B. And if it is 
true that in reality we tend to feel more sadness for A than for B, I would suggest 
part of the reason is precisely that we do not empathise in equal measure with 
both A and B. It is precisely if I do not empathise with both A and B that I will 
feel sadness differentially. 
Therefore I consider the fourth interpretation of ‘less empathy’ to not present a 
worry for the moral value of empathy. So there remain two different worries 
that need to be addressed. Those are the worries that we are less likely to be 
motivated to empathise with certain people; and that we are less likely to 
empathise with them accurately. I will address these two worries in sections 
4.1.2 and 4.1.3. 
 
4. 1. 1. 2. A few notes about Prinz’s criticism. 
Before proceeding to reply to the two criticisms that we identified, I will note 
something about Prinz’s own worry with empathy that I think is worth 
mentioning, given that Prinz is probably the most vocal critic of empathy in the 
moral philosophy literature. I will note that Prinz defines empathy in a way 
more narrow than it is defined here. In the papers in which he attacks empathy, 
Prinz sees empathy as experiencing the same emotion as the person one is 
empathising with: ‘empathy is a matter of feeling an emotion that we take 
another person to have’.223 I have a slight worry with this. It seems to be the 
case that for Prinz I only empathise with you if I experience myself the same 
emotion as you do, and it seems to be the case that for Prinz I cannot be said to 
empathise with you if I imagine what it is like to experience the same emotion 
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as you do, without actually experiencing it myself. For example, if you feel afraid 
of that spider, it seems to be the case, from Prinz’ definition, that I am only 
empathising with you if I start to feel afraid of that spider myself, and 
presumably I am not empathising, according to Prinz, if I vividly imagine what 
your fear feels like, without actually starting to be myself afraid. But maybe I 
am just not afraid of spiders, and cannot make myself fear them. Does this mean 
then that I can never empathise with you? To me this seems implausible. If 
Prinz really means to restrict empathy to cases where I, the empathiser, actually 
adopt for myself the emotion you, the person I empathise with, are having, then 
it seems that empathy would be quite uncommon and different from how we 
normally think of it. I think that a more charitable interpretation of Prinz here 
would be to suggest that he has not been very careful in setting up his 
definition, and that he would also refer to as ‘empathy’ cases in which I 
vicariously feel your emotion while imaginatively recreating your experience, 
yet without actually adopting that emotion myself. Of course it is possible that 
Prinz has implicitly adopted a view similar to that held by Currie and 
Ravenscroft, according to which emotions are ‘transparent’ to imagination, in 
the sense that there is no difference between recreatively imagining an emotion 
and really experiencing it.224 If this is the case, then Prinz would presumably 
take his definition of empathy to already include the cases which I discussed 
above. But I cannot make a commitment to the transparency of emotions to the 
imagination on Prinz’s behalf. So I will take it that ‘feeling of an emotion’ 
includes vicarious feeling without adopting it, and that therefore Prinz would 
consider it to be an instance of empathy the case where I vicariously feel an 
emotion without adopting it myself. As we will see this move from my part will 
not be entirely unproblematic, as at least one interpretation of some of Prinz’ 
challenges does not seem to work if we adopt the more extended definition. But 
Prinz’s challenges against the more narrow definition would be little more than 
defeating a straw man, on Prinz’s part, therefore it is more charitable to adopt 
the extended one. 
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Still, it is worth noting that even with this allowance what Prinz sees as empathy 
is importantly different from empathy as understood in this thesis. It is more 
narrow than the latter. It is either a non-necessary part of empathy, or a 
consequence of empathy as defined in this thesis. Empathy here is seen as the 
recreating of another’s experience in one’s imagination, and this is not limited 
to the affective domain, so it might or might not involve the feeling of an 
emotion which another is feeling: our empathy might merely involve seeing the 
world from their point of view without feeling their emotions. This difference 
in definition means that some of the worries Prinz airs against empathy do not 
apply to empathy as understood here at all. However, his worries about 
empathy being biased can still be raised about empathy as defined here, so this 
is why I am addressing them. 
In conclusion, in this section I argued that talk of empathic bias is ambiguous, 
and disambiguated Prinz’s criticism of empathy in this regard. This results in 
two versions of the criticism that I should be worried about. These are what I 
call the ‘selective nature of empathy’ worry, and the ‘empathic accuracy’ worry. 
I will now proceed to phrase more carefully, and reply to, these criticisms, in 
the following two sections. 
 
4. 1. 2. We have less empathy for certain agents and this is itself problematic. 
Above, I disambiguated the phrase ‘less empathy’. The result of my analysis is 
that the criticism that we have ‘less empathy’ for certain individuals rather than 
others can mean two things: either a criticism that we are less willing to 
empathise (with a great degree of involvement) with certain individuals, or a 
criticism that we are less likely to achieve an understanding of certain 
individuals. In short, when saying that empathy is biased, one might mean 
either of these two things. 
There is one more thing which is not yet clear. When stating that empathy is 
biased that is, that we have ‘less empathy’ (on either of the two interpretations) 
for certain individuals rather than others, what exactly is morally problematic? 
146 
 
I think that there are two kinds of things which can be morally problematic in 
having ‘less empathy’ for certain people. One thing is the mere fact that the 
empathy is less. Perhaps having someone empathise with you is desirable, and 
therefore it is simply not good to receive less empathy than others. What is at 
issue is the lack, smaller ‘amount’ of empathy itself. 
The other, and perhaps graver sort of consideration is about things which can 
be plausibly seen to follow from empathy. For example, if empathising with you 
would make me more likely to help you, then a direct consequence of having 
‘less empathy’ for certain individuals is that I will be presumably less likely to 
help them, than I am to help you. In this case the issue of ‘less empathy’ 
becomes an issue of perhaps unfairly distributing certain kind of ‘resources’ 
distinct from empathy itself, and where these resources are of crucial 
importance, the fact that we have ‘less empathy’ for certain individuals might 
result in our treating them in an unfair way. 
In the next section (4.1.3) I will address the second kind of criticism. Now I will 
address the first. 
 
4. 1. 2. 1. Another group: those who express their emotions. 
Before I address the criticism, I would like to point attention to one more 
dimension which I think might also influence the extent to which we are willing 
to empathise with someone, and the extent to which we might be successful in 
so empathising with them, which as far as I am aware, has not received special 
treatment in the literature just yet. It is the dimension of whether an agent is 
‘charismatic’ in expressing their emotions. 
Apart from the four dimensions mentioned above (section 4.1.1.), another 
dimension that seems to be ‘morally irrelevant’ but is likely to influence the 
extent to which we are willing to empathise with someone else, and the extent 
to which our empathising with someone else might or might not be successful, 
is the dimension of whether or not an agent is able to express their emotions. 
It seems likely that agents who express their emotions are more likely to be 
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empathised with; they are already helping us as it were, to imagine what it is 
like to be them. It is harder to not empathise with someone who expresses their 
emotion than with someone who does not. And this might lead sometimes to 
unjust treatment whereby individuals who do not express their emotions are 
put at a disadvantage.225 
 
4. 1. 2. 2. The selective nature of empathy. 
One might be worried that we apply empathy selectively, to particular groups 
of people only, and that the factors that decide whether we are willing to 
empathise with them are morally irrelevant ones, such as the agent’s cuteness, 
or their salience. 
The assumption behind this worry is that empathy itself is a desirable thing. 
What is problematic is that our ‘distribution’ of empathy (comparable perhaps 
to our distribution of attention) would be in a way unfair, decided by morally 
irrelevant factors. 
The first thing to note is that, just as the fact that attention itself can be 
distributed in morally questionable ways is not a point against giving people 
attention, so is the case with empathy – just because we might tend to distribute 
empathy in, say, an unfair way, this does not mean that empathy is itself 
undesirable, or should not be encouraged. 
Therefore the worry here cannot be that there is something wrong with 
empathy when we empathise. It is rather that, if we rely on empathy, as a tool, 
in a certain kinds of project, we would be likely to end up having the wrong sort 
                                                 
225  In certain contexts, it seems to me, it is not altogether unfair to treat preferentially people 
who express their emotions. When nothing important is at stake, I can just as well prefer 
people who do not expect me to read their mind and instead do something to ease me in this 
respect. Emotions are in an important sense social, and communicating your emotion is a 
valuable thing in the social contract which should be encouraged. If you cannot be bothered 
to help me by expressing your emotions, I might be justified in treating you with relative 
indifference compared to other people who express their emotions. But of course, this is not a 
relevant point in cases such as jury trials, where considerations such as this ought to not play 
a part. 
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of judgment, since we would have empathised with different people to a 
different extent, instead of having empathised with everyone involved equally. 
However, as understood in this thesis, empathy is voluntary. It is an involved, 
wilful act of imagination. Therefore, any decision that is made which would rely 
on empathy, say, in order to gain relevant information, would rely on empathy 
knowingly. 
Therefore it is possible to counteract the problem about the selective nature of 
empathy. Namely, any time that a decision is about to be made, one needs to 
empathise with all the parties involved. As long as one adheres to this principle, 
empathy would present no problem. It might, of course, be a thing that we are 
more willing to empathise with, say, attractive agents. This is probably why the 
characters in movies often are attractive, to help the audience in taking in their 
viewpoint. But this tendency for us to be more naturally willing to empathise 
with the more attractive agents need not have any bad repercussions. When we 
have to take part in some decision-making, for example, we can always adhere 
to the principle where we try to empathise with representatives (hypothetical 
or otherwise) of all the parties likely to be affected by this decision. 
Therefore, since I am assessing the merits of a cultivated empathy, as opposed 
to some spontaneous spark of fellow-feeling – which is not what empathy is 
understood to be in this thesis anyway – this issue does not present much of a 
problem with empathy. 
Any such tendency to be willing to empathise with only certain individuals is 
best countered not by disallowing oneself to empathise with them, but rather, 
by making the effort to empathise with others as well. 
 
4. 1. 2. 3. Empathic accuracy. 
Another, and as I said, more challenging worry for empathy, is the worry that 
empathy might be bound to be less accurate for certain people: if you are a 
member of my family, or of my nation, my empathy with you will likely yield a 
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true understanding of your experience; however, this would not apply if you are 
a total stranger, or someone with a life experience radically different from mine. 
I accept that this is a limitation of empathy. However I do not consider this to 
be a point against it. Prinz seems to suggest that this worry is a reason why we 
should not have a morality ‘based’ on empathy. However, he does not specify 
his claim as to what he means by a morality based on empathy; if he means by 
this a moral system in which empathy is the only thing that guides our moral 
choices, then he seems to be defeating a straw man. 
 
4. 1. 2. 4. Conclusion. 
So far I have addressed the worry that we experience ‘less empathy’ – less of a 
good thing – for certain people. As already argued above, this worry has two 
interpretations. I answered them both: in the first case, my reply was that we 
should make ourselves empathise with more people; in the second case that 
empathy is still a good thing, and something we should be trying to do, even if 
doomed to a relative failure from the start. 
In the next section I will address the worry about unfairness – where what is at 
issue is not merely the distribution of empathy itself but something else that 
seems to depend on empathy. 
 
4. 1. 3. Empathy results in an unjust treatment of others. 
The most serious worry with empathy is not that empathy might be itself a good 
which tends to not be fairly distributed among people. Rather, it is that 
empathy might result in us treating people unfairly in other ways, beyond our 
not empathising with them in the right amount. 
For example one might worry that empathy towards certain individuals or 
groups might lead us to act in ways which are unfair or straightforwardly 
harmful to other individuals or groups. The worry here is that empathy for the 
in-group results in harm to the outgroup. I will consider two versions of this 
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criticism. One is that empathy leads to preferential treatment of certain people 
which results in harms to other people. The other version is one raised by 
Bloom recently, and it is that empathy directly incites violence to the outgroup. 
I will in this section present the two criticisms. In the following section, 4.1.4, I 
will reply to them. 
 
4. 1. 3. 1. Empathy leads to preferential treatment of people we have empathised with. 
One of the most serious worries about empathy is that empathy leads to 
preferential treatment of those we empathise with. Prinz cites a finding that if 
asked to empathise with someone subjects are more likely to move that person 
up a waiting list, even when they know that on the same waiting list there are 
other people who are more deserving to go up.226 The worry is therefore that 
when we empathise with someone we are likely to do things for them which 
might result in injustice for other people. 
This is a serious problem. If Prinz is right that empathy is the main propulsion 
for injustice here, then there is a good reason to be worried about how empathy 
might influence our actions. Perhaps in certain decision-making contexts it will 
be good to avoid empathy altogether. 
I will not here argue against the finding that Prinz discusses. It seems plausible 
that it is precisely empathy with a particular individual and not something else 
that which triggered people to move that individual up the waiting list. What I 
think can be concluded from that is that we should beware certain action 
tendencies that result from empathy since like any potentially powerful tool 
empathy too has to be used with care. 
 
                                                 
226  Prinz, 2011b, p.226. 
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4. 1. 3. 2. Empathy incites violence. 
Another recent criticism of empathy is that by Bloom who has claimed that 
empathy incites violence.227 He observes that empathy with victims often 
motivates us to act violently towards the perpetrators and concludes from this 
that empathy is morally undesirable, that we would be better off without it. 
Presumably he thinks that if we were not empathising with the victims, we 
would not have had the motivation to revenge them, and this motivation often 
leads to cruelty and disproportionate punishment, which makes empathy 
undesirable. He uses the example of American troops torturing and executing 
Nazi soldiers at a concentration camp in a way which is morally reprehensible. 
Even though the Nazi soldiers needed to be punished, Bloom says, the specific 
punishment was too much and immoral. 
It is not easy to assess Bloom’s criticism, as he is not overly careful in framing 
his argument. There are a couple of things to note. First, Bloom seems to be 
right to observe that sometimes empathy with victims leads to acts of violence 
that are morally unjustified. However, it is a far cry from this observation to 
conclude that the best solution to this problem is to have less empathy. In order 
to be able conclude this, Bloom needs to argue that were I not to empathise 
with a victim of a crime, I would not be led to desire punishment for the 
perpetrator. But Bloom fails to do this. And I think this is a false claim anyway. 
The American soldiers in Bloom’s example need not have empathised with the 
Jews killed at the camps or with anyone in particular in order to have been 
motivated to revenge. It seems uncontroversial to point out that not all desire 
for excessive violence in the name of revenge is fuelled by empathy with the 
victims. But if this is true, then Bloom’s criticism of empathy as inciting violence 
is not a strong point against empathy. 
If there is any truth in Bloom's observation, I think it has to do with an intuition 
that emotionally experiencing a victim's suffering - what Bloom takes empathy 
to mean - is somehow more motivating towards violent revenge than a cold-
blooded cost-benefit analysis would be. Given the motivating power of 
                                                 
227  Bloom, 2015; Bloom, 2016. 
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emotions, this seems approximately right. Still, the most that Bloom can claim 
here is that if we are revenging out of empathy with the victim, we would be 
more likely to err on the side of more violence than if we are revenging out of 
other emotions or without emotions. But even this claim is in need of further 
backing. The question of whether there even is such a thing as a 'proportionate' 
revenge notwithstanding, I can imagine someone quite dispassionately 
allocating punishment according to a set of rules without realising that the 
punishment is too great for the wrong that has been committed. It would be a 
different kind of crime, a crime of ‘thoughtlessness’, but a crime nevertheless. 
It is not immediately clear that the two kinds of crime can be compared. Which 
is worse – punishing someone out of excessive empathic anger, or out of 
thoughtlessness? If I had the space to make this argument, I would argue that 
the latter is worse. There is something distinctively human and valuable in 
anger. But I do not need to pursue this quite interesting, yet involved line of 
thought here. All I need is the hardly controversial claim that crimes of 
thoughtlessness are not in any obvious sense ‘better’ than crimes of outrage. 
And because they are less noticeable it does not mean they do not happen just 
as, if not more, often. Also other emotions might make us revenge 
'disproportionately' e.g. anger. Anger need have nothing to do with empathy, 
as Prinz has argued.228 So to think that empathising with the victim of a crime 
would somehow lead me astray so often that a world in which I do not 
empathise with victims of crime is a better world than a world in which I do, is 
a very strong claim and Bloom has not given us any good reasons to hold it. To 
back his criticism he not only has to show that empathy in fact often leads us 
astray in the direction of more violence, he also has to show that a world 
without empathy would not too often lead us astray in other ways which would 
be less preferable than a world in which revenges are more violent than they 
should ideally be. And I think these are difficult claims to defend. If one agrees 
with Bloom that empathy is very motivating, it seems too likely that in a world 
                                                 
228  Prinz, 2011a. 
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without it we would shrug our shoulders at committed wrongs way too often to 
make this non-empathy world overall morally better. 
If there is any truth in Bloom's observation, I think it has to do with the way 
empathy is exploited in political rhetoric, e.g., in justifying going at war with 
another country. The exploitation of 'experience the victim's suffering' in the 
press can manipulate people in dangerous ways. This is a slightly separate worry 
that merits a discussion on its own; I will further discuss the worry from 
manipulation in section 4.2.3 below. 
 
4. 1. 4. The solution: cultivating empathy. 
In this section I will reply to the worry that empathy might lead us to treat 
people in an unfair way. The two versions of this worry that I considered are 
described in the previous section 4.1.3. 
I will argue that despite the worries empathy is still morally desirable. This I 
will do in two ways. First I will argue that if we are better aware of empathy, 
and cultivate ourselves to use it in the right way, namely, a systemic empathy, 
it becomes less likely to treat people unjustly. One feature of a cultivated 
empathy is that it allows us to expand our circle of care. I will also argue that 
empathy can and especially in the relevant context, should be combined with 
other considerations, such as justice. To note that empathy is not always 
sufficient to arrive at the best moral judgment is not an argument against my 
thesis that empathy is desirable. 
Second, I will consider alternatives and argue that a world without empathy 
and where we let empathy influence our decisions even less than we do at 
present, would in fact be a grimmer prospect. Empathy has shortcomings and 
is not perfect, yet it might still be in certain ways, the best thing that we have. 
Without the prospect of a better alternative, the claims that empathy has 
shortcomings can be little more than warning to use it with caution. They 
cannot be taken to be arguments against employing empathy in making our 
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moral choices, even if we are speaking about, say, making political decisions 
that involve many people. 
 
4.1.4.1. Empathising systemically. 
In order to properly assess the moral merit of empathy, what we should assess 
is a cultivated form of empathy, rather than empathy as it happens to be in 
certain circumstances. Here I will argue that a cultivated empathy is at a much 
smaller risk of being pray to the biases that critics of empathy have been 
worried about. 
In order to be able to speak about cultivated empathy, one needs the implicit 
claim that empathy is malleable - 'it can be changed, redirected, and 
cultivated'.229 This is something there is no reason to doubt, and even the critics 
of empathy admit it, e.g. the worry that empathy can be manipulated (4.2.3) 
relies on this claim. We can modify our empathic response230 rather than it 
being the case that empathy leads us to have a fixed response to a situation. 
Empathy can be cultivated which means that we can cultivate ourselves to 
(spontaneously) empathise with certain people in a certain kind of 
circumstance. 
A cultivated form of empathy will mean, first, that we will be able to balance 
considerations coming from empathy with other considerations such as 
judgment, etc. Being more familiar with empathy, that is, being more 
experienced with empathising with different people will mean that it is less 
likely that empathising with someone will overwhelm one so much so that they 
forget to take into account any other morally relevant consideration, such as 
fairness, when reaching a decision. 
Awareness of the way in which empathy might influence our decisions seems 
to be good enough for us to know how better to respond in certain situations. 
For example the case that Prinz discusses it does not seem as if considerations 
                                                 
229  Hu, 2018, p.351. 
230  Peterson, 2017. 
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of fairness could not have overridden the tendency to move the person up the 
waiting list. It is just that these considerations have not been made salient to 
the people asked. Empathy was never meant to be the sole and only factor to 
influence our moral actions; and it seems possible to combine empathy with 
considerations of fairness. 
Second, one can become what I call a ‘systemic’ empathiser. What I call 
systemic empathy is trying to empathise with representatives from all the 
parties involved in making a decision. If one adopts this as one’s principle, the 
more spontaneous empathy for certain individuals which presumably triggers 
responsive reaction in relation to them will be balanced with the empathy for 
others, leading to an overall more balanced decision and preventing us from 
acting on these initial urges if it would be the case that these urges would come 
at the expense of other parties. 
In this case the biases inherent in empathy would not be such an issue. The fact 
that empathy might tend to lead us to do something for someone would not 
result in an unjust treatment of others if we take the time to take into 
consideration those others too. Take for example the study Prinz quotes. If one 
adopts empathy as a strategy, one would not commit the moral error that the 
subjects from the finding did; one would be able on these occasions, to also 
empathise with another individual, e.g. with an abstract individual who is going 
to be pushed down on the waiting list. In other words, even if individual 
empathy might on occasion result in injustice, a more rigorous practice of 
empathy is far less likely to do so. The fact that our experience of empathy for 
others is influenced by morally irrelevant factors such as an agent’s cuteness, is 
not problematic since, in Hu’s words, ‘it does not mean that one must come to 
inconsistent conclusions or have contradictory moral motivations after 
empathising with different sides’.231 
 
                                                 
231  Hu, 2018, p.353. 
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4.1.4.2. Empathy is our best bet. 
The criticisms of empathy discussed above can be taken to be little more than 
a warning for us to use empathy with caution. In this sense they are a welcome 
argument in favour of us dedicating special attention to cultivating empathy, 
and entangling it with our moral choices, as opposed to letting it influence our 
choices spontaneously and non-consistently. 
However, sometimes critics of empathy have wanted to do more than just warn 
us about potential risks of using empathy. For example Prinz suggests that we 
would be better off if we did not empathise at all when making a certain kind 
of decision, but instead of empathy we used direct emotional response to 
action-types.232 However, I would argue that his proposal does not fare any 
better than empathy does with regards to his own criticism of it. For example, 
Prinz’s own proposed alternative – to ‘directly condition each other to be 
outraged at the thought of iniquity, genocide, and neglect’233 seems to make it 
much easier for audiences to be manipulated. One can just choose to describe 
an event as ‘neglect’ and without empathic insight into whether this event was 
actually neglect, the judge would be just as likely to be manipulated by a skilful 
defendant, victim, or lawyer. Depending on the way information is served to us, 
it seems to me that direct emotional response to action-types would be subject 
to bias just as much as empathy is. It seems hard to deny that would be more 
likely to have a (strong) emotional response, if the action-type is salient, or if it 
concerns someone who is near and dear, or attractive, or a member of the in-
group. If there is any reason to be optimistic that a direct emotional response 
can be cultivated in such a way as to be applicable equally and indiscriminately 
to all kinds of actions, it would be hard to deny this for the case of empathy as 
well. There is no reason to doubt that empathy (including on Prinz’s own 
definition, as well as mine) can be cultivated any less than a direct emotional 
response to action-types can. 
                                                 
232  Prinz, 2011a. 
233  Prinz, 2011b, p.229. 
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Any attack on the moral value of empathy whose aim is to actually discourage 
us from empathising has to propose a serious alternative to it and to argue that 
it would indeed be a better world one in which we did not let empathy influence 
our decisions. One might consider as an alternative to empathy a world in 
which we are more disengaged with the experiences of other people. 
First thing to note is that such an outlook might be very difficult to attain. If 
empathy is indeed hard-wired into us, and if we have a strong tendency to 
empathise at least in certain cases, it seems that either way – cultivating 
empathy, or cultivating a more disengaged non-empathic attitude – we would 
need to do a lot of work. Given that empathy is already a tool on our disposal, 
a tool which even the harshest critics of empathy acknowledge is sometimes 
good and leads to morally valuable judgments and actions, it seems far more 
sensible that we should learn how to handle this tool, and how to make use of 
it, rather than try to avoid using it altogether. 
Second, I would like to point to scenarios where the good we do to someone 
does not harm or result in an unfair treatment of another person. Then, Prinz’s 
observation that empathy propels us to help someone means that in this case 
the fact that empathy would motivate us to bring about something good to the 
first person seems to be an unquestionably good thing. The alternative – to not 
feel empathy – seems grim because it would inhibit us from doing a good deed 
even where that would come at a cost to no one else. 
With this I hope to have shown that empathy is not necessarily more 
problematic than a more disengaged attitude. 
 
4.1.5. Conclusion. 
In this section I discussed the worry that empathy is prone to bias. In particular, 
empathy can be problematic in cases where the good deed that empathy 
motivates us to do towards one person is likely to result in an unfair or even 
harmful treatment of another. I hope to have shown that in these cases a 
cultivated form of empathy is not necessarily problematic and that despite the 
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legitimate worry about empathy leading to a problematic preferential 
treatment, a cultivated form of empathy is more useful than worrisome. 
 
4. 2. Empathy clouds our judgment. 
So far I have addressed criticisms of empathy having to do with its biased 
nature. There are other criticisms that also have to do with the more general 
worry that empathy does in some way cloud our judgment. The worry that 
empathy is biased is within this category, but now I will discuss some other 
criticisms which are also about empathy clouding our judgment. 
4. 2. 1. The ‘inside’ perspective might be misleading. 
One line of criticism that falls within the category of worries that empathy leads 
us to wrong judgment, is the criticism that states that we would be better off at 
judging what another person needs if we saw them from an ‘external’ rather 
than an internal perspective. A criticism of this sort is aired by Goldie.234 Goldie 
considers empathy an inferior response to sympathy when it comes to 
morality.235 He thinks that empathy can inhibit lucid moral judgment, and be 
an impediment to right action, whereas sympathy is the quintessential ‘moral 
emotion’ because it is a third-personal response where the sympathiser is not 
feeling what the other is feeling.236 The intuition is that our being ‘separate’ 
from others makes us better able to judge what is the thing that will be truly 
beneficial for them. 
There is something to this observation. For example, sometimes we want to see 
ourselves ‘from the outside’ because we think that this can provide us with a 
better perspective of what is actually good for us. This is one of the reasons we 
often ask our friends for advice: that they can easily see us ‘from the outside’ 
whereas for us this can be difficult. The external perspective can sometimes 
                                                 
234  Goldie, 2007. 
235  Note this is in earlier work by Goldie; I am not concerned here with Goldie’s subsequent 
argument for the conceptual limitations of empathetic perspective-shifting. For these, see 
chapter 3. 
236  Meyers, 2017. 
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provide epistemic goods which the internal perspective cannot, as Goldie 
points out.237 I will not argue with that. 
However, I do not think that this observation makes empathy any the less 
valuable. Goldie emphasises the role of adopting an external perspective 
towards other people, however, I do not think that empathy is incompatible 
with, or necessarily gets in the way, of that. 
This might at first seem like a contradiction. I hurry to stress that I do not mean 
to claim that while empathising with someone I am also at the same time 
viewing them from an ‘external’ perspective. This does indeed seem like a 
contradiction. What I am claiming instead is that, when we take any temporally 
extended period of time, there will be time right before and right after the 
duration of our empathising, during which time I will be seeing you from an 
external perspective. 
This claim is hard to deny. It seems implausible to suggest that we are even able 
to see another person only through their own perspective. Just as Goldie says, 
the external perspective is the default position238, is something that we do so 
often that, like the air we breathe, we forget to think about it.239 This means 
that we return to the default external position before and after empathy 
anyway. But if so it seems problematic to suggest, as Goldie does, that, should 
I empathise with you, aspects of your situation might be lost to me. It seems 
unlikely that something that is visible from an external perspective about you 
will be lost to me, because the external perspective is the one I cannot help but 
adopt most of the time. By contrast, what is at risk of being lost to me, precisely 
because it is not the default perspective I have of you, is the insight I would gain 
if I empathise with you and I imagine how you yourself experience certain 
things. Empathy is an additional, bonus way, of seeing another person. And this 
is why Goldie’s criticism seems to me unsuccessful. 
                                                 
237  Goldie, 2005; Goldie, 2007. 
238  Goldie, 2005. 
239  Goldie, 2007. 
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What his criticism is useful at is showing that when it comes to making the best 
decision, we should not limit ourselves to the other’s perspective. We should 
not take only that into account when making a decision. There might be things 
that are unknown to the other, yet that might be good to take into account 
when trying to figure out what the best thing to do is. This is the point Goldie 
raises about dramatic irony.240 And this is a good point to consider when we 
want to weigh our considerations in favour of various possible courses of action. 
Certainly, I cannot fail to have both the external, and – if I empathise – also the 
internal perspective of the other person. So there is no worry that empathising 
inhibits us from seeing things. However, there might still be the worry that if 
we rely only or too much on the perspective of the other when making a 
judgment, that might lead us to make an unsuitable judgment. I will consider 
this worry now. 
 
4. 2. 2. Empathy weighs the scales the wrong way. 
Another way in which one can worry that empathy clouds our judgment is to 
consider cases where empathy makes us take the other’s opinion and 
perspective as having too much weight in our consideration of what to do. This 
might ultimately lead us to do not what is good, but what the other person 
thinks is good which is not always the best thing. One can think of a spoiled 
child as a good illustration of this case. The parents end up doing too much of 
what the child wants, which in the end might not be good for the child. One 
might think that, if empathy makes us more likely to commit a similar mistake, 
then we should handle empathy with care. 
It seems clear to me that, in the spoiled child example, the problem is that of 
balancing out different considerations. That is, there is not anything wrong in 
seeing and appreciating the perspective of the child. What is wrong is the 
parent’s failure in weighing the different considerations in the most beneficial 
way. So I think that phrasing the criticism in the way Bloom does – by saying 
                                                 
240  Goldie, 2007. 
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that parents in such cases err by having too much empathy – is incorrect.241 It 
is not the getting of the other’s perspective that is problematic, it is what one 
decides to do as a result of getting it. 
Someone might object by holding that even if empathising with the child and 
not acquiescing in its wishes are logically compatible, they are not likely to co-
occur in reality. Maybe empathy just tends to make us err on the side of taking 
the other’s perspective as having too much weight in our decisions? 
However, I do not think that there is a good reason to think this is the case. As 
I argued above in section 4.1.4.1, a cultivated empathy is able to balance 
considerations coming from empathy with other kinds of considerations, such 
as considerations about the other’s own well-being. 
Therefore having empathy would be just like having extra information which 
in and of itself is not problematic. What could be a problem is how we decide 
what to do, on the basis of that information. The problem about weighing the 
scales the wrong way is one of managing the information that empathy provides 
one with, and not a worry about empathy itself. 
 
4. 2. 3. Empathy makes us easy targets of manipulation. 
It has also been suggested that empathy might cloud our judgment by being 
‘easily manipulated’; Prinz cites evidence from a study by Tsoudis that found 
that judges deliver lighter sentences to defenders who display regret and 
harsher ones when the victims are visibly emotional.242 Prinz suggests that this 
happens because the judges had empathised with the victims or defendants in 
the cases when they expressed regret and therefore the verdict has been altered. 
I have two problems with this. First, it is not clear whether empathy as defined 
here, or as defined by Prinz (emotional mimicry) has been instrumental in 
altering the verdict of the judges. What Tsoudis has really measured seems to 
me to be compassion instead, the question used to measure empathy in her 
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study being: ‘To what extent do you feel compassionate towards the 
(criminal/victim)?’243 Further, it is not clear to me that the alterations in the 
verdicts have been altogether a morally undesirable thing. Prinz claims: ‘What 
matters is whether victims were really harmed and whether perpetrators are 
really responsible’244 and I am inclined to agree. But it seems reasonable to 
suggest that in order to assess the extent of a victim’s harm and of a 
perpetrator’s responsibility, empathy as defined here could provide important 
epistemic input and that a judge is therefore better off to take into account how 
the parties involved experienced things. Two crimes might look the same from 
the outside, but might be very dissimilar ‘from the inside’ for the parties 
involved and the fact that verdicts can be sensitive to this is not obviously 
ethically problematic. 
One aspect of Prinz’s worry about manipulation is that the judges were 
presumably in a way manipulated by the agents skilled at expressing their 
emotions. I think that Prinz is worried that being more, rather than less, 
responsive to another’s emotions makes one more vulnerable to the other 
person manipulating them in some way. Since empathy usually involves 
recreating in one’s mind emotional as well as other states, then perhaps this 
worry can extend to empathy as well. 
But still the worry does not seem fair. It is true that being able to completely 
block the emotions of another person might make our judgment more 
‘objective’ in a way. But even by not taking another’s emotions into account we 
can be manipulated by them. More importantly, being responsive to another’s 
emotions does not automatically mean that the other person will be able to 
trick us into thinking whatever they want us to think. On the contrary it seems 
to me that it makes it even easier to detect, for example, when an agent has 
particular non-spoken intentions such as trying to manipulate us. The agent 
who is trying to manipulate us will now have more work to do; in the first case 
they only needed to carefully orchestrate the content of what they say, whereas 
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in this case they also need to carefully orchestrate the emotions they are 
displaying, and to put some work into hiding their real emotions. 
Therefore, if anything, it seems to me that it is relatively harder for me to 
manipulate someone who is empathising with me, compared to someone who 
is not. If you recreate my experience in your imagination, it seems to me, it 
would be harder for me to mislead you because you will be aware of a greater 
pool of information than otherwise. 
 
4. 3. Empathy inhibits action. 
Another way to criticise empathy is to hold that, even if we have arrived at the 
right judgment about what to do, empathy might inhibit us from acting on that 
judgment. 
Three separate worries fall in this category. One is the worry that when we 
empathise with people in distress, we might end up being so overwhelmed by 
their suffering that we become unable to act. This is to my mind the most 
challenging worry. A second worry is that empathy might detract our attention 
from acting, as we end up indulging in experiencing another’s emotions 
vicariously and this somehow inhibits us from acting. Finally, the worry has also 
been raised that empathy has a limited motivational force. As I will argue, the 
latter two criticisms do not stand much ground. In all three cases the criticism 
is not relying merely on the weak claim that empathy is insufficient for right 
action but rather on the claim that we would have been more likely to act had 
we not empathised to begin with. 
 
4. 3. 1. Empathy inhibits us because of distress. 
One worry is that empathising with certain kinds of experience tends to inhibit 
the empathiser from action. In particular this might seem to be the case with 
experiences which are excessively distressing: they might actually result in the 
empathiser becoming distressed themselves. In such cases one might worry 
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that empathising might actually get in the way of one’s acting to alleviate 
another person’s condition. Thus Hoffman defines empathic over-arousal as the 
phenomenon where a victim’s distress cues are ‘so aversive that an observer’s 
empathic distress is transformed into an intense personal feeling of distress’.245 
Kaplan is worried by a similar thing, what she has called a ‘vicarious trauma’ 
response246 in the case of which empathy does not result in a pro-social 
behaviour because the empathiser becomes immediately concerned with 
removing the source of the vicarious distress to themselves – for example, by 
looking the other way, crossing the street away from the beggar, switching the 
TV channel when shown news of a natural catastrophe, and so on. Prinz also 
speculates that misery might promote social withdrawal247 and cites evidence 
that vicarious distress can interfere with prosocial behaviour.248 He speculates 
that unhappiness might lead to withdrawal, avoidance, and defensiveness and 
contrasts this with a more ‘dispassionate’ registering of another’s emotions249 
which according to him does not inhibit prosocial behaviour. 
In short, empathy might be so overwhelming that it actually inhibits positive 
action. This seems to imply that in certain cases it is better to not empathise at 
all. For example, if I see a beggar and empathise with him I might be 
overwhelmed by his suffering and as a result do something to avoid him, e.g. 
cross to the other side of the road. By contrast, if I hadn’t empathised, I would 
not have felt overwhelmed and would not have crossed the street to avoid the 
beggar, which would have been more likely to result in my giving him change. 
It does seem indeed that in certain cases empathising might actually get in the 
way of our acting to bring about something good. These would be cases where 
the person we are empathising with is suffering to such an extent that we 
cannot really bear to think about it.250 These cases might be of a limited range 
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but they are by no means exceptional; depending on the general sensitivity and 
particular momentary state of the individual who is empathising, sometimes 
even more ‘trivial’ kinds of suffering can easily become ‘too much’ and trigger a 
reaction of avoidance. 
One available reply here is to agree that empathy is not a suitable response in 
these cases, but to hold that empathy is a suitable response in other cases where 
the target of empathy is not undergoing too intense a suffering as to trigger an 
avoidance reaction from the empathiser. Perhaps a good (and healthy; see 
section 4.5) heuristic for the empathiser is to empathise selectively, only in 
cases where suffering is not ‘too much’. When we have good reasons to suspect 
that empathising with an individual might distress us excessively, we just would 
be better advised to not empathise at all. 
This is certainly a reasonable strategy to follow in some cases, but I do not think 
that avoiding empathy altogether is the best heuristic to use. Using this strategy 
would mean, for example, that the moment I see a beggar I should stop myself 
from even attempting to imagine his condition. But given the epistemic import 
of empathy already discussed in Chapter 3 and considering its moral value, it 
seems that empathising with people in distress should ideally not be avoided. 
Therefore, it seems that more reasonable than avoiding empathy altogether 
would be to at least begin empathising, but pull out if and when we begin to 
become empathically distressed. One way to do this would be to empathise 
partially, imagining only select aspects of the other’s experience, yet without 
fully recreating the emotionally distressing aspects of it. Another way would be 
to somehow distance oneself when one feels the surge of negative emotions and 
to observe them without experiencing them. 
Since our empathic responses are modifiable251 one can learn to control one's 
own responses and not let oneself be too overwhelmed by another emotion. 
Hence it seems that if we have cultivated empathy so as to become good at 
                                                 
empathiser becoming depressed themselves, and thus unable to offer help. However, I will 
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251  Peterson, 2017. 
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controlling our empathic responses, we should be able to avoid empathic 
distress. While empathy does indeed sometimes lead to avoidance, a cultivated 
kind of empathy would be able to manoeuvre around the excessive, unhealthy 
distress in such a manner so it does not tend to result in our avoidance of 
otherwise easily available morally valuable actions. 
 
4. 3. 2. Empathy distracts us from action. 
The second worry is that empathy somehow distracts us from action. It takes 
away our attention from action to feeling the other’s emotion. For example, 
even defenders of empathy such as Gruen seem to acknowledge that feeling-
along-with can be a distraction from getting something useful done.252 Similar 
criticisms have sometimes been aired in the press. Brooks in his New York Times 
column criticises empathy as being ‘a way to experience delicious moral 
emotions without confronting the weaknesses in our nature that prevent us 
from actually acting upon them’253 seeing empathy as little more than a self-
serving affirmation. The common thing between these criticisms is the claim 
that empathy compromises action. 
I think however that there is a serious problem at the heart of these criticisms 
which reduces their strength. It is that they rely on an unstated assumption that 
there is a disjunct between feeling and action and the feeling somehow takes away 
from the action. But this assumption is at the very least very controversial. On 
the face of it, it seems plainly wrong to assume that the more one feels, the less 
one acts. Feeling and action are not components of a zero-sum game. Not only 
that, it seems intuitively more plausible to hold with Prinz that emotions are 
inherently motivating states254, states that prompt us to action, so the more 
feeling there is, the more action there will be. 
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4. 3. 3. Empathy and motivation. 
Finally, another criticism has been aired at empathy: Prinz has criticised 
empathy by claims that it has a limited motivational force.255 I think he is wrong 
to claim this and will now explain why. 
Prinz holds that the empathetic emotions are limited to sadness, misery, and 
distress, and that these emotions do not have great motivational force. On the 
other hand, he argues that other emotions – what he calls emotions of 
disapprobation – anger, guilt, indignation – have great motivational force. He 
also cites evidence in support of the claim that positive emotions do have great 
motivational force.256 
I am not going to challenge Prinz on the claim that emotions of disapprobation 
and positive emotions have great motivational force. I think he is right, and he 
cites good empirical evidence in support of this view. However I do not buy 
Prinz’s claim that emotions which arise from empathy are limited to sadness, 
misery, and distress. I do not think Prinz can defend this claim either. On his 
view empathy is experiencing the emotions that another person has. And if 
‘empathetic emotions’ is taken to mean the vicarious emotions, it seems clear 
that, just as the other person can have each and any emotion possible, so I can 
vicariously experience each and every emotion. On the other hand if 
‘empathetic emotions’ are not the vicarious experience of another’s emotions, 
but rather the emotions that arise out of the appreciation of another person’s 
experience it also it is unclear that these emotions would be limited to misery, 
sadness, or distress. On the contrary empathy might make me feel anger or 
indignation at another person’s situation. Hence Prinz does not support his 
claim that the empathic emotions are limited to sadness, misery distress, and 
so the only thing left to assume is that Prinz merely chooses to call the emotions 
of sadness, misery, and distress ‘empathetic emotions’.257 But certainly this is 
misleading and cannot be taken to mean that there is anything motivationally 
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problematic with empathy since in fact empathy has no special connection with 
these negative emotions. With this I have shown that Prinz is wrong in his claim 
that empathy has a limited motivational force. 
 
4. 4. Empathy and politics: empathy distracts us from the ‘real’ 
issues. 
Both Prinz and Bloom have claimed that a ‘politics of empathy’ is morally 
harmful. They worry that a focus on empathy distracts and takes away from the 
attention that other issues should deserve.258 
Unfortunately these criticisms have not been put forward very carefully and 
before I can address them I will have to make more explicit the claims that Prinz 
and Bloom are probably making. I think that they might be making any or all 
of the following claims: that people should not make political decisions based 
on empathy; that political leaders should not tap into people’s empathy in order 
to manipulate their decisions; that there is something morally objectionable 
about a milieu in which empathy is put to the fore of public attention. As I will 
argue below, neither of these interpretations of the claim that a ‘politics of 
empathy’ is morally lacking, presents a problem to my thesis that empathy at 
the individual level should be encouraged and that cultivating empathy and 
involving it in one’s decision making is usually a desirable thing. First to the 
claims Bloom and Prinz are making. 
Bloom in The New Yorker argues against an ‘increasing focus on the emotions’ 
and ‘politics of empathy’. He states that instead of empathy which he sees as a 
little more than a ‘spark of fellow-feeling’ we should concentrate on a ‘reasoned, 
even counter-empathetic analysis of moral obligation and likely 
consequences’259 which involves what Pinker refers to as ‘harder-boiled 
faculties’ namely ‘prudence, reason, fairness, self-control, norms and taboos, 
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and conceptions of human rights’.260 Dayan in a Boston Review article interprets 
Bloom’s position as follows: ‘empathy summons an intensely humanized world, 
where our emotional life—how much we feel for or with—matters more than 
the conditions that cause suffering’.261 
Bloom finds it particularly worrying that a certain kind of stories, namely those 
with identifiable victims which we can easily empathise with, get all the media 
attention, and thus take attention away from other more important issues. 
Bloom gives us convincing examples of how, say, a story about a baby trapped 
in the well, or a missing teenager, is able to captivate all media attention and 
unleash an outpouring of support, whereas other issues, presumably more 
deserving of attention, such as improving medical facilities, leave people 
unmoved.262 
 
4. 4. 1. A most plausible interpretation: criticising public attention in media and 
politics. 
The claim that a ‘politics of empathy’ is not morally desirable here can be read 
as a weak claim about the desirable distribution of public attention. However, 
it is not clear whether Bloom intends it in this way, or as an argument against 
encouraging empathy in general. I will discuss the stronger interpretation in 
the following subsection, but first I will start with the weaker, and to my mind, 
much more reasonable one. I agree with Bloom that the way the public 
attention was distributed in this case, and perhaps in other cases, is in a way 
morally lacking. I do think that there is something left to be desired if the media 
attention is all consumed by a case of individual suffering rather than of some 
larger-scale disasters. I agree with Bloom that a world in which perhaps our 
media spends more coverage on other ‘more important’ issues would in some 
sense be more desirable. With this weak interpretation in mind, I agree with 
Bloom that a politics of empathy is undesirable. 
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And this claim, of course, does not pose any problem to my thesis that empathy 
at the individual level should be encouraged. What causes the problem here is 
not the fact that people can, and do, empathise. It is not at all clear that either 
decision-makers or the public empathising with victims is itself the reason for 
the distribution of media attention. There are a whole lot of other factors 
involved. Hu has recently replied to this criticism as well by nothing that 
‘empathy’s preference is not the sole explanation, and may not be the best 
explanation for the phenomenon Prinz observes here’ since there are ‘a number 
of factors such as media coverage, political relevance, and so on’ which 
‘contributed to the distribution of public attention’.263 
The criticism of a ‘politics of empathy’ in this sense is at most a criticism that 
political decisions should not be made when only taking considerations from 
empathy into account; rather they should be made when taking other 
considerations into account as well, considerations such as fairness, rational 
problem-solving and the like. What seems problematic here is that political 
decisions are found lacking when it comes to ‘hard-boiled’ analysis, and 
considerations of fairness and the like. Even though Bloom calls this kind of 
analysis ‘counter-empathetic’ there is nothing in it which is contrary to 
empathy. They are just two completely different things. Again, this is not a 
criticism of empathy itself. 
Another critic of the ‘politics of empathy’ is Prinz, and he is not much clearer 
on the issue of what exactly is undesirable about (the politics of) empathy 
either. He claims that ‘The politics of empathy tends to treat the victims of 
inequality without targeting root causes’264 without aiding us much in 
understanding this claim. Since Prinz does not specify what he means by 
‘politics of empathy’ his attack seems little more than giving this label to politics 
that does not lead to appropriate moral action. For example Prinz claims that 
empathy might offer ‘very helpful support’ to victims of economic injustice, but 
that it does not target the root causes of such injustice. This seems like a bold 
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claim and in the absence of Prinz actually giving an argument in its support, it 
is hard to guess what his line of reasoning is. I would argue that this claim false: 
it seems unreasonable to assume that if I empathise with you as a result two 
things will happen: I will be willing to give you financial aid, and I will not be 
willing to work for a change in social structures that will secure your child’s free 
education. Therefore it seems a rash and unjustified claim to say that empathy 
limits the scope of our actions in the way Prinz claims. On the contrary, it is far 
more probable that imagining other people’s situation is a likely motivator for 
us to target root causes of economic injustice, just as it is a likely motivator for 
us to offer immediate financial help. 
It is difficult to unpack the substance of Prinz’s argument, but again on a weak 
interpretation perhaps his criticism is aimed not at how empathy affects us, but 
rather at the attention distribution in politics and media coverage. Perhaps the 
phrase ‘politics of empathy’ as used by Prinz is really supposed to pick out the 
fact that, say, the media covers stories about victims of inequality far more than, 
say, discussing ideas about root causes of inequality. As already mentioned, I 
think that this worry, if it applies, is a legitimate worry, and I will address it 
now. 
I think that Bloom is right that there is something undesirable about a milieu 
in which it seems acceptable and normalised to have an entire nation’s 
attention directed at some individual suffering, whereas other causes do not 
receive the attention they should. One might even (although this is not Prinz’s 
claim) think about a Randian anti-hero, Ellsworth Toohey as embodying the 
sort of worries Prinz is on about. There is something sickening, almost evil, in 
not getting any help in building a better future, something good for all of us, 
because we are too busy feeling sorry about the less fortunate among us. And 
especially where distribution of public resources is concerned, such as public 
attention or funding, a focus on particular emotions might indeed be harming 
to society at large. 
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4. 4. 2. What if the criticism is not just about public attention? 
But is it possible that Prinz and Bloom mean something more than merely 
criticising the political milieu? Perhaps it is the way they phrase their criticism, 
but at times it does sound like they are almost against empathy itself, rather 
than merely the political climate and media coverage. 
I think that in this sense there is a possible interpretation of Prinz and Bloom’s 
worry with the ‘politics of empathy’. Perhaps they worry that we end up affected 
by one thing instead of another and that the ‘focus on empathy’ is somehow 
‘getting in the way’ of a reasoned analysis of moral obligation and 
consequences. What Prinz and Bloom particularly dislike here is the emotional 
aspect of empathy. However, this worry comes from an unjustifiable dichotomy 
between reason and emotion and the claim about one of them distracting us 
from the other is hard to justify. Whereas it is true that we have a limited 
attention span, it is a whole other matter to claim that it is exactly the attention 
that we would have given to one issue that has been wasted on this other issue, 
and also that it is exactly empathy which is to blame for this. 
Therefore my thesis – that empathy in the individual should be encouraged – is 
not challenged by Bloom and Prinz’s critique of the ‘politics of empathy’. Except 
if one has a further worry. If the result of my thesis is to encourage empathy at 
the individual level, then one might wonder: would not such a kind of 
encouragement ultimately promote and make more likely the unjustified 
political and media attention, which I agreed was undesirable? Perhaps 
encouraging and praising empathy in individuals is more likely to result in, in 
such kind of distribution of media and political attention? I think this is a fair 
question and I will address it now. 
 
4. 4. 3. How does encouragement of individuals’ empathy square with the ideal 
of avoiding an undesirable distribution of public attention? 
Even if Bloom and Prinz are not criticising the individual functioning of 
empathy, but rather a kind of milieu that seems to place higher value on 
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emotional attunement with another person than that attunement really 
deserves in areas such as politics and media coverage. If this is true, however, 
this position is still compatible with my thesis that individual empathy should 
be encouraged. It is a criticism of what is put to the front of media attention 
rather than anything else. 
However, one might think that the thesis that I defend here, even if not 
incompatible with Bloom and Prinz’s view that there is too much ‘politics of 
empathy’ perhaps seems to suggest otherwise. If empathy is to be highly 
cherished on an individual level, how are we to escape a consequence such as 
the consequence that there will end up being ‘politics of empathy’? Even if this 
is not in my immediate concern, perhaps it is a downside of empathy if the 
encouragement of empathy in life of individuals is likely to lead to such 
problematic ‘politics of empathy’. 
To this I can say that ‘encouragement of empathy’ does not mean encouraging 
it everywhere and always, and most certainly it does not mean encouraging it 
at the expense of other highly desirable things, such as rational analysis, and 
fighting causes of injustice rather than its symptoms. I would argue that, on the 
contrary, a cultivated form of empathy, one where we are less likely to be 
‘manipulated’ by it, but rather in control of it, does make it easier rather than 
more difficult, to employ this analysis. 
For example, in order to find a solution to the root causes of injustice, a huge 
motivation can come from one’s imagining what would people who are the 
victims of such injustice feel. Even if in these cases empathy is not as palpable 
as empathy with real, rather than hypothetical, individuals, still if one 
empathises systemically with hypothetical representatives of all involved 
parties to be affected by a certain decision it seems to me that the chances of 
overlooking some ultimately desirable course of action are significantly 
diminished. This is so because empathising with more people, as opposed to a 
small number of people, is likely to dilute any biased effect that might come 
through from empathy. Were empathy systemic it would have been less likely 
that one particular story, such as that of a baby trapped in a well, would 
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dominate the landscape of public attention, since there would be so many other 
stories apart from this one to which people would attend. A systemic empathy 
would take into account, say, the future generations, empathising with the 
happier as well as the unfortunate, and so on. Therefore systemic empathy 
seems a reliable way to diminish the risk of overlooking a desirable course of 
action. 
 
4. 5. Empathy is unhealthy. 
So far I considered ways in which empathy can negatively affect one’s 
judgments and actions. The criticisms discussed above have been put forward 
in the moral philosophy literature and the popular press. 
In this section I will discuss another, and to my mind even more serious issue 
with empathy, an issue which concerns the effect empathising can have on the 
empathiser themselves. It has to do with the fact that empathy can become ‘too 
much’ and not healthy for the person engaging in it. Although this dimension 
of empathy has not received a great deal of attention in moral philosophy, it 
has been extensively discussed in the medical literature, and in particular has 
been part of the discussion about what should be the preferred attitude 
practicing clinicians265 (which includes health professionals who deal with 
mental as well as physical health) have to adopt with regard to their patients. 
The main observation here is that empathy can become ‘too much’ and become 
unhealthy for the person engaging in it. This claim has, I think, an intuitive 
appeal, and I will not specifically argue for it here. Perhaps many of us have felt 
in one instance or another, how engaging too much with a negative experience 
of another person, can leave us drained, depressed or distressed. It is this 
complex of negative experience for the empathiser, which lasts for a significant 
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amount of time after the exercise of empathy, that I refer to as ‘unhealthy’ 
effects of empathy. 
In this sense especially at a risk of experiencing the unhealthy effects of 
empathy are those who are in a position to spend a lot of their time interacting 
with people with grave negative experiences and who have to attend to these 
experiences. The prime example of a profession which is at risk in this sense is 
that of clinicians, as clinicians are expected to deal with issues that concern 
people’s mental and physical health. Clinicians are not the only professionals at 
a systemic risk of experiencing the negative effects of empathy, other 
professions like social work and charity work come to mind as well, and 
certainly the issue of the negative effects of empathy, although most easily 
observable in the medical professions, is an issue which is by no means 
restricted to the context of any particular profession since any individual who 
happens to empathise too much with someone’s negative experience is at risk 
of letting empathy become unhealthy for them. Nevertheless, since it is in the 
clinical literature where there is most systemic discussion of the way empathy 
can backfire on the person empathising, it is this literature that will guide the 
discussion in the present section. 
In the medical ethics literature there is a debate over whether, and to what 
extent, clinicians should empathise with their patients. On the one hand is the 
position that clinicians should not be engaged emotionally when interacting 
with their patients, and instead should adopt an attitude of ‘detached concern’ 
which amounts to trying to understand the patient without emotional 
engagement.266 This attitude of detached concern is only a less involved 
empathy according to the way empathy is understood in the present thesis, 
because a full-fledged version of empathy would also involve emotions, and is 
thus closer to what in the medical literature is sometimes referred to as 
‘engaged empathy’267 defined for example by Halpern as ‘an emotion-guided 
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activity of imagination, making use of such distinctive emotional processes as 
associating, resonance, and moods that provide context’.268 
One of the crucial considerations behind the view that clinicians should not be 
adopting anything more than detached concern when dealing with their 
patients, is that of protecting clinicians’ own health. The thought is that too 
much emotional engagement with the patients can be overwhelmingly 
straining on the clinician. In other words, empathy can backfire, leading to 
emotional depletion, distress, and depression. 
On the other hand some have argued that clinicians should empathise in an 
emotionally engaged way with their patients. One set of arguments to this effect 
is aspirational – being empathic is seen to be more in line with the aspiration 
of the medical profession, and with the move toward a patient centred care. 
Also it has been suggested that emotionally engaging with the patient might 
have certain benefits in the clinical context, such as increasing the patient’s 
trust and thus enabling them to share relevant information with the clinician. 
Further, in the context of mental health in particular, one might reasonably 
suppose that there are independent reasons why empathy between clinician 
and patient might be desirable: for example, empathy might be one of the most 
effective ways to make the sufferer feel ‘connected’ to a reality beyond their 
own, a suggestion about which I will also speak in the following chapter. 
Defenders of empathy in the clinical context have, as a rule, not been denying 
the claim that empathising with many people with significantly negative 
experiences can be exhausting and that too much investment on the part of the 
clinician can lead to negative effects for the clinician’s well-being. And they 
certainly have not been denying that clinicians, just as any other people, should 
look after their own well-being. 
The presumption is that there is a way to empathise which reliably does not 
backfire on the empathiser’s own well-being. When one cultivates empathy in 
the right way, one would be able to know where one’s own limits are, and there 
                                                 
268  Halpern, 2011, p.11. 
177 
 
will be a significantly reduced risk of empathy backfiring. And just because this 
risk is not completely removed does not mean that empathy should, as a whole, 
be discouraged. 
Of course the exact same thing can be said for empathising with people in any 
context, not just the clinical one. We undeniably have the responsibility to take 
care of our own well-being. But just because empathy can sometimes, if 
overdone, backfire, does not mean that we should avoid any empathic 
engagement with others. The benefits of empathy are far too many for it to be 
dispensed with and not just any unpleasant sensation that was formed as a 
result of empathising with someone, counts as empathy ‘backfiring’. Empathy 
can have negative effects on one’s well-being only in the more extreme cases. 
And more importantly, it is certainly possible that one trains oneself to be aware 
of one’s own mental and physical well-being in such a way as to be able to 
manage and reduce the risk of empathy backfiring. 
Just as we are sometimes expected to go out of our way to help another person, 
so it is with empathy. Certainly, being a complete egotist who is not moved by 
anyone else’s experience is, in a sense, the most ‘healthy’ of choices. And 
whereas looking after our own selves should, in my mind, have a very central 
place in any moral system, this is not to say that morality should mean we are 
all egotists. Getting a bit out of our way is certainly the right thing to do in many 
circumstances. And in the case of empathy, I think, the getting out of the way 
is in most cases fairly minimal compared to the advantages, both the general 
ones, and in particular the advantages to the person who empathises. 
There is one more thing that has been suggested by some defenders of empathy 
in the clinical context. An argument has been put forward that empathy 
decreases rather than increases clinician burnout, due to its increasing the 
physician’s overall job satisfaction.269 The thought is that symptoms of burnout 
include a sense of depersonalisation, and diminution of personal 
accomplishment270 which supposedly are counteracted by a more involved 
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engagement of the clinician with their patients which contributes to clinicians 
experiencing their profession as more meaningful. Indeed there have been 
studies finding that domains of burnout inversely relate to empathy271 but it 
suffices for present purposes to acknowledge that it cannot be quickly assumed 
that empathy does overall, increase rather than decrease burnout. Perhaps 
when all its negative and positive effects are balanced, it becomes less obvious 
that empathy’s effect on one’s well-being is if anything negative. Empathy 
might provide a sense of purpose and connection that would not increase 
emotional exhaustion, and perhaps a clinician who is very detached might 
burnout more quickly than one who is not. 
Even though the clinical context can provide an additional reason why someone 
who empathises might feel satisfied with themselves (‘I did my job well today’) 
there is a sense in which empathy can provide us with a feeling of 
connectedness and a kind of special satisfaction and a sense of purpose in a 
variety of contexts. It is hard to articulate this idea of connectedness, but I give 
a go at it below, in Chapter 5. For now I will just state that when taking into 
account both empathy’s negative, as well as positive effects on one’s well-being 
(speaking about one’s levels of depletion, distress, and depression) it is not at 
all clear that empathy’s overall effect on that well-being, even when empathy is 
‘too much’ is a necessarily a negative one. 
Still, this is not to say that excessive empathising cannot on occasion be a 
serious concern about one’s own well-being. This means that empathy should 
be cultivated because once empathy is cultivated in the right way the risk of its 
having unhealthy effects on the empathiser is minimised to a great extent. Not 
only experience with empathising, but also awareness of one’s own mental well-
being is necessary. And of course there are independent reasons why such an 
awareness is always desirable. In order to be able to truly assess empathy’s 
merits, we have to assess a cultivated form of empathy. 
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4. 6. Empathy weakens our imaginative resistance. 
Finally, I will raise an original criticism of empathy which has to do with 
imaginative resistance. The criticism is that empathy has the potential of being 
morally degrading because if we systematically empathise with all kinds of 
people, including moral transgressors, we would imagine things which our 
imaginative resistance might have otherwise inhibited us from imagining. But 
perhaps there is moral value in imaginative resistance, and if this is true, one 
can worry that systematic empathy might erode the protective barrier of 
imaginative resistance, and this might make us worse off morally. 
There are two layers of this worry. One layer is that the ‘perfect moral agent’ as 
it were, is not someone who empathises on every occasion it is possible to do 
so. On the contrary, there are cases where the truly moral thing to do would be 
to not empathise with another person. Would we think highly of someone 
when, instead of flaring up in a righteous anger at a transgression, they decide 
to carefully and full-heartedly consider the perspective of the transgressor? The 
intuition is that in certain cases something of moral worth would be lost if an 
agent sets off to empathise with another person. 
One can reply to this relatively easily by acknowledging merely that empathy is 
not always and everywhere the right response to a situation. This, stated in this 
way, might sound obvious. What the objector here seems to assume, which is 
wrong, is that I advocate the idea of a person who empathises everywhere and 
always, but I have not anywhere made this claim, and now I am specifically 
pointing out that I consider there to be situations such as righteous indignation, 
where empathy is not, at least at the moment, the most virtuous response. It is 
a separate lot of work to delineate where and under what occasions empathy is 
the ‘right’ response; I do not think there is an easy formula-like answer to this. 
Perhaps it is only up to a virtuous agent in a specific situation to know, when 
the situation arises. 
Therefore this layer of the worry can be dealt with without much ado. It is not 
really an objection against empathy to say that a virtuous agent would not 
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empathise in a specific situation in which a less virtuous agent may find it 
appropriate to do so. 
What is a challenge to my claim that empathy at the individual level should be 
encouraged, however, is the second layer of the worry. It has to do with systemic 
empathising. I do advocate that a virtuous agent is one who empathises a lot, 
and often, and with various people in various circumstances. The worry here is 
that, little by little, such kind of empathising might erode the agent’s 
imaginative resistance, which could eventually lead them to become less 
virtuous. It is just one consequence of having eroded imaginative resistance 
that in the scenario mentioned above, when prompted by someone to imagine 
the situation of a moral transgressor, the agent would not deny it, but rather 
might indeed have ‘second thoughts’ about this – second thoughts that would 
immediately, on at least some moral frameworks272, reduce the agent’s 
virtuosity. Thus, indirectly, too much empathy perhaps, whereas it is 
compatible with a high level of virtue, perhaps indirectly precludes someone 
from being super virtuous, a virtuous super-star, as it were. 
This is the place to mention that this objection is inspired from a discussion in 
Morton.273 Morton argues that being a decent person involves having 
internalized a code of behaviour that constrains one’s imagination, and which 
has a blinkering effect that makes it difficult for one to understand important 
parts of human possibility. For example, when confronted with information 
about some committed atrocity (say a Nazi soldier shooting people in a 
concentration camp) a decent person is most likely to be shocked and quickly 
conclude that the soldier in question was a monster, a non-human, and they 
would not even make an attempt to empathise with the soldier, therefore 
missing on a chance to understand important things about human possibility. 
Morton is concerned that the imaginative resistance that goes along with being 
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a decent person makes it impossible to empathise with individuals who perform 
atrocious acts, and hence limits our understanding of some important sides of 
human nature. Morton does not formulate an objection against empathy, 
however his discussion points out to an inverse relationship between empathy 
and imaginative resistance and as such inspired the present objection. 
By imaginative resistance here I mean the resistance to imagine committing 
certain morally repugnant acts. This is not the usual thing philosophers mean 
when they speak of imaginative resistance. Far more common is to think of 
imaginative resistance as the resistance to imagine counter-morals; it is not 
about resisting to imagine torturing another, but rather about resisting to 
imagine torturing another and that being a right thing to do. This is not how 
everyone thinks of imaginative resistance though, for example Morton in the 
paper I mentioned above thinks of it in a way more similar to mine. However, 
someone might still wonder whether it is a good strategy for me to choose to 
call the resistance to imagine committing certain immoral acts ‘imaginative 
resistance’ given that there is sizeable literature on imaginative resistance 
which yet does not seem on the surface at least to be concerned directly with 
the thing I am concerned with. What I will say in response is that what I am 
interested in clearly is a resistance to imagine something, so it clearly is a kind 
of imaginative resistance. Second, it is not at all clear to me that what I am 
interested in should have a different name, since it seems possible that what 
explains it would not be something so different from what explains the more 
‘usual’ kind of imaginative resistance. 
Standardly there are two kinds of account of imaginative resistance which see 
it as attributable to either our difficulty of imagining certain things, or our 
unwillingness to do so.274 I am myself inclined to believe that in the moral 
domain the cannot / will not distinction is in an interesting way blurred, since 
for someone who has deeply internalised a moral code, imagining performing 
an atrocious act might present itself as an impossibility of sorts, even if it is not 
something that is technically impossible for his imagination to tackle. So I take 
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it in cases like this it is not clear whether the reason to resist imagining lies 
primarily in difficulty or unwillingness to do so as both factors seem important 
and importantly entangled. I am myself tempted to think that speaking merely 
of unwillingness has the danger of overlooking how it is that in certain cases 
imagining something immoral might actually present itself as impossible for the 
moral agent. I take it this is at least sometimes the reason people, when being 
presented with evidence of an atrocious act, say things like ‘I cannot imagine 
doing that’. This I take it is sometimes more than a turn of phrase; it is an honest 
appraisal of a kind of difficulty. On the other hand, putting the focus primarily 
on difficulty is at a risk of overlooking the agential aspect of imagination. 
Perhaps the difficulty interpretation is a more plausible one for the ‘usual’ 
understanding of imaginative resistance, yet I consider it to be the case that 
with the phenomenon I am interested in, unwillingness plays an important role 
as well. Still, I will not here commit myself to an account explaining imaginative 
resistance. I am only observing that it seems to be the case that many of us 
would resist empathising with perpetrators of atrocious acts, whatever the 
reasons for that, in the sense that we would tend to resist imagining what it is 
like to commit such an act. 
I suggest that there are at least two reasons to suppose that imaginative 
resistance is morally valuable. One is the instrumental value it has in ultimately 
preventing us from imagining the adoption of certain attitudes, or the 
committing of certain deeds, where the thought is that imagining these might 
somehow make the attitudes more likely for us to adopt ourselves, and the 
deeds more likely for us to commit. For example, if I imagine what it is like to 
commit an atrocious act, that might in itself make the act somehow more 
available in my mind, and thus make me more likely to commit it. 
Another reason has more to do with resistance being an expression of a person’s 
principles; perhaps, even if the previous worry does not hold (i.e., even if there 
happens to be no empirical connection between whether or not I had imagined 
committing a certain deed, and the likelihood of me actually committing 
something similar) there is something desirable in people not wanting to even 
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engage in imagining certain things. It is a valuable act of pride. This latter point 
might be somehow similar to what Williams in his essay criticising 
utilitarianism has in mind in the following passage where he suggests that some 
people might have moral outlooks that would make them refuse to even engage 
in utilitarian considerations: 
It could be a feature of a man’s moral outlook that he regarded certain 
courses of action as unthinkable. [...] Entertaining certain alternatives, 
regarding them indeed as alternatives, is itself something that he regards 
as dishonourable or morally absurd. But, further, he might equally find 
it unacceptable to consider what to do in certain conceivable situations. 
Logically, or indeed empirically conceivable they may be, but they are 
not to him morally conceivable [...]. For him, there are certain situations 
so monstrous that the idea that the processes of moral rationality could 
yield an answer in them is insane: they are situations which so transcend 
in enormity the human business of moral deliberation that from a moral 
point of view it cannot matter any more what happens. Equally, for him, 
to spend time thinking what one would decide if one were in such a 
situation is also insane, if not merely frivolous.275 
In a similar way, one might refuse to empathise with a serial killer, not because 
one finds it difficult or one fears that the imagining of the killer’s experience 
would somehow influence one’s own life; rather as a matter of principle and an 
expression of one’s moral outlook. 
It would seem that a commitment to empathising often would go directly 
against this principle and would, if anything, erode it if empathy is something 
one does systemically. So the worry is that empathising with all kinds of people 
and situations might ultimately erode my imaginative resistance, and deprive 
me of something morally valuable. Therefore developing a habit of empathy, 
while otherwise a beneficial thing, might ultimately be depriving me of 
something of moral worth. 
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I think that this is a very serious objection against empathy. One might be 
disinclined to agree with me that imaginative resistance is morally valuable, but 
it seems to me not a straightforward thing to deny this. One cannot easily 
dismiss the claim that resisting to imagine certain things might be morally 
valuable. I am personally one who, despite my strive to empathise often, would 
resist imagining the experience of a serial killer, or a sadist torturer, and I do 
not think I am any worse human being for that. Intuitively, it even seems that 
the contrary is true – it seems to me that the internal resistance to even 
acknowledge the serial killer’s experience in my imagination has certain moral 
value to me. And I am not altogether certain that I desire it to be the case that 
people around me are easily and without struggle able to jump into the mindset 
of serial killers or sadist torturers either. 
One line of response to the worry would be to argue that imaginative resistance 
is not particularly valuable. If this is so, then empathy cannot be morally 
problematic, since it would erode something which wasn’t valuable in the first 
place. Maybe I was wrong to consider this resistance of moral worth, or 
empathising with some moral transgressor dishonourable. But I am not 
convinced this is the case, and for the reasons just mentioned I think there is 
no simple way of denying the potential worth of imaginative resistance. I think 
this question merits a longer discussion which I cannot provide here. 
Therefore two possible lines of response are left to me here. One is to deny that 
empathy leads to erosion of imaginative resistance. The other is to bite the 
bullet and to say that even though systematic empathy erodes imaginative 
resistance, we are overall better with more empathy and less imaginative 
resistance, than we are with more imaginative resistance and less empathy. I 
am not convinced of the merits of the second approach, and I will go with the 
first. 
I will deny that empathy erodes imaginative resistance and argue that it is 
possible to retain our imaginative resistance while being a systemic empathiser. 
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I distinguish here two aspects of imaginative resistance. One has to do with its 
disallowing me to form a certain picture in my mind. The other has to do with 
a felt resistance, and inner ‘friction’, as it were, should I decide and attempt to 
form this picture in my mind. This friction is I think an uncontroversial 
phenomenological feature of imaginative resistance. It is like a slope one has to 
climb in order to reach the summit, and if one does not reach it, one does not 
end up imagining the thing one resisted imagining. Empathy is the equivalent 
of having reached the summit in this analogy: having formed the picture of the 
experience of the moral transgressor in my mind. Empathy is incompatible with 
me failing to imagine something. Therefore empathising with a moral 
transgressor is incompatible with the first aspect of imaginative resistance. 
However empathy is still compatible with the friction aspect of imaginative 
resistance. The fact that I reached the summit does not mean my climb there 
wasn’t tough. Imaginative resistance would make empathy difficult, but not 
impossible. The fact that I experienced imaginative resistance is the fact that I 
was aware of this imaginative act as climbing a summit, rather than taking a 
stroll in the park. And empathy, even if systematic, need not erode the 
resistance aspect to imagining certain experiences. There is no reason to 
suggest that, just because I end up imagining something, my way there would 
have been smooth and void of inner qualms and friction. 
One might be unsatisfied with this response. One might hold that the real value 
of imaginative resistance is the instrumental value mentioned above in keeping 
our mind clear of certain thoughts. As long as the thoughts enter our mind, no 
matter how difficult it was for them to do so, something morally undesirable 
has occurred. What is truly bad about empathy is that we end up imagining 
something, with or without an accompanying feeling of friction. And this might 
be dangerous. After all, it seems plausible that at least very often, the first step 
of performing a deed, including an evil deed, is imagining it. It does not seem 
implausible to suggest that it is more likely that I commit, say, a murder, if I 
have imagined what it is like to commit a murder before, as opposed to when 
the thought of what it is like to commit a murder hadn’t even crossed my mind. 
One might be right to worry that imagining things makes them somehow more 
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available. If this is indeed so, the fact that empathy does not erode the feeling 
of friction when imagining certain things is all well and good; but it is not good 
enough. The real problem is that we reached the summit and ended up forming 
that picture in our minds. Our imagining the performance of immoral deeds 
paves the way to our committing them, and therefore systemic empathy overall 
increases the probability of our performing such deeds. 
I think this is a serious objection. I do not think I can easily deny that in a sense 
empathy makes the committing of certain atrocious acts more available in our 
imagination; I will not challenge the claim that it is more likely for one to 
perform an action that one has imagined performing than an action that has 
not even crossed one’s mind before. My only reply here is that empathy might 
have other effects too, which push us away from committing these acts, and it 
is not clear that the overall effect of empathy would push us more in the 
direction of committing these acts than away from it. There is hope that the 
insight gained by empathising is multi-dimensional and not confined only to 
the realisation that the criminal’s point of view is one possible for a human 
being to have. The insight would extend also to the pain of the (potential) 
victims of the crime, and hence to why it might be a wrong thing. Generally, a 
practice of empathizing would lead one to a better understanding of the human 
condition and it is to be hoped, to a more benevolent disposition towards 
others. There is hope that systemic empathising would overall have made one 
especially unwilling to act on the immoral deeds that one has imagined just 
because one will be more acutely aware of the suffering they might cause. So 
even if the risk of one’s performing an evil deed is somewhat increased by the 
fact that one has imagined that deed at all, the hope is that a risk of committing 
something immoral would be ultimately decreased by the repeated practice of 
empathising, since the moral insights gained by that practice are overall 
contributing to one’s good moral disposition, in such a way as to make one 
acting on one’s imagined bad deed particularly unlikely. 
Further, one can argue that even without having previously imagined it, people 
would still be likely to perform atrocious acts under certain circumstances 
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anyway. As Morton argues, ordinary decent people would willingly partake in 
atrocities in certain circumstances, and our denial of this and unwillingness to 
empathise with evil-doers represents a failure of our understanding of human 
nature.276 Therefore, it can be argued, that empathy with evil-doers might have 
a preventative role in that it helps us understand how barriers against 
committing atrocious acts in ordinary people can be eroded, and this 
understanding of parts of our nature which we usually do not think about might 
ultimately be beneficial and help us to control better our barriers. Thus, even if 
empathy increases the availability of the committing of atrocious acts, it also 
prevents them from being committed, due to the increased understanding of 
our nature that it provides us with. 
Finally, there is one more thing to be said in favour of empathy. Imaginative 
resistance is not all of the time good and just sometimes it might be good for it 
to be countered. Empathy might be especially valuable in this respect. It might 
occasionally be the case that a deed for which we would normally feel 
imaginative resistance might in the end turn out to be something that should 
not be morally condemned. Our moral attitudes change and this is sometimes 
for the better. For example we can suppose that not too long ago people would 
resist imagining what it is like to be a homosexual because homosexuality 
would be seen as immoral, a kind of taboo. But empathising with homosexuals 
could show to people that homosexuals are not immoral. Thus it seems that 
where imaginative resistance sometimes makes us blind, empathy sees well, 
and sometimes empathy might be a way towards a morally good action when 
going against our imaginative resistance is needed. 
 
4. 7. Conclusion. 
In this section I have addressed a variety of criticisms that have been raised 
against the moral value of empathy. I also developed and addressed an original 
criticism of my own. I hope to have shown that some of the criticisms are 
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mistaken, whereas others point at features of empathy we should indeed be 
wary of, yet from neither of them we can conclude that empathy should be 
avoided. We can instead conclude that we should take special care and dedicate 
special attention to cultivating empathy in the right way, which includes for 
example, our dedication to empathise at least partially with the different parties 
affected by our decision-making. I hope to have shown that cultivated empathy 
is on the whole more useful than worrisome. 
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5. The Moral Value of Empathy: 
Building a Positive Case. 
 
Empathy is usually thought to bring about moral benefits.277 In this chapter I 
will argue that indeed there are good reasons to think that empathy has moral 
value. In particular, I will argue that empathy has moral value in three 
distinctive ways: it increases our awareness of how we should act; it provides us 
with a distinctively gripping motivation to act for the good of the other; and it 
brings about a special, valuable kind of togetherness with another person. 
 
5. 1. Empathy informs our judgment in moral matters for the 
better. 
One way in which empathy is morally beneficial is a direct consequence of its 
epistemic benefits. In cases in which one is motivated to bring about something 
good, empathy makes one better informed about the ways in which one’s 
actions are likely to affect other people. If we are already motivated to bring 
about some desirable state of affairs, empathy would help us do it. This is so 
because we would be better in touch with how exactly our actions are going to 
affect others. 
In Chapter 3 I discussed the epistemic benefits of empathy. I argued that 
empathy allows us to understand the experience of the person we are 
empathising with, and that empathy allows us to gain understanding of things 
in the world that are valued by these people in particular ways. If empathy 
brings about these epistemic benefits, then it is easy to see that empathy how 
empathy can be morally beneficial, since one’s better epistemic orientation is 
likely to produce more morally beneficial results than if one were to act in 
relative ignorance of the other’s experience and of things in the world. For 
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example, having access to the other’s perspective might make us better 
informed as to how our choices would affect their well-being. Therefore, if I am 
independently motivated to pursue what is good and avoid what is bad, 
empathy would be a useful tool to help me in this task. I take this to be a 
straightforward point about empathy’s attaining moral value in virtue of its 
epistemic value. 
 
5. 2. Empathy and morality. 
Above I claimed that since empathy offers epistemic insights, then if one is 
already motivated to bring about something good to others, empathy would 
help them bring about these goods. Here I will argue for the more controversial 
claim that empathy is likely to boost one’s motivation to bring about what is 
good for others. 
I will argue for three claims. One is that empathy has a great motivational force. 
The second claim is that that which empathy motivates us to do tends to be for 
promoting the well-being of the person empathised with. That is, empathy 
intrinsically tends to promote the good as opposed to the bad or the neutral of 
another person. This, combined with the first claim, will result in a strong case 
for empathy’s moral value. The third claim is that empathy increases what I will 
call our ‘moral perceptivity’ – our ability to detect and become aware of morally 
relevant features of situations. From these claims it follows that cultivating 
one’s empathy will boost one’s likelihood of bringing about what is good for 
others. 
 
5.2.1. Empathy is motivational. 
Here I will argue that empathy is motivational, leaving aside the question of 
whether that which empathy motivates us to do is in any way morally desirable. 
I will argue that empathy tends to motivate us to promote the well-being of 
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others in the following section. For now the claim is simply that empathy has a 
large motivational force. 
Empathy has a large motivational force because it centres our attention on the 
experience of one particular individual. It seems that we are more motivated to 
act when presented with the story of one particular individual, rather than 
when presented with statistics alone. This has been called ‘the identifiable 
victim effect’278 and its existence has been empirically confirmed in many 
studies which show that we are more likely to donate when presented with the 
story of one person, rather than when presented with impersonal statistics, or 
the story of many people. For example, apparently we are even less likely to 
donate to a charity when we know that the money will benefit two children, 
than when we know that it will benefit one child.279 The identifiable victim 
effect finds confirmation for example in the way charities work. Charities have 
long been using the fact that one particularly gripping way to motivate people 
to donate is to elicit their emotions, for example by sharing pictures and stories 
of the plight of one particular individual, rather than by giving out statistics 
alone.280 Concentrating on an identifiable individual can extend our circle of 
care by bringing nearby what is otherwise distant and does not affect us. 
Empathising with one person can motivate one to help the many to an extent 
to which mere conviction might not always do. This is the same intuition that 
is behind the words of Mother Theresa: ‘If I look at the mass I will never act. If 
I look at the one, I will’.281 
The existence of the identifiable victim effect I think shows that empathy has 
the potential to motivate us, since empathy is the kind of activity that focuses 
our attention on the experience of one particular individual. As just mentioned, 
there is evidence suggesting that when presented with an identifiable victim 
people are more likely to act than if not presented with such information. Note 
that I am not claiming that in these cases people who donate to charities are 
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empathising with the individuals – in fact I think that most of the people 
donating to charities are probably not empathising. My point is that if being 
presented with an identifiable individual motivates us to act, then empathising 
with an individual would also motivate us to act, since empathy by definition 
involves focussing our attention on the experience of one individual. 
Therefore my claim here is that empathy is motivational because it is a way of 
making salient to us the experiences of particular individuals, and empirical 
evidence, as well as common sense, suggest that we are more likely to be 
motivated to act in a situation if we are aware of how identifiable people would 
be affected by our actions. 
The implicit contrast here is between cases where I apprehend a situation 
without focusing my attention on how a particular individual is affected by that 
situation, and cases where I do focus my attention on the way a particular 
individual is affected by that situation. Empathy is not the only way for me to 
focus my attention on an individual’s experience. I might consider this 
experience without empathising with the individual. So empathy is one way of 
apprehending the world via making salient the experiences of particular 
individuals; since evidence suggests that making salient such experiences is 
motivational, then empathy is motivational. 
One might wonder whether empathy motivates us strongly when our attention 
is already focused on the experience of a particular individual; in other words, 
whether there is any additional strength that our motivation to act might obtain 
if we empathise with someone. For example imagine that I see you coming up 
the stairwell struggling with a heavy suitcase. It seems pretty obvious that a 
good thing to do here would be to help you with the suitcase and I might be 
motivated to help you in various ways, for example out of habit (I was brought 
up to help people with heavy suitcases) or out of eagerness to produce a good 
impression. It is also possible, however, that I empathise with you and imagine 
what it is like to be struggling with the luggage, and to be experiencing any or 
a combination of the following: muscle tension, despair, pain, tiredness, 
frustration, or even humiliation due to your inability to reach your destination 
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with the luggage. Of course given that helping with your suitcase is such an 
obvious thing to do, it seems that re-creating your experience in my mind 
would be mostly a waste of energy and effort in relation to the final outcome – 
my helping you with the suitcase. My purpose in considering this example is 
not to advise whether empathy in this particular situation would be desirable; 
rather it is to try and consider what, if anything, would be different in the 
motivation resulting from empathy when compared to the non-empathic 
motivation to give you a hand with the suitcase. In the suitcase scenario, no 
matter whether I empathise or not, it will be obvious to me that my action (or 
inaction) will affect one particular, salient individual – you. The question is 
whether the motivation to help if I empathise with you be in any way different, 
or maybe even stronger, than if I do not? 
I am posing this question because I have an intuition that indeed motivation 
resulting from empathy will have a particularly gripping character: that I would 
feel it ‘in my veins’ as it were, that I want to help you, which means that in the 
case of empathy I would be somehow more engaged in the prospect of helping 
you. 
I think that this intuition can be justified; since empathy engages many 
dimensions of my imagination, I would be aware of your experience in a more 
gripping way than if I registered it without re-creating it in my imagination. In 
particular, empathy would be therefore very likely to evoke my feelings, and 
feelings have a large motivational force. 
Empathy is likely to evoke my feelings because it is a re-creative activity of 
imagination with engages various dimensions of experience, including ones 
with an affective feel such as physiological states, emotions, and feelings. In 
other words, when empathising I am engaging with your situation in an 
affective way. It can be argued that it is precisely the feelings evoked by being 
presented with an identifiable individual that can explain the identifiable victim 
effect. Slovic has argued that in cases of plights involving big numbers of people, 
our failure to act is explainable by a failure of our feelings to be activated in 
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ways similar to the ways in which they tend to be activated in the case of the 
plight of a single identifiable individual.282 
The idea that affect can prompt us to do things that merely rational convincing 
might not is ancient. Hu recently argued that on Mencius’ account of moral 
motivation an important step of cultivating someone’s morality is to get them 
to feel an emotion. Hu discusses a famous passage in the Mencius, Mencius 1A7, 
where Mengzi takes up the challenge of making King Xuan care for his people. 
Mengzi learns that the king once spared an ox that was to be sacrificed in a 
ritual ceremony; the King says that he could not bear its frightened appearance, 
‘like an innocent going to the execution ground’.283 Mengzi (after telling King 
Xuan that ‘this heart is sufficient to become King’284) encourages the King to 
expand his circle of caring by encouraging him to feel towards his people the 
same emotion of compassion that he had felt towards the ox. Importantly, Hu 
argues that this process of moral cultivation involves not only reflecting on 
analogies between the plight of the ox and the plight of the people, but putting 
the king in a certain emotional state; ‘instead of urging the king to intellectually 
acknowledge his obligations as a ruler, Mencius makes the king emotionally feel 
such an obligation’.285 Hu argues that Mencian moral cultivation is ‘not merely 
a matter of verbal debate but an embodied process that involves evoking the 
king’s emotions’.286 The king probably already knows that he should care about 
his subjects; therefore, Hu argues, a crucial step in Mencian moral cultivation 
is to make the king’s ‘heart move’ since it is this affective dimension that could 
make the king actually care about his people. This I take as an example of the 
intuition that affective feel can be motivational in a way in which pure 
reasoning cannot always be. 
Here is one reason why engaging with your experience in an affective way has 
the potential to motivate me. In cases where I am considering your situation in 
                                                 
282  Slovic, 2007. 
283  Hu, 2018, p.354. 
284  Hu, 2018, p.354. 
285  Hu, 2018, p.357. 
286  Hu, 2018, p.356. 
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a detached way, my emotional capacities are busy engaging with my own 
situation; by contrast, if I empathise with you, they will be, for a few moments 
at least, engaged in yours. If I see you struggling with a suitcase when I enter 
the building, and I am annoyed that they failed to give me the correct change 
in the bakery, even if I detect that you are struggling and that helping you would 
be a good thing to do, I would be concerned with my own ‘plight’ so emotionally 
I will be unavailable to get motivated to help you. By contrast, if I empathised 
with you at this moment, I would for a moment stop engaging with my own 
‘plight’ and would get ‘out of my head’ as it were, and I would for a moment 
engage emotionally with your situation instead. Even if the end result is the 
same both in cases when I empathise with you and when I do not, there will be 
a difference in the phenomenal feel of the motivation which, in the case where 
I empathise, can be felt somehow more strongly, due to the fact that affective 
dimensions of my being are engaged with your situation. 
In conclusion, empathy is motivational because we tend to respond to an 
individual’s plight (‘identifiable victim’ effect) more than we respond to 
unidentified individuals and empathy focuses our attention on an identified 
individual’s experience. Also, empathy is motivational because it usually 
engages the emotions, and emotions are motivational. This suggests that an 
‘empathic person’ – i.e. someone who empathises often – would often tend to 
be motivated to act as a result of their empathy. Therefore, if we want to be the 
kind of people who act, then cultivating our empathy can be of help. 
 
5.2.2. Empathy motivates us to bring about the good to the person we empathise 
with. 
Here I will argue that it makes sense to think that empathy motivates us to 
bring about the good to the person we empathise with. The claim is that, all 
things being equal, empathising with you would motivate me to do that thing 
which would increase your well-being, rather than that thing which would 
decrease it, or would leave it at the same level. 
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In general, the claim that empathy motivates me to do the good for the person 
I empathise with seems to be a part of common sense. The invitation to 
empathise with another is usually seen not merely as an invitation to expand 
your intellectual horizons, but also as a step with a near-certain guaranteed 
result that this would make you want the good for that other. Also, as we saw 
in Chapter 4, some of the criticisms of empathy287 depend on the claim that 
empathy motivates us to do good things for people we empathise with, resulting 
in the worry that has been raised by critics, that this motivation might be so 
overwhelming as to cloud our judgment, and to make us pursue a course of 
action which, even if benefiting the parties we empathise with, might otherwise 
be unjust towards other people. The hypothesis that there is a link between 
empathy and ‘pro-social behaviour’ has been subject to empirical studies, most 
notably the ones by Batson et al.288 These studies show that empathy gives rise 
to motivation ‘to promote another’s well-being purely for that person’s sake’289 
rather than some other reason. 
All this evidence perhaps shows that indeed empathy goes hand in hand with 
good-doing, but barring any model as to why this might be so, it does not show 
that empathy leads to good-doing. Perhaps one might explain the correlation 
by arguing that this merely seems to be the case, because the urge to empathise 
in the first place would be more likely to arise for people who already mean the 
good to others; in other words, if I do not care about your well-being, there is 
little reason to expect that I would pay you the attention which empathy 
requires. Of course, this is not always the case; but it seems plausible to suggest 
that if I am indifferent to your well-being, I would most likely be disinclined to 
empathise with you. Therefore, the fact that I empathised with you shows that, 
at least in a minimal sense, I was not completely disinterested in your well-
being. I paid you attention, I expended some of my cognitive and emotional 
resources in order to understand and appreciate your experience and from the 
fact that I was ready to do that it means that I was probably more inclined to 
                                                 
287  Prinz, 2011b; Bloom, 2016. 
288  C Batson et al., 2002. 
289  Song, 2015. Footnote 4. 
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bring you about good rather than bad from the start anyway. And if this is true, 
someone might argue that there is no reason to believe that empathy itself 
brings about the motivation to do the good for you. It might seem like empathy 
motivates me to bring about the good to you, but in reality maybe there is a 
selection bias going on: people empathise only if they already want to bring 
about the good to others. So the fact that empathy and good-doing go hand in 
hand, even if independently established by other means, does not necessarily 
speak volumes about whether empathy itself makes one more likely to bring 
about the good. 
Therefore, despite common-sense, and some of the studies suggesting a 
correlation between empathy and good-doing, I still need to address the 
question of why the experience of empathising with you would make me want 
to bring about good to you.290 
The intuition behind my answer to this question is that when I empathise with 
you, your experience is made somehow more palpable and more real to me, 
than it otherwise would have been. When I empathise with you, I am able to 
appreciate in a palpable way that you are yourself a subject of experience just 
as I am. And just as I feel generally, unquestioningly, motivated to bring about 
the good to myself, in a similar way, when my imagination is centred on your 
being rather than mine, I will feel the urge of motivation to bring about the 
good to you. Since I am motivated to bring good to myself not through any 
reasons, but immediately and spontaneously out of my very being me, then 
when in my imagination I transport myself to the being of another person, I 
would be just as spontaneously and immediately inclined to do them good, to 
want that good to obtain.291 
                                                 
290  Perhaps one way to approach this question is to look for explanation at the neurological-
psychological level; perhaps mirror neurons prompt one to do for the other person what one 
would do oneself. If I see you nailing your finger with a hammer, I might flinch 
instantaneously. This might well be explained by some mirroring mechanism. However, what 
I am interested in here is the high-order explanation of the phenomenon. 
291 Someone might point out that there are cases where people are inclined to desire the bad 
for themselves; a starting point on literature on this might be Stocker’s essay. Stocker, 1979. 
However, when I claim that most of us are inclined to desire the good for themselves this is 
not a claim about any high-order desire. Rather, it is a claim about a spontaneous, and 
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This I hope shows why it makes sense for there to be a benevolent impulse 
associated with empathy. The reason is that if I, in my imagination, experience 
your experience, then part of what I experience would be the motivation to 
bring good to myself (as you) the desire for well-being of the person that I am 
empathising with. Therefore, empathy would leave us, all things being equal, 
want to desire the good of another person. 
It is relatively unlikely that before I empathised with you I have actively desired 
you harm; rather, it seems most likely that before I empathised with you I was 
at most indifferent to your well-being. Therefore empathy, by bringing your 
well-being into focus, is likely to make me care about it, since a desire to 
promote your well-being does not generally clash with my own attitudes. 
Empathy is pointing my attention to your well-being, making me aware that it 
is a thing in the world that I could care about. It is only necessary to hold a weak 
claim – that most of us care (in a very minimal sense) about other people’s well-
being – in order to hold that empathy would increase our motivation to do good 
to others. It just makes others’ well-being more salient to us. 
One might worry that this view is at odds with my claim that empathy is a 
morally neutral instrument which could in principle be used for bad as well as 
good purposes. But the two claims are not incompatible; on the present account 
the connection between empathy and benevolence is neither indefeasible, nor 
necessary. It is possible that I am very skilled at empathy, and use my 
understanding of your experience for non-benign purposes, such as actively 
harming you.292 
My claim is not the strong claim that empathy is incompatible with a non-
benign response – I consider this to be wrong. But I want to claim that empathy 
results in a certain barrier that needs to be overcome if one is to harm, or be 
indifferent, to another. Just because empathy makes your experience palpable 
                                                 
immediate, almost reflexive response out of the depths of one’s being, about something more 
akin to the instinct of self-preservation (e.g. flinching when something flies towards you) than 
anything else. And it seems to me a plausible assumption to hold that in this basic sense we 
all desire our own good. 
292  Someone else who explicitly makes the point that empathy is consistent with non-benign 
responses is  Goldie, 2002, p.215. 
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and salient to me, in most cases, most of the time, the prospect of my reducing 
your well-being either actively or through my indifference, would be 
unwelcome to me in an emotionally palpable way. In this sense empathy would 
tend to provide me with a minimal motivation to bring about the good to you, 
and this minimal motivation is something I need to overcome if I am to act 
against it. Overcoming this motivation might be fairly easy; but all other things 
being equal, empathy tends to motivate me to do the good rather than the bad 
or neutral to you. 
I would suggest that the intuition behind the claim I am making is similar to 
the intuition behind another claim which is sometimes made for empathy: the 
claim that something that occurs during empathy – the apprehension of the 
other as an independent locus of existence – is somehow at the core of morality. 
For example, Schopenhauer famously claimed that compassion (which is very 
similar to what here is understood as empathy) is the only non-egoistic, and so 
‘genuinely moral’ motive.293 According to Schopenhauer, morality is based on 
the everyday phenomenon of compassion, […] the immediate 
participation, independent of all ulterior considerations, primarily in the 
suffering of another, and thus in the prevention or elimination of it […]. 
Only insofar as an action has sprung from compassion does it have moral 
value; and every action resulting from any other motives has none.294 
More recently, a claim of empathy’s centrality in morality, has been made by 
contemporary moral sentimentalists, and in general the claim that empathy is 
central for morality seems to be common in moral sentimentalist theories.295 
For example, according to Slote empathic concern is fundamental to morality296 
and Sherman claims that it is only through empathy that we can cultivate the 
virtues of benevolence, generosity, compassion, and pity, since they presuppose 
empathic engagement.297 What is seen to be at the core of morality in these 
                                                 
293  Schopenhauer, 1903. 
294  Schopenhauer, 1903. 
295  For a notable exception, i.e. a moral sentimentalist who does not accord empathy a central, 
or even an overwhelmingly positive role in morality, see Prinz. 
296  Slote, 2013. 
297  Sherman, 1998. 
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cases is some kind of affective, spontaneous apprehension of the other person 
as a subject of experience. However, even if such an apprehension has a central 
role in morality, this does not mean that empathy as understood in this thesis 
does, since empathy is here understood as an involved, conscious activity of the 
imagination. Still, empathy necessarily involves this kind of immediate affective 
apprehension of the other as a subject of experience, and I take it that if one 
believes this apprehension to be a cause of moral action, then one would have 
reason to think that empathy can be so too. 
In conclusion, in this section I argued that all other things being equal, empathy 
results in our having a basic urge to promote another’s well-being. 
 
5.2.3. Empathy increases our moral perceptivity. 
Here I will argue that empathy is morally valuable because it can help us detect 
occasions to act morally, which otherwise would not have been easy to detect. 
In this sense, empathy can increase what I will here call our ‘moral perceptivity’. 
It seems hard to deny that a crucial aspect of the moral achievement of a person 
is the ability to detect when situations have a moral dimension even if this is 
not immediately obvious. In the real world critical situations do not come 
labelled with ‘morally relevant’ sign and it is up to a person to decide whether 
a situation has a moral dimension or not. It must be hard to deny that the 
perfectly moral agent does not only somehow effortlessly follow standards set 
out by some moral system but also is able to navigate the social space and new 
situations in ways which correctly alert them to when a particular situation 
should be treated as a moral, and when as a merely ‘conventional’ one. 
I will call this ability to differentiate which cases call for moral action, and which 
do not, moral perceptivity. Perhaps it is easiest to illustrate the importance of 
moral perceptivity by thinking about cases where one lacks such perceptivity. 
Maybe the ultimate example of lacking the ability to differentiate between 
when a situation has a moral dimension and when it has not, is committing 
crimes of thoughtlessness. The case of the person in the Milgram experiment 
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following the instructions despite the obvious damage and danger to a person’s 
life is a good example of someone manifestly lacking moral perceptivity.298 
What I call ‘moral perceptivity’ here is different from what is sometimes 
referred to as ‘moral sense’. The latter usually refers to the way in which we 
seem able to spontaneously evaluate what is good or not.299 Another take on 
the moral sense is to see it as the ability ‘in something like a perceptual way to 
detect the moral goodness/virtue or moral badness/vice of other people’.300 
Slote has recently argued that empathy is the moral sense, since good actions, 
acts of benevolence, are accompanied by a certain warmth, which warmth we 
can catch on when we empathise with the actor. Similarly bad actions are 
accompanied by a sense of chill or cold-heartedness which we can catch on 
when we empathise with the actor. Therefore, by empathising with a person 
committing a deed, we are going to feel warmth or cold-heartedness, and this 
is a way via which we can come to be sensitive about whether the person or 
action are morally good or bad.301 However, as Hardy and Kauppinen 
independently note, Slote’s claim that acts of benevolence are accompanied by 
a certain warmth is in need of defence302, and according to Hardy, Slote’s view 
of empathy as a moral sense can be interpreted in at least one other way, 
according to which we feel kinship with those people who feel the same way 
about some action, which then gives us a feeling of warmth.303 
Instead what I call moral perceptivity is the ability to distinguish the morally 
relevant features of situations. My claim is that empathy can enhance our moral 
perceptivity because re-creating another’s experience can alert us to the moral 
dimensions of a situation: it might be easier to see how certain feature of a 
situation is morally relevant if we can occupy another’s point of view. In this 
                                                 
298  Milgram, 1963. 
299  E.g. according to Hutcheson the moral sense is 'a determination of our minds to receive 
amiable or disagreeable ideas of Actions, when they occur to observation, antecedent to any 
opinions of advantage or loss to redound to ourselves from them.'  Hutcheson et al., 1726, 
p.135; Kauppinen, 2017b. 
300  Slote, 2017, p.845. 
301  Kauppinen, 2017a. 
302  Hardy, 2017; Kauppinen, 2017a. 
303  Hardy, 2017. 
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sense sometimes it can be our empathy for the people involved in a situation 
what makes us recognise a situation as having a moral dimension. 
Of course I am not claiming that empathy is always, or even often, necessary to 
apprehend morally relevant features of a situation. For instance, in the suitcase 
example discussed above it seems easy for me to detect without empathising 
with you that helping you with your suitcase is a good thing to do. In some cases 
such as this it is ‘obvious’ or easy to detect morally relevant features of a 
situation. Another example would be the more drastic cases of acts that are 
universally thought of as morally transgressory – such as the cases of murder or 
torture. We can just learn – e.g., by being told – that murder is bad, and then – 
even if we do not apprehend why it is bad – we would be able to be aware that 
in any situation that involves murder, that there is something moral at stake. 
Therefore in many cases we do not need to exercise any empathic ability in 
order to become aware of certain morally relevant features of situations. 
However, there are also cases where it is not so straightforward to figure out 
morally relevant features of situations. I would like to argue that in such cases 
empathy can be especially helpful for alerting us to the moral features of a 
situation. 
For example, it might not be obvious that I should reply to your message to go 
out this weekend if I am not interested in going out with you. After all, you will 
eventually ‘get the message’ either way, even if I do not reply, since the fact that 
I did not reply would itself ‘send a message’ as it were, that I am not interested. 
Perhaps there are even certain costs associated with replying to your message, 
because it is some effort (even if fairly minimal) and I certainly do not have any 
obligation to reply. Even further I might not fancy being ‘rude’ by telling you 
directly that I am not interested in you, and that you should stop inviting me 
to things. Because of these considerations, if I do not empathise with you, I 
probably would ignore your message without thinking twice about it, and I 
would not even consider my texting habits as something that could be seen as 
morally good or bad, I would just read your message and not reply, because I 
am not interested in the offer. However, if I empathise with you, I will realise 
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that providing no response might be disrespectful or even devastating to you, 
and therefore I would simply reply negatively, informing you that I am not 
interested, as I would be able to see that this would be for your benefit. If I see 
things from your perspective, it would be clear to me that it would be better for 
you to be on the same page with me regarding my feelings, and not to hope to 
go out with me, nor make plans which would be ruined. In this way, my 
empathy has alerted me to the moral dimension of a situation which seems to 
be to certain people not obvious.304 In short, if I am not empathic, I might not 
even realise that my behaviour might be hurting you, but if I imagine what you 
are going through, I might become more considerate of the things I do. 
Therefore empathy can alert me to moral features of the situation. 
In particular, empathy would be especially helpful for enhancing our moral 
perceptivity in situations where the reasons to act morally have to do with 
another’s experience or psychological state. In these cases some of the morally 
relevant features of the situation would be made especially salient via recreating 
the other’s experience. In the suitcase example, if the reason I should help you 
has anything to do with your present experience – e.g. your experiencing 
tiredness and frustration – then recreating your experience would make me 
directly aware of morally relevant features of the situation. By contrast, using 
cold judgment alone in this case might leave me less directly in touch with the 
reason why I should help you. So the claim here is that in cases such as the 
suitcase one, where my reasons to act ultimately have to do with your 
experience, empathy might get me more directly in touch with these reasons. 
If I empathise with you I would be able to think of the impact of my acts in 
palpable terms – you are going to feel like this if I help you – and this would 
make me value my acts in a different way than I would had I not empathised. 
There is some empirical evidence which could perhaps be brought in support 
of the claim that empathy enhances our moral perceptivity. This is a much 
discussed set of experiments conducted by Blair in the nineties, which allegedly 
                                                 
304  The practice of ceasing all contact with the other person and ignoring their attempts to 
reach out is also known as ‘ghosting’ and it has been suggested that it is becoming 
increasingly more prominent, e.g. LeFebvre, 2017; Freedman et al., 2018. 
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found that psychopaths have difficulty differentiating between moral rules, like 
the rule that you should not hit another person, and conventional rules, like 
the rule that you should wear a uniform to school.305 The ability to draw the 
conventional/ moral distinction seems to be an important tenet of what I here 
call moral perceptivity since a reduced ability to draw the distinction suggests 
a reduced ability to be aware of morally relevant features of situations. Hence a 
reduced ability to draw the distinction entails a reduced moral perceptivity. 
Three dimensions were thought to represent the conventional/ moral 
distinction in Blair’s experiments: permissibility, seriousness, and authority-
dependence,306 and psychopaths were found less likely than healthy controls to 
be able to distinguish between moral and conventional scenarios on all three 
dimensions. Blair’s hypothesis was that psychopaths think of all transgressions 
as conventional rather than moral. Since characteristic of psychopaths is their 
lack of empathy towards others, one possible explanation of Blair’s finding is 
that empathy might be what helps us to become aware of the conventional/ 
moral distinction of situations. 
It is worth noting that the credibility of Blair’s experiments has been 
questioned. Baxter notes that only in Blair's second study involving children the 
results directly confirm the hypothesis; in the first study which involved 
imprisoned psychopaths, the subjects tended to treat all transgressions as 
moral rather than conventional, and Blair explains this with the imprisoned 
psychopaths' motivation to appear virtuous.307 Since this interpretation is only 
one possibility, one can reasonably wonder whether the data actually 
corroborates Blair’s hypothesis. But even if we do not agree with Blair that 
psychopaths tend to see the moral as conventional, there still seems to be 
something amiss with psychopaths’ ability to make the conventional/ moral 
                                                 
305  Blair, 1995; Blair, 1997. 
306  Baxter (2017) convincingly argues that the authority dimension is problematic in at least 
two ways: first, many conventional transgressions cannot be related to authority; and second, 
one can reasonably suggest that even among non-psychopaths the failure to recognise that 
some transgressions are not authority-dependent might be common. 
307  Baxter, 2017. 
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distinction. 
There is one more thing that has to be kept in mind. As noted by Vargas and 
Nichols, the experiments do not show that psychopaths are unable, but merely 
that they are less likely than ‘normal’ subjects, to draw the conventional/ moral 
distinction.308 Hence if psychopaths are not empathic, it would seem that at 
most these experiments can show that empathy might aid the drawing the 
contours of the moral, but they definitely cannot be taken to show that empathy 
is necessary for it. Since at least some psychopaths some of the time are able to 
successfully draw this distinction, it would be unlikely that empathy is 
necessary for one to be able to perceive a situation as moral. 
One might wonder if, even if a psychopath is reasonably able to categorise 
situations as belonging to either the ‘moral’ or ‘conventional’ domain, there is 
not a sense in which they are not able to fully understand what makes a 
situation moral. As Baxter argues, an ability to categorise situations as moral is 
not sufficient for moral understanding, and without a certain kind of 
understanding ‘we are left with a sense of ‘should’ that is prudential, rather than 
moral’.309 This is so because: 
The kinds of reason presented by an infraction of ‘the rules’, while 
pressing, are much less pressing than the kinds of reason that are salient 
to normal agents when considering an action that will cause harm to 
others. If psychopaths can indeed only recognise and respond to these 
kinds of reason, then they are missing an important piece of the normal 
agent’s psychological repertoire […].310 
A handy simile used by Elliott to capture this intuition is that of someone who 
is able to describe in correct terms why a certain composer is great, yet who is 
‘clearly and unquestionably tone deaf’.311 In a similar way Elliott suggests that 
psychopaths might have some understanding of moral rules, but this does not 
                                                 
308  Vargas and Nichols, 2007. 
309  Baxter, 2017, p.114. 
310  Baxter, 2017, p.117. 
311  Elliott, 1996, p.78. 
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mean they do not lack ‘any sort of deep engagement with morality’.312 Using a 
somewhat similar analogy, Baxter compares the psychopath to a person who is 
unable to see a work of art as valuable, even if they are aware that other people 
see something of value in the artwork. In a similar way, Baxter argues, 
psychopaths are unable to ascribe value to other people and non-egocentric 
considerations ‘simply do not occur to psychopaths as something of which they 
should take account or by which they should be motivated’.313 
Overall Blair’s experiments show that reduced empathy correlates with a 
reduced ability to draw the conventional/ moral distinction. It can also be 
argued that reduced empathy correlates with a reduced understanding of what 
makes a situation moral. However, from neither of these it can be inferred that 
empathy is what aids one to draw this distinction, or what aids one to 
understand what makes a situation moral; for example it could be the case that 
that which makes one capable of drawing the conventional/ moral distinction 
(and/or understanding what makes a situation moral) is also that which makes 
one capable of empathising. However, if levels of empathy correlate with levels 
of ability to draw the conventional/ moral distinction, one can reasonably 
wonder whether cultivating one’s empathy does not aid one in increasing one’s 
ability to draw the distinction. For example, if the same capacity underlies both 
our ability to empathise and to draw the distinction, then cultivating our 
empathy, in so far as it results in strengthening of the same capacity, might aid 
us in increasing our ability to draw the distinction. 
For example Baxter argues that the reduced ability of psychopaths to draw the 
conventional/ moral distinction is a result of them failing to see others as 
sources of value, which failure Baxter attributes to psychopaths’ lacking ‘the 
intensity of full-blooded emotional experience’.314 A core characteristics of 
psychopathy is ‘the profound emotional absence’315 and according to Baxter it 
is precisely the ‘general shallowness of emotional experience’ – referring to a 
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315  Baxter, 2017, p.124. 
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lack of or a reduced embodied feeling element in emotional experience – which 
‘interferes profoundly with the psychopath’s experience of value’.316 On the 
present account the ability to have a full-blooded emotional experience would 
be a prerequisite for a full-fledged kind of empathy. On Baxter’s hypothesis it is 
the inability to have full-blooded emotional experience which causes 
psychopaths’ reduced ability to draw the conventional/ moral distinction. Such 
a lack of full-blooded emotional experience would cause reduced ability to 
empathise. Therefore, if a hypothesis such as the one Baxter defends is right, it 
would explain why reduced levels of empathy correlate with reduced ability to 
draw the conventional/ moral distinction without it being the case that 
empathy is that which makes one able to draw this distinction. Nevertheless, 
even on such an account it seems plausible to suggest that cultivating one’s 
empathy would be likely to aid one in cultivating one’s ability to draw the 
conventional/ moral distinction, in so far, at least, that it is possible that 
cultivating empathy might result in one’s becoming more capable of having 
full-blooded emotional experiences. At least in non-pathological cases where 
having a full-blooded emotional experience is at least a possibility, it seems that 
my making an effort to empathise, since it would involve making an effort to 
have a full-blooded emotional experience, could aid me in understanding what 
makes a situation moral. 
In conclusion, it seems plausible to suggest that cultivating my empathy might, 
via engaging in me that same capacity which is responsible for my ability to 
draw the conventional/ moral distinction, could aid me in my understanding of 
what makes a situation moral, hence in increasing my moral perceptivity. Also, 
as I showed earlier, empathy can directly increase my moral perceptivity, by 
making me aware of moral dimensions of a situation which might be more 
easily accessible via re-creating the experience of another person. These are two 
ways to show that cultivating our empathy would make us overall more morally 
perceptive, i.e., more capable of becoming aware of morally relevant features of 
situations. 
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5. 3. Empathy allows us to be together with others in a special 
way. 
I will now argue that empathy can be of value because it brings about a special 
togetherness between two people allowing us to be with another person in a 
unique way. This connection can be felt by both parties, the target of empathy, 
and the empathiser themselves, and it can be particularly valued by the person 
we empathised with. That empathy can bring about such a sense of 
togetherness can be evidenced by the way empathy is sometimes appreciated 
by the person empathised with, which is perhaps most obvious in the encounter 
with someone struggling with a mental difficulty. Before I examine this 
scenario, however, I will argue that togetherness, or connectedness, is 
important for human well-being. 
The value of togetherness for human well-being is not, as far as I am aware, 
feverishly discussed among philosophers. I take togetherness to be a state in 
which one feels like one is together with someone in the sense of being 
somehow ‘connected’ with them. When claiming that togetherness is good for 
human well-being, I do not mean merely that, say, it is good to be physically 
co-present with other people. Even though I believe there is little reason to 
doubt that this kind of co-presence is of crucial importance for human well-
being, what I am interested in here is a more psychological kind of togetherness 
– togetherness as in bridging psychological aloneness. One might be in a crowd 
of people, yet do not feel togetherness; similarly, one might experience 
togetherness with someone even if they are not physically co-present. I will 
focus here on this more psychological sense of being together317 because I think 
that it is this kind of togetherness which empathy can help us bring about. 
                                                 
317  I hope that in an age of technologically mediated communication, separating the ‘physical’ 
togetherness, and the more ‘psychological’ togetherness would not raise conceptual 
difficulties. 
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It seems hard to deny that togetherness, in this more encompassing sense in 
which it is more than physical co-presence with another, is an important aspect 
of human well-being. In psychology, it is recognised that the need to belong is 
‘one of the most basic and pervasive human drives’318 and feeling connected to 
others is seen as essential to well-being, a feeling often conceptualised in terms 
of love and care.319 Different from that, speaking in a more encompassing sense 
of connectedness, Fromm claims that we all have a need for union, and 
separateness is the fundamental feature of human existence, and the 
fundamental problem of people.320 There is hardly anyone who would not agree 
that psychological isolation is usually a terrible thing. One fact that can be 
brought in evidence of the fact that people desire to bridge psychological 
isolation is the simple fact that people ‘share’ things. That sharing is an 
important aspect of what people find valuable is in our day and age particularly 
easily recognisable from the rise of a social media culture where people are 
encouraged to share their experiences online. 
In the philosophy of well-being literature there have been some efforts to 
highlight the social nature of people, but I am personally not aware of anything 
that is a direct statement of the value of togetherness itself. Some of the closest 
claims seem to be, for example, Nussbaum’s speaking of affiliation as one of the 
core human capabilities.321 But this is not completely overlapping with what I 
am interested in, since I might feel affiliated to an institution, but that would 
not bring me the sense of togetherness that I want to argue empathy can bring 
me.322 Griffin comes closer, claiming that having ‘deep personal relations’ is a 
prudential value and it is these relations that ‘contribute to making one’s life 
fulfilled’ and without such relations ‘an adult will suffer […] an altogether less 
experiential, more contentious sense of “suffering”’.323 I take it that on at least 
                                                 
318  Baumeister and Vohs, 2007. 
319  E.g., ‘to feel connected to others – to love and care, and to be loved and cared for’ in  Deci 
and Ryan, 2000, p.229. 
320  Fromm, 1995. 
321  Nussbaum, 2001. 
322  Although, interestingly, an element of affiliation seems to be ‘to be able to imagine the 
situation of another’, p.79. 
323  Griffin, 1998. He argues that one cannot reduce prudential values to natural facts. 
210 
 
one interpretation what makes a personal relation ‘deep’ has something to do 
with a greater sense of connectedness between two people. 
Other fields like that of clinical psychology have paid more attention to how 
important a sense of connection can be for a person’s well-being. Perhaps one 
of the most dramatic claims about the importance of togetherness for human 
well-being is Berg’s claim that loneliness is the fundamental cause of all mental 
illness: 
The variations are endless but the essence is always the same: the 
psychiatric patient stands apart from the rest of the world. This is why 
he has a world of his own […] Thus, loneliness is the nucleus of 
psychiatry. If loneliness did not exist, we could reasonably assume that 
psychiatric illness could not occur either.324 
One does not need to agree with the stronger claim that loneliness is at the 
heart of many psychiatric illnesses in order to appreciate that it is a terrible 
thing that can be truly devastating and that it is something that people with 
mental illness suffer from. The sufferer stands ‘apart from the rest of the world’ 
which is easy to observe with there being a certain lack of understanding 
between the sufferer and other people, the ‘sane’ ones. Thus it is almost as if 
the patient inhabits a different world, even if they move in the same physical 
space as other people. 
What breaks this isolation is a sense of connection with other people. One way 
this connection can manifest, I take it, is in a sense of ‘being on the same page’ 
with others, and of them ‘being on the same page’ with you; the sense of sharing 
one and the same reality. If you are suffering from a lack of connect in this 
sense, and if there is someone who knows what it is like to be experiencing what 
you are experiencing, your awareness of this person who knows would almost 
tautologically bring about this connectedness, it would relieve you from your 
isolation. In this sense, then, empathy is a powerful tool to bridge the isolation 
                                                 
324  Jan Hendrik Berg, A Different Existence: Principles of Phenomenological Psychopathology 
(Duquesne University Press, 1972). 
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of someone who is suffering from a lack of connectedness, irrespective of 
whether they suffer from a mental illness or not. 
I also take it that another way in which this connectedness can manifest is in a 
less concrete way; perhaps it is not necessary that someone actually is on the 
same page as you regarding your experiences, but rather it needs to seem like a 
possibility – or even better, as something that cannot be doubted – that another 
person could be on the same page as you regarding your experiences. Empathy 
is valuable in this case too, for in order for me to believe in the possibility of 
being on the same page with others, I need to have experienced empathy – 
either as an empathiser or as a target of empathy – and I need to experience it 
regularly enough. In this sense it is valuable for well-being not just to be 
surrounded with people often – that alone might not cure isolation. What is 
even more valuable is to have people around you who are empathising with you 
often enough, so you can be prevented from suffering this profound isolation. 
One way to see that empathy can bring about a strong sense of connectedness 
between two people is to observe the great value that someone who has suffered 
profound isolation would attach to being empathised with. This is what 
Ratcliffe does when he observes the value that depressed patients attribute to 
empathy.325 As already mentioned above in section 1.3.4.3 one of the core 
characteristics of depression is a profound sense of isolation; a common 
metaphor being used is that of being put underneath a glass jar, as it were, 
unable to connect to other people. As was also mentioned above, people with 
depression feel that their experience ‘cannot be successfully conveyed to 
others’326 and that ‘other people are unable to understand the experience or just 
do not care’.327 That is why the patient’s face ‘lights up’ when another person is 
                                                 
325  Ratcliffe informs us: ‘The label “depression” encompasses a range of diagnoses, but the 
kinds of experience I will address are all consistent with diagnosis of a major depressive 
episode or major depressive disorder.’  Ratcliffe, 2014. 
326  Ratcliffe, 2014, p.271. 
327  Ratcliffe, 2014, p.271. 
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‘suddenly’ present in their world.328 Empathy breaks the isolation of the sufferer 
and thus relieves one of the major symptoms of depression. 
Here important is interactive empathy – in order for you to feel connected to, I 
have to communicate this connect to you; it will not be enough if I simply 
understand your experience, or a feature of this experience, without making 
you aware that this is so. In order for my empathy to have some beneficial 
effects for you, I would have to somehow communicate it to you. If I empathise 
with you ‘in secret’, then this could not be any consolation to you. However, if 
I communicate to you my understanding (even if a partial one) or even just my 
effort of imagining what it is like to be you (regardless of whether it results in 
an understanding that is fully-fledged) this can result in a sense of 
connectedness. 
One might agree that empathy is valuable in this context, but still doubt 
whether it is valuable for most people, most of the time. For example, it might 
be reasonable to suggest that those lucky ones who are saturated with love and 
friendships might need less empathy in order to flourish. For them one person 
more, or one person less, empathising with them would make little difference 
to their overall well-being. If we look to those lucky few, and ask them what is 
of value in life, they might not even think of mentioning togetherness. They 
might even think that loneliness is a luxury and believe themselves self-
sufficient, and feel little but derision for those in need of togetherness. And if 
one has reason to think such people are not in fact few, but that many people 
are firmly embedded in stable social circles and would not appreciate this 
special sense of connection empathy provides, then perhaps achieving 
togetherness via empathy can only be of value to a few lonely souls. And maybe 
what applies to a few lonely souls does not need to tell us anything about the 
human condition in general. 
                                                 
328  The metaphor of ‘lighting up’ I take from Havens: ‘It is a dramatic experience to share the 
flat timelessness of many chronically schizophrenic people, and then to watch them light up 
in recognition of your sudden presence in their lives.’ Even though the example here is that of 
a chronically schizophrenic person Havens’ discussion is general.  Havens, 1985, p.24. 
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However, I would argue that it is not that connectedness is like a medicine, 
needed only by the sick; rather, it is like a nutrient that the healthy live on, and 
the sick are deficient in. Sometimes this nutrient can be so basic, as to be hardly 
more noticeable than the air we breathe. Above in section 1.3.4.3 I already 
discussed what Ratcliffe calls a ‘broad kind of phenomenological change’; the 
fact that sometimes one can experience the world very differently from others 
because of an alteration of an aspect of experience ‘that is so pervasive and 
deeply engrained that it is seldom noticed and even more rarely discussed’.329 
In this extreme case, the sufferer lacks a sense of connect with others – this 
includes the minimal connectedness of inhabiting the same world with them. 
It is not that the healthy person does not need this minimal connectedness – it 
is just that for them this connectedness is so pervasive that they do not even 
notice it. 
I take it that many or perhaps most people have not suffered the loss of this 
minimal sense of connectedness. Similarly I consider it in principle possible 
that there might be some people who rejoice in a permanent feeling of 
connectedness (and not just minimal one) to others even if there are no 
instances of empathy in their life. For example a strong sense of togetherness 
might be achieved by entertaining the same thoughts as another person – what 
after Heal we can call ‘co-cognition’.330 From experience, it seems that many of 
the moments in which we feel connected with others, we do not wonder about 
their experience is, nor they do about ours, it is just that we looked in the same 
direction and shared the same thoughts about a same topic. 
Still, for the lucky individuals who feel connected even without empathy, what 
makes for their sense of connectedness, I would argue, is that they do not even 
doubt that they share the same reality with others and that there are people 
                                                 
329  Ratcliffe, 2014, p.272. 
330  Heal, 1998. Heal on co-cognition: ‘Co-cognition is just a fancy name for the everyday 
notion of thinking about the same subject matter […] So for example, two persons M and N 
co-cognize when each has the same beliefs and interests and reasons to the same further 
belief. […] Or M and N may co-cognize if M actually believes what N entertains as mere 
fantasy, but each exercises the same grasp of the subject matter and so the same patterns and 
linkages are detectable in their thoughts.’ P.483. 
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around them to whom in principle, their own experience could be made 
knowable. However, it seems to me that even such a lucky person would not 
fail to place positive value in empathy. Most of us would evaluate positively the 
opportunity to share internal, private aspects of our experience; often people 
want others to know how they felt. For me to know how you felt, it is not 
enough that we share the same reality (the minimal sense of connectedness); it 
seems rather that I will need to explicitly try to figure out how you felt, i.e., 
empathise with you. Therefore, even if some people rejoice in high levels of 
well-being, and therefore a sense of togetherness cannot be something which 
restores an otherwise reduced well-being, still even in such cases empathy 
would in most of the cases be seen as valuable. 
Also, I take it that the togetherness that empathy provides is in a way similar to 
the one provided by co-cognition, with the important difference that the 
subject of co-cognition are the experiences of one of the two people. In this 
sense, empathy goes one step further than co-cognition in bringing about a 
sense of togetherness, being the closest we can get in our imagination to 
another person. 
Overall, it seems hard to question that empathy can be of value in order to 
connect with others. Kohut331 argues that empathy (understood by him as 
putting yourself into another’s shoes) is itself ‘a therapeutic action in the 
broadest sense, a beneficial action in the broadest sense of the word’.332 He 
elaborates: 
the presence of empathy in the surrounding milieu, whether used for 
compassionate, well-intentioned therapeutic, and now listen, even for 
utterly destructive purposes, is still an admixture of something positive. 
In other words, there is a step beyond an empathy-informed hatred that 
wants to destroy you; and an empathyless environment that just brushes 
you off the face of the earth.333 
                                                 
331  Kohut famously disagrees that empathy is to be recommended in the clinical setting. 
332  Kohut, 1981, p.126. 
333  Kohut, 1981, p.126. 
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Kohut’s idea here seems to be that there is something dehumanising in the case 
where no empathy is present since empathy is a kind of acknowledgement of 
another’s humanity and being. And this has nothing to do with any positive 
action that might be informed by empathy – as Kohut points out, empathy can 
be used for utterly destructive purposes. However, even in these cases empathy 
itself has certain value, because there is a sense in which the other’s being is 
acknowledged by it. Perhaps another less striking example might illustrate the 
same intuition: an unrequited lover would clearly prefer to be despised or even 
ridiculed than being merely ignored since ignorance, especially from those we 
care about, might make us feel like we do not exist at all. An acknowledgement 
of the other’s experience, no matter for what purpose, is in this minimal sense 
valuable. I am sympathetic to this point and am inclined to agree that 
empathising itself has, no matter for what purpose it was used, a certain kind 
of value for the person empathised with. There is a kind of acknowledgement 
of one’s existence and experience that, all other things being equal, one would 
prefer to be there. 
Finally, let me draw attention to one more thing. In this section I argued that 
empathy provides a valuable kind of connectedness, and even if I did not specify 
this explicitly, most of the discussion seems like it is centred on the target of 
empathy. However, I do not mean to claim that empathy provides a sense of 
connection only to the person who is empathised with. I was hoping to make a 
strong case for the value of this connectedness via considering the case of a 
sufferer of mental illness who often has to suffer from a sense of isolation since 
the ‘sane’ people cannot easily imagine what it is like to grapple with mental 
illness. However, I mean to claim that empathising oneself, and not merely 
being a target of empathy, can bring about a sense of connection as well. When 
I empathise with you, I might get the feeling that, in regards to certain matters, 
we are ‘on the same page’ as it were, and this would be sufficient for a kind of 
connect. Therefore empathy, as a means of achieving connection with another 
person, can be just as valuable to the person who empathises as to the target. 
In this sense I can also have a very ‘egoistic’ motive to empathise – ‘merely’ to 
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obtain that sense of connectedness with another, which would be valuable for 
my own well-being. 
In conclusion, in this section I argued that empathy is valuable for achieving a 
kind of connectedness with others. I suggested that this psychological kind of 
togetherness is valuable and pointed to the devastating effects the lack of such 
connectedness can have in one’s life, most clearly evidenced in the case of the 
sufferer of a mental condition. Then I argued that empathy can bridge this 
psychological isolation and bring about a sense of togetherness that is 
something that would be appreciated even by people who tend to experience 
connectedness quite often and might seem to be otherwise happily oblivious of 
its value. 
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Conclusion. 
In this thesis I have argued that empathy has epistemic and moral value. I 
defended a model of empathy according to which empathy is the imaginative 
activity of re-creating another’s experience in one’s imagination in an 
experiential way. I argued that this re-creation which involves various 
dimensions of experience – i.e. it is not restricted to pure thought or pure 
feeling – is a powerful epistemic tool for gaining insight into another’s 
experience, and also, as a result of this insight into another’s experience, 
empathy is a tool for learning about evaluative aspects of objects in the world. 
I answered some of the major challenges that face the claim that empathy has 
moral value, and in the last chapter I argued that empathy is morally valuable 
in three ways. Firstly, as an epistemic tool that guides our moral choices; 
secondly, as a motivator to bring about the good to others; and finally, as a 
mediator of a special kind of togetherness with other people. 
All this I believe shows that there is value in becoming an empathic person, 
value both for promoting others’ well-being but also one’s own. I think that this 
feature of empathy as being valuable for the well-being of the empathiser 
themselves is not given much attention in the literature, which mostly engages 
with empathy in the context of morality or the ability to understand other 
minds. With the present writing I hope to have not only reaffirmed empathy’s 
positive value for promoting the well-being of others, but more originally, to 
have made a case for empathy’s value for promoting one’s own well-being via 
its epistemic value and via its bringing about a sense of togetherness with 
others. 
I think of the empathic person as someone who is skilled at empathising, but 
being an empathic person is more than merely possessing the skill of empathy, 
since one can have a skill without exercising it. The empathic person I think of 
as someone disposed to empathise in the right circumstances and to the right 
amount (i.e. without letting oneself be too overwhelmed with empathy, yet at 
the same time without remaining too distanced from the other person). In this 
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sense we can see empathy as a virtue. I am not using the word ‘virtue’ in some 
very specific way; I assume that it is not necessary to distinguish between 
virtues, excellences (of character), and good traits (of character).334 I would say 
that one possesses the virtue of being an empathic person when one empathises 
spontaneously and effortlessly in the right circumstances. 
This thesis has been an attempt to show that being an empathic person is 
beneficial in various ways. It means that one is likely to be able to bring about 
reliably frequently each of the good things that empathy helps one bring about: 
understanding of others and of the world, a well-informed judgment with 
regards to how particular actions would affect others, motivation to bring about 
the good to others, awareness of non-obvious morally relevant features of 
situations, and a sense of connectedness. Second, the empathic person is not 
just able to bring about empathic goods with a reliable frequency; the empathic 
person is skilled at empathy which means being able to empathise more 
accurately and effortlessly and being in a better position to bring about the 
empathic goods in any particular circumstance than a non-skilled empathiser. 
Also, as I argued in Chapter 2, the skill of empathy involves the skill of 
understanding how various dimensions of the human experience fit together, 
something which is independently beneficial to the empathic person in 
understanding not only others, but also themselves. 
In conclusion, in this thesis335 I hope to have made a strong case for being more 
empathic in our lives by showing that there is epistemic and moral value in 
empathising with others. It brings about epistemic benefit, informs and 
motivates our moral choices, and brings about a valuable connectedness to 
others. 
  
                                                 
334  A similar approach is used by Slote, 1983. 
335  A piece of writing which, after insertion of the present footnote, consists of exactly 77777 
words. This includes all text on file: title, headings, references, and footnotes. 
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